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The European Communi ty' s programme for the creation of the Single 
Market is now largely complete. Two specific objectives underlie the 
measures which have been adopted in the field of insurance. The first 
is the application of the principle of "mutual recogni tion" to 
prudential supervision. This is intended to allow insurers to conduct 
business throughout the Community subject only to the control of their 
home State. The second objective is that purchasers of insurance should 
be offered greater choice through the freedom to purchase insurance 
from any authorised insurer within the Community. 
The introduction of the Single Market in insurance raises two important 
issues in the field of contract law. First, the law applicable to the 
contract must be clearly determined. Secondly, consideration needs to 
be given to the impact which differences in contract law among the 
Member States have on the functioning of the Single Market. In 
addressing these issues, the Commission initially focused on the need 
for harmonisation of insurance contract law. However, as it was not 
possible to reach agreement among the Member States, the harmonisation 
proposals were abandoned in favour of choice-of-law rules. These rules 
will not result in any material change in the rules of English or Scots 
law as regards the law applicable to insurance contracts. In most cases 
the common law principle allowing a free choice of law will be 
preserved. However, the implications of a choice of English or Scots 
law as the applicable law will vary according to whether or not the 
insured is resident in the United Kingdom. 
The Community's approach to insurance contract law can be criticised 
on two grounds. First, the complexity of the choice-of-Iaw rules makes 
it difficult for the parties to cross-border insurance transactions to 
determine their rights and obligations. Secondly, choice-of-law rules 
do not address the issue of the impact which differences in insurance 
contract law have on the functioning of the Single Market. The French, 
German and British models illustrate that there are fundamental 
differences among the laws of the Member States. If the benefits of the 
Single Market are to be realised it may be necessary to revert to the 
policy of harmonisation. This would permit a simpler approach to the 
determination of the applicable law and would also make it easier for 
business to be transacted on a cross-border basis. However, the 
original proposals may require substantial amendment if harmonisation 
is to make a material contribution to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Single Market in insurance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Insurance Sector within the Community 
As shown in Table 1, the Community accounts for 24% of the world's 
insurance business. This compares with 37% for the United States and 
22% for Japan. Taken as a whole, the proportion of gross domestic 
product represented by the insurance sector within the Community is 
relatively small: the figure of 5.5% shown in Table 1 compares with 
8.8% for the United States and 9.7% for Japan. Several other countries 
also have proportionately larger insurance sectors than the Community: 
Switzerland (8.4%), Sweden (6.0%), South Africa (10.0%), Australia 
(6.9%) and Israel (6.1%). 
Table 1: Total Insurance Premiums in the European Communi tyl . 
(A) (A) as a World Share 
US$(m) % of GDP (%) 
Germany 81,043 5.47 6.70 
United Kingdom 76,401 9.38 6.31 
France 63,271 5.99 5.23 
Italy 23,374 2.50 1. 93 
Netherlands 18,999 7.67 1. 57 
Spain 13,174 3.22 1.09 
Belgium 7,009 4.06 0.58 
Denmark 5,153 4.45 0.43 
Ireland 3,880 10.42 0.32 
Portugal 1,470 3.09 0.12 
Greece 785 1.40 0.06 
Luxembourg 327 3.95 0.03 
Total EC 294,886 5.48 24.37 
The aggregate figures for the Community disguise a substantial degree 
of disparity among the Member States, with the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Ireland having proportionately large insurance 
industries and Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal having a relatively 
IData is extracted from Sigma publications of Swiss Reinsurance 
and relates to 1989. Figures for East and West Germany have been added 
together. The UK figures are boosted by substantial overseas business 
placed in the London market. 
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small involvement in the sector. Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
are by far the largest insurance markets, accounting for some 75% of 
total premiums in the Community. Given their predominance, the 
comparative sections of this thesis will focus primarily on the law and 
practice in those three countries. Moreover, the tradition of heavy 
regulation of insurance in France and Germany as opposed to the history 
of light regulation in the United Kingdom provides a suitable 
background for an analysis of the de-regulatory impact of the Single 
Market programme. 
As illustrated in Table 2, there is considerable dispari ty in the 
Community as regards the distribution of spending by consumers between 
life and non-life insurance. In the United Kingdom, premiums per capita 
for life assurance are almost twice the level for non-life insurance, 
reflecting the importance of life assurance as a savings mechanism and 
as a method of financing house purchase. By contrast, in continental 
Europe, France is the only country where spending on life assurance 
exceeds that on non-life insurance. 
Table 2: Premiums per Capita in the European Community(US$)2. 
Total Non-Life Life 
United Kingdom 1,335.7 485.2 850.5 
Netherlands 1,281.1 677.1 604.0 
France 1,126.7 525.8 600.9 
Ireland 1,105.4 412.8 692.6 
Germany 1,036.4 636.8 399.6 
Denmark 1,004.5 611.7 392.8 
Luxembourg 860.5 607.9 252.6 
Belgium 705.9 494.2 211.7 
Italy 406.3 306.2 100.1 
Spain 337.0 233.4 103.6 
Portugal 140.4 111.4 29.0 
Greece 78.3 47.0 31. 3 
Total EC 861. 2 449.1 412.1 
2Source as per note 1, above. 
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The way in which insurance is purchased varies substantially throughout 
the Community3. In the life sector, considerable change has occurred 
in recent years. In France and Spain, sales of life assurance over the 
counter by banks have increased rapidly to a point at which they now 
account for the bulk of sales. In the Uni ted Kingdom, independent 
agents4 have seen a sharp fall in their market share following the 
Financial Services Act 1986. In Germany, tied agents 5 have continued 
to control the bulk of life assurance sales despite increasing 
competition from banks. 
In the non-life sector, a distinction can be drawn between commercial 
and personal lines of business. In the commercial sector, 
internationally-orientated markets such as the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands have a tradition of business being placed through brokers. 
In other Community markets, a tradition of direct relationships between 
insurers and their clients has tended to predominate. In personal lines 
of business, brokers have generally been less active, with insurers 
relying on sources such as motoring organisations, banks and building 
societies. Recent trends in personal lines show an emphasis on selling 
directly to the customer in order to cut costs. 
2. The Single Market in Insurance 
The Single Market6 is defined in Article 8A of the Treaty of Rome (the 
EEC Treaty) as an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
3See Swiss Reinsurance Sigma publication (1992), Bancassurance: 
A survey of competition between banking and insurance. 
4Such agents are free to place the business of their principal 
with any insurer. 
5Tied agents are restricted in the choice of insurer which they 
can offer to a customer. 
6The terms "Single Market" and "Internal Market" have the same 
meaning. The former is used in this thesis. 
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accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Article 8A was inserted 
into the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act of 1986. The objective 
of free movement incorporated in Article 8A repeated the original 
provisions of the Treaty7 relating to the establishment of the common 
market. However, three factors were significant in introducing a more 
dynamic approach to economic 1ibera1isation under Article 8A than had 
previously been possible. The first was the adoption of a target date 
(31st December 1992) for the completion of the Single Market Programme 
which was only six years away. The second was the change to majority 
voting contained in the new8 Article 100A of the EEC Treaty: prior to 
this, the requirement for unanimi ty in Article 100 had given each 
Member State a veto which hindered the adoption of Community 
legislation. Finally, the change in approach within the Community in 
the early 1980's in respect of harmonisation, which put greater 
emphasis on the mutual recognition of the rules of member States as the 
basis for free circulation of goods and services, greatly reduced the 
volume of proposals for harmonisation and introduced a new impetus in 
the development of cross-border trade within the Community. 
The Single Market incorporates both political and economic objectives. 
The significance of economic integration to the broader objectives of 
political and social integration was recognised in the Treaty of Rome 
and re-iterated in the Treaty on European Union. In purely economic 
terms, the creation of the Single Market is intended to boost the 
Community's economy and to act as a staging post on the road towards 
the more ambitious objective of economic and monetary union. 
In common with other sectors of the economy, the general objectives of 
the Single Market apply to the insurance sector. However, there are 
also specific objectives. As regards the financial services sector as 
a whole, it is intended that there should be a "level playing field" 
between providers of services in order to ensure fair competi tion. This 
is particularly important in areas such as investments, where banks, 
7Artic1e 3. 
8Introduced by the Single European Act 1986. 
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insurers and other providers are competing with each other. Another 
objective is that purchasers of insurance should have access to the 
full range of products offered by Community insurers. In order to make 
this possible, it is intended that insurers which have been authorised 
by one member State should be free to market their products anywhere 
else within the Community (the "single licence"). 
3. Insurance Contract Law in the Single Market 
The initial view wi thin the Communi ty was that harmonisation of 
insurance contract law was necessary for the creation of a framework 
within which the right of establishment, freedom to provide services 
and fair competi tion could be achieved. In 1979, the Commission 
published a draft Insurance Contract Law Directive9 which set out the 
following objectives: 
"The harmonisation of contract law in connection with freedom to 
provide services and freedom of choice of applicable law has a twofold 
objective. Firstly, to guarantee the policyholder that whatever the 
choice of applicable law, he will receive identical protection as 
regards the essential points of the contract. Secondly, to eliminate 
as competition factors for undertakings the fundamental differences 
between national law. Such is the object of this directive." 
An amended draft lO was subsequently published which incorporated most 
of the amendments sugested by the Economic and Social Committee and the 
European Parliament. However, the draft Directive was not adopted by 
the Council of Ministers. Difficulties arose from the fact that the 
proposal would have involved substantial amendment to the laws of some 
Member States and that the Treaty basis11 of the Directive required 
unanimity. 
The Commission subsequently changed its approach towards the 
harmonisation of insurance contract law. This was made clear by Sir 
Leon Brittan, the Commissioner responsible for insurance, in November 
Act. 
9COM (79) 355 final. 
lOCOM (80) 854 final. 
11Articles 57(2) and 66, prior to amendment by the Single European 
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1989: 
"The forthcoming non-life framework directive will need to cover 
certain issues relating to contract law and policy conditions .... but 
it is already certain that we will either withdraw or substantially 
amend the proposal for a contract~ directive which has, in any case, 
made no progress in the Council." 
Recent measures have referred to the Commission's view that 
harmonisation of insurance contract law is not a prior condition for 
the achievement of the Single Market in insurance. However, the case 
for this view has not been made clear, wi th the result that some 
uncertainty attaches to the objectives identified in the original draft 
Directive. In particular, it is not clear why the Commission has chosen 
to abandon the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive whilst seeking 
to introduce measures which impinge on the substance of insurance 
contract law through the medium of other Directives. 
The approach through harmonisation has been replaced by rules of 
private international law. These rules govern choice of law where a 
choice is permitted, and, where no choice is allowed, they identify the 
law applicable to the contract. However, the rules of private 
international law do not address two issues which lay behind the 
original proposal for harmonisation: first, the need for an equivalent 
level of consumer protection for all purchasers of insurance wi thin the 
Community; and secondly, the distortion in competition which arises 
from differences in contract law. These differences relate not only to 
the substance of insurance contract law but also to the principle of 
freedom of contract and the extent to which laws on consumer protection 
apply to insurance. 
In the light of the completion of the Single Market, this thesis will 
analyse the Community's approach to insurance contract law. The 
objective will be to determine the implications for the operation of 
the Single Market in insurance of the regime governing contract law and 
to examine the merits of alternative solutions. Consideration will also 
12 An address to the Comite Europeen des Assurances, extracted from 
Regulation of Insurance in the United Kingdom and Ireland (editors T.H. 
Ellis and J.A. Wiltshire). 
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be given to the working of the choice-of-law rules of the insurance 
Directives in the United Kingdom with a view to clarifying two issues: 
first, the circumstances in which the contract may be governed by 
either English or Scots law; and secondly, points of substantive law 
which are important in determining the rights and obligations of 




THE SINGLE MARKET IN INSURANCE 
Introduction 
The Single Market in insurance is intended to foster open competition 
within a system which provides adequate protection for the consumer. 
Competition is expected to intensify as a result of two influences: 
first, the dismantling of national regulatory barriers wi thin the 
insurance sector; and secondly, the recognition that in many aspects 
of their business, insurers will be required to compete with banks and 
providers of investment services, who are subject to a similar 
programme of liberalisation1. There are two main objectives. The first 
is that European Community consumers should be able to choose any 
insurance policy offered by an insurer authorised in any Member State. 
The second is that Community insurers, once authorised in the Member 
State where they have their head office (the "home" state), should be 
free to market their insurance products in any other Member State (a 
"host" state). 
The most important principle for the regulation of the Single Market 
in insurance is that of "mutual recognition" of the supervisory regime 
of an insurer's home state. It is this principle which attempts to link 
together the objectives of competition and consumer protection by 
creating a system in which the responsibility for authorisation and 
supervision of insurers lies with the home state (the "single licence") 
yet provides some measure of consumer protection irrespective of where 
the product is purchased. Competi tion has been encouraged as the 
"single licence" opens national markets to insurers whose main 
establishment is in other Member States. The objective of protecting 
the consumer has been pursued largely through the harmonisation of the 
process of authorisation and supervision, wi th particular emphasis 
being placed on the financial security of insurers. 
ISee Sir Leon Brittan, "European Insurance in a Single Market", 
European Access, 1990 vol.4 p12. 
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A. THE LIBERALISATION PROCESS 
1. Treaty Basis 
As with other sectors of the economy, the creation of a Single Market 
in insurance is ultimately guided by the provisions of the EEC Treaty 
as amended by subsequent Treaties. Article 8A of the EEC Treaty 
provides that: 
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively 
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 
1992 .... 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." 
Article 3 of the Treaty, which sets out the activities of the 
Communi ty, is also important as it provides for, inter alia, the 
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market 
is not distorted and the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market. 
Insurance is mentioned only once within the Treaty: Article 61(2) 
provides that the liberalisation of banking and insurance services 
connected with the movements of capital shall be effected in step with 
the progressive liberalisation of the movement of capital. As argued 
by Chappatte2, this provision appears to relate to the movement of 
capital in the sense of the investment of funds and does not govern 
payments of premiums and claims ("current payments") which fall under 
Article 106(1). However, this distinction is now of limited relevance 
as the series of Directives3 enacted under Article 67 of the Treaty 
cover both capi tal and current payments4 and have abolished all 
restrictions on movements of capital within the Community. 
2philippe P. Chappatte, "Freedom to Provide Insurance Services in 
the European Community", 9 ELR (1984) 3. 
3Council Directive of 11 May 1960 [1960] J.O. 921, as amended by 
Council Directive 63/21 [1963] J.O. 62, Council Directive 85/566 [1986] 
O.J. L332/22 and Council Directive 88/361 [1988] O.J. L178/5. 
4See: J. A. Usher, "Financial Services in EEC Law", 37 ICLQ (1988) 
144,151. 
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Secondary Community legislation governing the Single Market in 
insurance is based primarily on Chapter 2 (The right of Establishment) 
and Chapter 3 (Freeedom to provide Services) of the Treaty of Rome. The 
Directive has been the main legislative instrument through which the 
Community has sought to liberalise and regulate insurance business: 
those which are referred to in this and other chapters are summarised 
in Appendix 1. 
2. Impediments to Liberalisation 
The movement towards a Single Market in insurance has not been easy. 
In terms of attitude towards liberalisation, the Community was split 
between two camps: on the one hand, those countries which already had 
open and internationally-orientated insurance markets (the Uni ted 
Kingdom and the Netherlands) were in favour of rapid progress, whilst 
on the other, the remaining countries, which generally had a less open 
and more heavily regulated insurance sector, were much less enthusias-
tic. Several factors can be identified as major impediments in the 
process of liberalisation: 
(a) The "General Good" or "Public Interest" 
The insurance sector is regarded as particularly sensitive by Member 
States. As almost everyone purchases some form of insurance, consider-
ations of the "public interest" or "general good" have a more obvious 
role than in sectors where the customer base is smaller. Moreover, as 
insurance in many cases has a direct social function (such as the 
guarantee of compensation for injured motorists provided by compulsory 
motor insurance), there has been greater reluctance to open national 
markets to foreign competi tors for fear that the quali ty of the 
security provided to policyholders (and injured third parties) might 
be eroded. 
(b) Consumer Interests 
From an early stage, there was common agreement among the Member States 
on the principle that the "consumer" should be provided with special 
20 
protection. In this context, the "consumer" was taken to be a person 
purchasing insurance other than in a professional capaci ty: thus, 
consumer interests were regarded as absent from areas such as 
reinsurance, co-insurance and the direct insurance of large commercial 
risks, where business is typically conducted between professionals. 
However, this is not to say that the implementation of the principle 
was without difficulty: indeed, definition of the proper scope of 
consumer interests has attracted considerable attention both in the 
negotiating process and in the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
(c) Differing Bases of Regulation 
As noted by de Frutos Gomez5, the approach to regulation of the 
insurance industry among the Member States differed widely prior to the 
adoption of Community secondary legislation, both in respect of the 
degree and nature of the regulation. Twenty years after the adoption 
of the first Communi ty measures, substantial differences are still 
apparent. Germany, for example, has a system characterised by a high 
degree of regulation, which includes prior approval of policy terms 
and conditions and rates for certain classes of business. In France, 
where a large part of the industry is still nationalised, there is also 
a system of administrative control of policy forms and rates for 
certain classes of business. These provisions are alien to the UK 
system, which focuses on the solvency of insurers but otherwise 
provides a liberal regime for the conduct of business6• 
5J . M. de Frutos Gomez, "Vers un marche interieur des assurances", 
Revue du Marche Unique Europeen, 1991 vol.3 p45. 
6As will be discussed below, the Community's system of regulation 
brings France and Germany closer to the British model. 
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(d) Fiscal Considerations 
Fiscal considerations which impinge on the operation of the Single 
Market in insurance arise in three areas7: premium taxes, the taxation 
of the profi ts of insurers and tax incentives applicable to life 
assurance and pensions. The divergence in premium taxes among Member 
States has given rise to concern that business will gravitate towards 
those States, such as the United Kingdom, which do not levy premium 
taxes. Differences in the taxation of insurers' profits represent a 
potential distortion in competition, but to no greater extent than in 
other sectors where the same situation prevails. Finally, as the tax 
incentives applicable to life assurance and pensions are closely linked 
to economic and social policy, individual Member States have been keen 
to retain control over them8. The decisions of the Court of Justice in 
Bachmann9 illustrate that it is reluctant to strike down national 
fiscal measures even where they threaten the operation of the Single 
Market. 
(e) Differences in Financial Reporting 
Standards of accounting disclosure vary markedly between different 
Member States in areas such as the requirement for the preparation of 
7See J. Biancarelli, "General Report" in Insurance Contract Law 
in the Single European Market Law Applicable, Public Policy 
~P~r~o~v~i~s~i~o~n~s~,~In~t~e~r~n~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~C~o~n~v~e~n~t~i~o~n~s, XII International Colloquium of 
Magistrates and Insurers, Avignon 4-7 October 1991. 
8Fiscal harmonisation, even when related to the operation of the 
Single Market, is still subject to a requirement of unanimous voting 
in the Council under Article 100A(2) of the EEC Treaty. Article 99 of 
the Treaty on European Union retains this requirement for unanimity. 
9Bachmann v Belgium (case C-204j90) [1992] ECR 1-249 and Commis-
sion v Belgium (case C-300j90) [1992] ECR 1-314. In both cases (which 
concerned the same facts) the Court held that a provision of Belgian 
law which required insurance premiums to be paid to an insurer 
established in Belgium if they were to constitute a deduction for 
income tax purposes was contrary to Articles 48 and 59 of the Treaty. 
However, in the circumstances, it was held that the provision was 
justified as being necessary to preserve the integrity of the Belgian 
fiscal system. The possibility of finding a similar provision illegal 
under a different national system of taxation was left open. 
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These differences are an impediment to superV1Sl0n, particularly as the 
main tool of supervision, the solvency margin10 , is largely a function 
of the assets and liabilities shown in a company's balance sheet. 
B. THE INITIAL PHASE 
The initial phase of liberalisation can be said to be marked by two 
main features: first, the adoption of a framework which allowed for 
freedom of establishment in both life and non-life insurance ll ; and 
secondly, the recognition that the regulatory framework should 
recognise a distinction between markets in which only professionals 
were active and those in which there was a "consumer" interest to 
protect. In this context, the "initial" phase is taken to cover the 
period from the creation of the Community in 1957 until 1979. 
1. Liberalisation of "Professional" Markets 
Given the recognition of consumer interests underlying the liberalis-
ation process and the difficulty in reaching agreement among Member 
States as to how such interests should be protected, it is hardly 
surprising that the first measure to be adopted was in the area of 
reinsurance12 , where there was virtually no direct consumer interest 
to protect. This fact was recognised in the approach of the national 
authori ties, who either imposed a minimal level of regulation on 
professional reinsurers13 or none at all (as in the case of Germany). 
Moreover, reinsurance was already in fact functioning as an interna-
lOIn its simplest form, the solvency margin is the ratio of net 
assets (gross assets less liabilities) to annual premium income. 
lIThe distinction between the two categories reflects their 
different functions: life insurance is often used as a form of 
investment and is generally a long-term contract whereas non-life 
insurance is generally short-term and does not constitute a form of 
investment. 
I2Directive 64/225, OJ Special Edition 1963/131. 
I3ThiS term refers to those companies whose only business is 
reinsurance, as opposed to those companies who are also engaged in 
other classes of business. 
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tional business in that there were few restrictions in the major 
markets on either establishing local operations or conducting business 
on an ad hoc basis. Thus, it was relatively easy to reach agreement 
that the EEC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment and services 
should apply in the area of reinsurance. The provisions of the 
Directive apply also to the reinsurance operations of direct insurers. 
The adoption of the Co-insurance Directive14 , albeit at the tail-end 
of the "initial phase", can be seen as confirming the approach adopted 
in the Reinsurance Directive. As the market was one in which all the 
participants were professionals and the interest of the consumer was 
therefore not to the fore, it was possible to introduce a limited form 
of freedom of services. This enabled insurers to act as "leader,,15 in 
co-insurance on a "services" basis without the need for the authoris-
ation procedure which applied in other classes of business 16 . 
The Co-insurance Directive initially applied to categories of risk17 
situated within the Community "which by reason of their nature or size 
call for the participation of several insurers for their coverage,,18. 
Thus, the scope of the Directive was left open at this stage, although 
provision was made for co-operation between Member States to prevent 
abuse of the Directive through its application to risks which did not 
require co-insurance19 . 
14Directive 78/473, OJ 1979 L151/25. Co-insurance involves the 
sharing of large risks among several insurers. 
15Article 2(1) provides that the leader should determine terms and 
conditions and rating. 
16W. Pool, "Moves towards a Common Market in Insurance" 21 CMLRev. 
(1984) 123, notes that the Co-insurance Directive was experimental in 
that it allowed the observance of the operation of freedom of services 
in anticipation of its extension to insurance generally. 
17Defined by Article 1. 
18Article 1 (2). 
19Article 8. 
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2. Liberalisation of Direct Insurance 
The extension of the liberalisation process to direct insurance, in 
which there was a considerable consumer interest, was accompanied by 
a narrowing of the scope of the proposed measures by comparison with 
the Reinsurance and Co-Insurance Directives. The direct insurance 
market differed from reinsurance in that there existed wi thin the 
Communi ty barriers to the exercise of both freedom of establishment and 
services. Moreover, as the volume of business transacted by insurers 
not established in the relevant Member State (services business) was 
minimal, the priority was to establish a framework for the exercise of 
the right of establishment. This also reflected the reality that the 
Member States were more willing to abolish restrictions in respect of 
foreign insurers becoming established within their territory, as they 
felt that effective control could be exercised over their operations, 
than they were to lift restrictions in respect of services business, 
where there was a suspicion that foreign insurers might escape 
effective supervision. 
Two Directives were adopted in 1973 which put in place a limited 
programme of liberalisation in the non-life sector. The First Non-Life 
( Establishment) Directive20 set out the principle that Member States 
were to abolish restrictions on the right of establishment, as provided 
for in Article 52 of the Treaty. The First Non-Life (Co-ordination) 
Directive21 had two principal objectives. First, it co-ordinated the 
conditions which must be met by an undertaking which seeks an 
authorisation to conduct non-life business; and secondly, it introduced 
an element of harmonisation into the process of supervision. 
As regards the first objective, the Co-ordination Directive provided 
that an insurer seeking authorisation must submi t to the relevant 
authorities, inter alia: a certificate of solvency from its home state; 
its statutes and a list of directors; and a business plan. Moreover, 
20Directive 73/240, OJ 1973 L228/20. 
21Directive 73/239, OJ 1973 L228/3. 
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Member States were required to provide reasons for declining applica-
tions and to make provision for an appeal to the Courts against a 
decision. The main feature of the harmonisation of supervision was the 
introduction of a common solvency margin22 which all firms had to 
satisfy. The purpose of this was to ensure consistency in the quality 
of security provided by companies operating within the Community. This 
regime incorporated an element of "home country control" by providing 
that the home State was responsible for monitoring the solvency of an 
insurer's entire Community business. As noted by de Frutos G6mez 23 , 
this represented, at that time, a major innovation in the sphere of 
insurance regulation in that the national supervisory authorities were 
no longer responsible for the solvency of all insurers operating within 
their borders. 
However, there was a significant gap in the harmonisation of supervi-
sion in that it was left to each Member State to lay down rules for the 
calculation of technical reserves 24 and the nature and valuation of 
the assets which represent such reserves. This had two consequences: 
first, the absence of harmonisation of technical reserves meant that 
the "common" element of the solvency margin was compromised as 
differing rules on technical reserves lead to differing solvency 
margins25 ; and secondly, it allowed Member States a considerable role 
in the supervision of all companies established within their territory. 
Thus, at this stage, there was only a 1imi ted harmonisation of 
supervisory functions. 
It was not possible at the time of the adoption of the First Non-Life 
Directive to extend its principles to the life sector as national 
22 The procedure for the calculation of the solvency margin is 
contained in Article 16. 
23 op . cit. p53. 
24Technical reserves are mainly provisions made by insurers in 
respect of claims payable to policyholders. 
25 See o. Mudrack, "Are solvency requirements for direct insurance 
undertakings in the EC really harmonised?", Journal of the Society of 
Fellows of the Chartered Insurance Institute, 1990 vol. 5, part 1, p38. 
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interests in this area were regarded as more sensi tive. However, 
agreement was eventually reached in 1979. The procedure followed in the 
non-life sector, involving two Directives in the creation of the 
establishment regime, was shortened by making reference in the co-
ordinating directive to the fact that Article 52 was directly 
applicable26 . The adoption of the First Life Assurance (Co-ordination) 
Directive27 resulted in the co-ordination of authorisation procedures 
and the adoption of a common solvency margin. It also introduced the 
principle of the separation of life and non-life businesses 28 in order 
to ensure the protection of the respective interests of life and non-
life policyholders29 . As in the case of non-life insurance, control 
of technical reserves was left to the individual Member States and 
therefore the limitations of the system of supervision observed in 
respect of the non-life sector above apply equally here. 
3. Other Measures 
Two other measures, which do not fit neatly into the analysis of the 
"initial phase" as being dominated by freedom of establishment and 
consumer interests, are worthy of mention. The First Motor Insurance 
Directive30 harmonised the obligation to insure against liability in 
respect of personal injury arising from the use of a motor vehicle: 
although it did not impinge directly on freedom of establishment or 
26This was contained in the preamble to the Directive. It is 
assumed that the intention was to refer to the direct effect of Article 
52. As regards the difference between direct effect and direct 
applicability see Wyatt & Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EC (2nd. 
edn.) pp25-26. The Court of Justice did not originally recognise the 
distinction, but, since the early 1980's, has stopped using the terms 
interchangeably. 
27Directive 79/267, OJ 1979 L63/1. 
28Article 13. 
29 ThiS followed the approach to regulation in Member States such 
as France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The United Kingdom, by 
contrast, permi tted the transaction of life and non-life business 
within the same company ("composites"). 
30Directive 72/166, OJ 1972 L103/1. Two Directives in respect of 
motor insurance were subsequently adopted (Directive 84/5, OJ 1984 
L8/!7 and Directive 90/618, OJ 1990 L330/44). 
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services, in that it did not affect the condi tions under which a 
company could operate in any particular Member State, it performed an 
important function in guaranteeing a minimum level of protection to 
injured motorists throughout the Community. 
the Insurance Intermediaries Directi ve 31 which set The second is 
s tandards32 for those wishing to become established or provide 
services as insurance brokers or agents: whilst it provided for freedom 
of services in that profession, it did not affect the regime governing 
insurers as regards establishment and services. Thus, an insurer 
wishing to transact business in another Member State could be and was 
subject to greater control than the intermediary through whom the 
business was channelled. The rationale here was that the primary 
relationship was between insurer and policyholder and justified 
limi tations on freedom of establishment and services resulting from the 
protection of consumer interests, whereas the intermediary should be 
allowed freedom of services in the pursuit of his profession within 
that framework. 
C. THE INSURANCE CASES 
The absence during the "ini tial phase" of any measures designed to 
implement freedom of services in direct insurance meant that the 
transaction of insurance on a "services" basis was governed at the 
level of Community law only by the relevant Treaty provisions. The lack 
of a developed regulatory regime, combined with the divergence in views 
among Member States as regards the speed at which liberalisation should 
proceed, contributed towards differing views as to the interpretation 
of the Treaty provisions on services as applied to insurance33 . In 
31Directive 77/92, OJ 1977 L26/14. 
32 The Directive established qualifications relating to the period 
of time during which an individual had worked as an intermediary. It 
did not introduce mutual recogni tion of diplomas, certificates and 
other formal qualifications as conditions for entry to the profession 
varied widely among the Member States. 
33This comment applies equally to other sectors of the economy. 
28 
particular, there was a difference among Member States over whether the 
effect of Articles 52 and 59, providing for freedom of establishment 
and freedom of services respectively, was dependent on harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States or whether a challenge to restrictive 
national provisions could be mounted on the basis of the Treaty 
articles alone. From a practical perspective, the issue was important 
as there was an increasing tendency in the commercial insurance market 
for buyers of insurance to place their business with foreign insurers 
for reasons of price and quality of service. 
A series of cases 34 brought by the Commission under Article 169 
provides the best guide to the interpretation of the Treaty provisions 
on freedom of services as applied to insurance. The most wide-ranging 
case was that of Commission v Germany, in which the Commission made 
three claims: 
(i) that, by providing that where insurance undertakings in the 
Community wish to provide services in Germany in relation to direct 
insurance business other than transport insurance through salesmen, 
representatives, agents or other intermediaries, such persons must be 
established and authorised in Germany and that insurance brokers 
established in Germany may not arrange contracts of insurance for 
persons resident in Germany with insurers established in another Member 
State, Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 59 
and 60 of the EEC Treaty; 
(ii) that German legislation implementing the Co-insurance 
Directive, in so far as it provided in relation to Community co-
insurance operations that the leading insurer must be established in 
that State and authorised there to cover the risks also on its own, 
infringed Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty as well as the Co-insurance 
Directive; 
(iii) that, by fixing excessively high thresholds in respect of 
the risks which may be the subject of Community co-insurance, Germany 
34 Case 205/84, Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755; 
Case 220/83, Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663; 
Ccase 206/84, Commission v Ireland [1986] ECR 3817; 
Case 252/83, Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 3713. 
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had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Co-insurance Directive 
and Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty. 
Al though the Court's decision in Commission v Germany was wide-
ranging, it is important to note that it was limi ted in scope by 
comparison with the three heads of claim brought by the Commission. The 
Court limi ted the scope of its decision to contracts of insurance 
against risks situated in one Member State concluded by a policyholder 
established or residing in that State with an insurer who is estab-
lished in another Member State and who does not maintain any permanent 
presence in the former State or aim his business activities entirely 
or principally towards its territory35. It did not directly address 
the issue of whether an insurance broker was free to place business 
with insurers who were not authorised in Germany36. The decision was 
also limi ted by comparison wi th the range of business which is 
transacted on a services basis in the sense in which that was 
interpreted by the Court: for example, services business where the 
risk, the policyholder and the insurer are all in separate Member 
States is excluded from the scope of the decision. In the remaining 
three cases (Commission v France, Ireland and Denmark respectively), 
the scope of the Court's ruling was limited to co-insurance within the 
meaning of the 1978 Co-insurance Directive. 
The decisions in the insurance cases can be broken down into two main 
issues: the definition of the scope of freedom of establishment and 
35 As regards the last element, David Edward ("Establishment and 
Services: The Insurance Cases", 12 ELR (1987) 231) has argued that it 
must be read in the context of the Court's decision in van Binsbergen, 
(case 33/74) [1974] ECR 1299, which makes clear that the major concern 
is to prevent abuse of the services regime in order to escape rules 
relating to establishment. 
36 J . Flynn, "European Court of Justice Judgements on Insurance", 
37 ICLQ (1988) 154, comments on this omission (p165): "It is unfortu-
nate that the opportunity was not taken to grapple with the issue of 
when and how Articles 59 and 60 apply to restrictions placed neither 
on the provider nor on the recipient of services, but on the go-
between. It is an issue which will increase, not diminish, in 
importance as communications improve." 
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services in insurance; and the limitations which a Member State may 
impose on freedom of services. Each is dealt with separately below. 
1. The Scope of Establishment and Services 
Although the Treaty provides no definition of establishment, Article 
52 is worded so as to apply expressly to "agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries". Chappatte 37 , prior to the Court's decision in Commis-
sion v Germany, argued that the criteria of the permanency of the 
operation and continuing authority to transact business were the 
critical factors in determining the scope of Article 52. This view was 
supported by the case-Iaw38 of the Court, but there remained some 
doubt as regards the dividing line between establishment and services. 
By way of background to the Court's ruling in Commission v Germany, it 
is useful to look at two instances in which the scope of "establish-
ment" in insurance had been addressed prior to the insurance cases. The 
first is Article 6 of both the First Life and Non-Life (Co-ordination) 
Directives which provides that a company whose main establishment is 
in another Member State must apply to the host state for an authoris-
ation if it intends to open a branch or an agency. Article 1 of both 
Directives provides that they apply to insurance undertakings which are 
established or wish to become established in a Member State. Thus, the 
regulatory regime envisaged from an early stage that agency as well as 
branch operations would be covered by the establishment regime. 
37 . t 8 0p.Cl . P . 
38Chappatte, op. ci t, cites case 33/78, Somafer v Saar-Ferngas 
[1978] E.C.R. 2183 at p2192, consideration 12: 
" .. the concept of branch, agency or other es tablishment implies a 
place of business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the 
extension of a parent body, has a management and is materially equipped 
to negotiate business with third parties so that the latter, although 
knowing that there will if necessary be a legal link with the parent 
body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have to deal directly 
wi th such parent body but may transact business at the place of 
business constituting the extension." 
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The second instance is the French Tax Credi ts 39 case concerning a 
French tax law which granted shareholder tax credits on the taxable 
profits of French companies, inter alia, to French insurance companies 
and French subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies which held 
qualifying shares t but not to unincorporated French branches of foreign 
insurance companies. The Court held that this law infringed the right 
of establishment contained in Article 52 as that right included a 
choice of form of establishment as between an agency, a branch and a 
subsidiary. Thus, Edward40 has argued that it was already clear from 
this case that both branch and agency operations fell within the Treaty 
provisions on establishment and not those on services. 
2. The Delimi tation of Establishment and Services in Commission v 
Germany 
Advocate-General Slynn proposed in Commission v Germany41 that: 
" .. in my opinion, the appointment of an agent or representative in the 
Federal Republic of Germany does not per se necessarily constitute 
establishment." 
The Court did not directly address this proposition in holding42 that 
an insurance enterprise of one Member State which maintains a permanent 
presence in another Member State is covered by the Treaty provisions 
on establishment even if its presence is not in the form of a branch 
or agency but consists merely of an office managed by the enterprise's 
own staff or by a person who is independent but authorised to act on 
a permanent basis for the enterprise, as would be the case with an 
agency. 
Taking the Court's definition of establishment in the context of the 
French Tax Credits case and Article 6 of the First Life and Non-Life 
39 Case 270/83, Commission v France [1986] ECR 273. The Court's 
decision was delivered in January 1986, prior to the decision in the 
insurance cases which was delivered in December 1986. 




Directives, it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the 
Court's decision had been well signposted and that the definition of 
" i serv ces" cannot be seen as unduly restrictive against that back-
ground. This is not to say, however, that the view of Advocate-General 
Slynn was without foundation. In some cases, an agent may be authorised 
by an insurer to act on a permanent basis for certain simple types of 
risk but may be permi tted to act only on an ad hoc basis for more 
complex risks. This situation was not specifically considered by the 
Court, but it seems likely that the representation in this instance in 
respect of complex risks would not qualify as permanent representation 
and would not constitute an establishment in respect of those risks. 
Thus, it is possible to accomodate the view of the Advocate-General 
within that of the Court on the basis that it is the presence of 
permanent representation which is the most fundamental characteristic 
of establishment and not the form which that representation takes. 
The Court's ruling also makes clear that freedom of establishment and 
services are mutually exclusive: an enterprise which is established in 
the sense indicated by the Court cannot avail itself of Articles 59 and 
60 in respect of its activities in the relevant State. However, when 
compared wi th the provisions of subsequent Communi ty legislation on the 
simul taneous pursui t 43 of establishment and services business, it 
seems clear that the Court's view does not accord with that of the 
Commission. The latter's view, applied consistently to both the 
insurance and banking sectors can be summarised in the words of 
Commissioner Paolo Clarotti 44 : 
"There exist two different freedoms (freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services) and therefore, any economic operator may 
benefit therefrom, even simultaneously, on the condition that it does 
not use the one (provision of services) to evade the regulations 
relating to the other (the right of establishment)." 
43 This is also referred to as "cumulation" or "cumul". 
44 A speech made at a seminar organised by the French Banking 
Federation on 16th March 1988 on the subject "1992: Quel Droit 
Bancaire?" Revue Banque Paris 16th March 1988 at p140. 
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This view of cumulation recognises the ruling of the Court of Justice 
in van Binsbergen45 , which was referred to in Commission v Germany. 
However, the decision in the latter case makes clear that the Court's 
view of cumulation was not qualified by considerations of whether the 
provider of services is seeking to avoid the rules of establishment: 
its view was that where an enterprise has an "establishment" within a 
Member State it cannot under any circumstances avail itself of the 
freedom of services provisions of Articles 59 and 60. 
The provisions of subsequent Communi ty legislation regarding the 
principle of cumulation show that it is the Commission's view which has 
prevailed46 • Both the Second Life and Non-Life Directives allow the 
Member States a limited option to restrict the simultaneous pursuit of 
business on an establishment and services basis47. Those measures were 
regarded as temporary, pending further harmonisation. The "Framework" 
45Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging 
Voor De Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299. The Court held that a Member 
State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the 
exercise by a person providing services whose activity is entirely or 
principally directed towards its territory for the purpose of avoiding 
the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if 
he were established within that State. 
46This approach has not escaped criticism. The Comite Europeen des 
Assurances (Position Papers 1990, p26) commented on the draft Third 
Life Directive as follows: 
"Supervision in the head office country of all the undertaking's 
insurance acti vi ty (by way of establishment or freedom to provide 
services) must not result - either de jure or de facto - in the 
disappearance of the distinction in the Treaty of Rome between the two 
forms of activity (articles 52 et seq; articles 59 et seq)." 
J. Biancarelli, op.cit. note 7 above p47, comments: 
"I personally feel extremely reluctant to follow this line of thinking 
which, in the end, via texts of secondary community law, conflicts with 
what appears to me to be the very balance of constitutional order, as 
defined in the EEC Treaty." 
47Article 13 of the Second Non-Life Directive authorises a 
prohibition on cumulation in respect of "mass risks", whilst Article 
16 of the Second Life Directive authorises a similar prohibition in 
respect of cases not falling into the category of "own ini tiative". The 
United Kingdom has not imposed any restrictions on the provision of 
services under the principle of cumulation. 
34 
Directives48 abolish the limited option to prohibit cumulation, 
thereby introducing complete freedom for insurers to pursue business 
simultaneously on a services and establishment basis. 
The Court's delimitation of the scope of the establishment and services 
regime was of considerable importance at the time in that it had the 
effect of consigning most transactions to the establishment regime, as 
permanent representation is required for most business other than large 
risks, which can be deal t wi th on an ad hoc basis. However, the 
delimitation of the scope of the two regimes is becoming less relevant 
as the completion of the Single Market will resul t in a system of 
regulation which does not make significant distinctions between the 
two. This is a consequence of the "single licence" provisions of the 
Framework Directives49 which have recently been adopted: they will 
resul t in authorisation and supervision in respect of an insurer's 
entire Community business becoming the sole responsibility of its home 
State, both in respect of "establishment" and "services" business. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the aboli tion of restrictions 
on cumulation and the continued relevance of distinctions between 
establishment and services business are likely to remain contentious 
issues during the implementation phase of the Single Market programme. 
3. Limitations on Freedom of Services 
(a) Commission v Germany 
The Court's starting point in Commission v Germany was that freedom 
of services was a fundamental principle of the Treaty: it followed the 
ruling in van Binsbergen50 that Articles 59 and 60 became directly 
effective on the expiry of the transitional period and that their 
applicabili ty was not condi tional on the harmonisation or co-ordination 
48Article 9 of Directive 92/49, OJ 1992 L228/1 (Non-Life) and 
Article 37 of Directive 92/96 OJ 1992 L360/1 (Life). 
49 See note 48 above. 
50 Case 33/74, [1974] ECR 1299. 
35 
of the laws of the Member States. The Court then identified the 
condi tions under which restrictions may be imposed on freedom of 
services, in the following terms: there must be imperative reasons 
relating to the public interest; the relevant interest is not already 
protected by rules to which the provider of services is subject in the 
Member State of his establishment ("equivalence"); the same resul t 
cannot be obtained by less restrictive rules ("proportionality"); and 
the provisions constituting a restriction must be applied equally to 
all persons or undertakings operating wi thin the terri tory ("non-
discrimination"). As noted by Chappatte 51 , each of those elements, 
which together constitute the "judicial exception" to Article 59, were 
already recognised in the case-law of the Court prior to its decision 
in the insurance cases. 
In reaching its decision, the Court was heavily influenced by the state 
of development of the Community's regulatory structure, particularly 
the provisions of the first Life and Non-Life Directives. Given the 
changes which have since taken place in both the life and non-life 
sectors, it is likely that the Court's decision on the facts would now 
be different, albeit that the principles remain unchanged. The three 
areas in which a different decision would be likely under the regime 
which will be in place once the Single Market programme is complete 
are: the requirement for an authorisation procedure; the supervision 
of technical reserves; and terms and conditions of insurance. Each is 
discussed below. 
(i) The Requirement for Authorisation 
The Court upheld the German requirement for authorisation in respect 
of the supply of insurance services on its territory. The reasoning was 
that the co-ordination of the authorisation process implemented by the 
First Non-Life Directive was limited: in particular, an authorisation 
was still required from each Member State in which an insurer wished 
to conduct business. Whilst the proposal for a Second Non-Life 
Directive envisaged a change in procedure, it appeared likely that the 
51 op.cit. pplO-15. 
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requirement for individual authorisations from each Member State would 
be retained. Thus, the Court was able to conclude that only the 
requirement of authorisation could ensure the degree of supervision 
which was justified for the protection of the consumer, both as a 
policyholder and as an insured person. 
The "single licence" principle of the "Framework" Directives 52 will, 
however, result in a system of supervision in which the home Member 
State will have sole responsibility for all business conducted within 
the Community. Thus, it will no longer be possible for the host Member 
State to apply a separate authorisation procedure: the Court's decision 
on this point will therefore no longer be relevant. 
(ii) The Supervision of Technical Reserves 
As regards the extent to which the public interest was already 
protected by rules in the Member State of establishment, the Court 
reached different conclusions in respect of the rules on solvency 
margins and those on technical reserves. It held that a certificate of 
solvency from one Member State must be accepted by another as the 
proviSions on solvency in the First Life and Non-Life Directives were 
sufficiently detailed and included a requirement to verify the solvency 
of the undertaking in respect of its entire Communi ty business. 
However, as the First Directives had left the rules covering technical 
reserves to the individual Member States, and there had been no 
harmonisation, each Member State was justified in requiring compliance 
with its own rules. 
The position of technical reserves has been altered by the Second Non-
Life Directi ve53 which transfers responsibili ty for the supervision 
of technical reserves in respect of "large" risks written on a services 
basis to the Member State of the establishment covering the risk. A 
further change will result once the Third Non-Life "Framework" 
52See note 48 above. 
53 Article 23. 
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Directive54 and the Insurance Accounts Directive55 are implemented56 
as full control of technical reserves will pass to the home Member 
State. A similar regime is provided for in the Third Life Directive5? 
Thus, the Court's decision in this area would also need to be reviewed 
to accomodate developments in the regulatory system. 
(iii) Terms and Conditions of Insurance 
In Commission v Germany the Court decided that a host Member State was 
entitled to require compliance with its rules in respect of terms and 
condi tions of insurance. This finding has also been affected by 
subsequent developments in the Community's regulatory framework. The 
"Framework" Directives 58 prohibit prior approval by Member States of 
policy conditions although there is provision for a system of ex post 
facto examination on a non-systematic basis. 
(b) The Co-insurance Cases 
The cases 59 brought by the Commission against France, Ireland and 
Denmark were concerned mainly wi th the legali ty of provisions of 
national legislation which provided that a leading insurer had to be 
established and authorised in the relevant Member State. This issue was 
also present in the German case in addition to the broader questions 
of the scope of "establishment" and "services" in insurance and 
permissible limitations on freedom of services. 
54Directive 92/49, OJ 1992 L228/1. 
55Directive 91/674, OJ 1992 L374/7. 
56 The respective implementation dates are 1st July 1994 and 1st 
Jan. 1994. 
57 Article 18. 
58Articles 6(3) and 39 of the Non-Life "Framework" Directive and 
Articles 29 and 39 of the Life "Framework" Directive. For a more 
detailed discussion of control of conditions of insurance see section 
E below. 
59 For citation, see note 34 above. 
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The Court's decision, applied in all four cases, was that a requirement 
for establishment of the leading insurer in the state where the risk 
is located infringed Articles 59 and 60. In this respect, it followed 
the approach towards establishment which it had taken towards insurance 
in general in Commission v Germany. However, the Court reached a 
different conclusion as regards authorisation in respect of co-
insurance. Whilst an authorisation process had been justified in 
Commission v Germany as being necessary to ensure a sufficent degree 
of supervision to protect the consumer, the Court held that this 
reasoning did not apply to co-insurance and that a requirement for 
authorisation contravened Articles 59 and 60 as well as the Co-
Insurance Directive. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made 
reference to the 1imi tations on risks which fell wi thin the Co-
Insurance Directive: in particular, its limitation to risks whose size 
called for the participation of several insurers and the exclusion of 
life assurance, accident & sickness and road traffic liability 
indicated an absence of substantial "consumer" interest. Moreover, the 
creation of a system of co-operation between national supervisory 
authorities in respect of co-insurance represented a stage of 
development more advanced than that which applied to insurance in 
general. A similar view as to the legality of authorisation procedures 
was taken in the co-insurance cases involving France, Ireland and 
Denmark. 
Nevertheless, the Court did uphold French measures which defined the 
scope of the Co- insurance Directive, which, as noted earl ier60 , had 
been defined in very loose terms. The effect of this was to allow 
Member States some discretion in setting thresholds for Community co-
insurance, thereby allowing them to set the boundary between those 
operations which required authorisation and those which did not. 
4. The Significance of the Insurance Cases 
The practical consequences of the Court's ruling are now of limited 
relevance to the insurance sector as several of the issues have been 
60Section B.1 above. 
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resolved by susequent Directives. However, the insurance cases remain 
important for three reasons: 
(a) First, they exerted an influence over the development of the 
regulatory regime in insurance in the years that followed, particularly 
as regards the need to ensure adequate consumer protection as 
liberalisation progressed. Indeed, the increasing erosion of their 
relevance can be said to be a measure of their success in focusing 
attention on problem areas such as technical reserves and terms and 
conditions of policies. Moreover, they remain the principal authority 
as regards the Treaty provisions on freedom of services in insurance 
should it become clear in future that not all the potential conflicts 
have been resolved by the existing regulatory structure. 
(b) Secondly, the insurance cases occupy an important position in the 
overall development of the concept of freedom of services within the 
Community. Earlier cases such as Cassis de Dijon61 had clarified that 
"indis tincti vely applicable" measures could cons ti tute barriers to the 
free movement of goods but the application of this principle to 
services remained less clear. The identification by the Court of 
Justice of permissible restrictions on services suggests that while the 
rationale of Cassis de Dijon - that products satisfying the rules of 
the country of origin should be entitled to free circulation - applies 
equally to services, the scope for restrictions imposed by Member 
States seems wider than in the case of trade in goods. Steindorff62 
takes this a step further by arguing that the Court in the insurance 
cases widened the instrument for the delimitation of restrictions in 
Article 59 to an open category of "policy considerations". Whilst this 
probably overstates the scope for action on the part of Member States, 
limi tations on freedom of services based on considerations of the 
"general good" are likely to remain a feature of the Single Market63 . 
61Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur 
Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
62Ernst Steindorff, "Freedom of Services in the EEC", Fordham 
International Law Journal vol. ii Winter 1988 no 2. 
63 ThiS is discussed in more detail in chaps. 2 and 4. 
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(c) Finally, the delimitation of establishment and services in the 
insurance cases resulted in insurers focusing on expansion into new 
markets wi thin the Communi ty on an establishment rather than a services 
basis 64 • This reflected both the limited defini tion of "services" 
adopted by the Court, the prohibition on cumulation65 and the consid-
erable restrictions on services business which were permitted. In these 
circumstances, insurers concluded that the services route offered no 
clear advantages over establishment. 
D. THE SECOND GENERATION DIRECTIVES 
Following the completion of the framework to facilitate the right of 
establishment during the "initial phase" of liberalisation, attention 
became more closely focused on freedom of services. The need to develop 
a regulatory framework to cover services was highlighted by the Court 
of Justice's ruling that Germany was in breach of its Treaty obliga-
tions in respect of its rules governing the provision of insurance on 
a services basis and that Germany, France, Ireland and Denmark were in 
breach of the rules governing co-insurance. 
1. The Creation of a Two-Tier Structure 
The development of the services regime shows a pre-occupation with the 
protection of the interests of the consumer. By contrast, those who 
were engaged in insurance in a professional capacity were not regarded 
as requiring special protection. This continued a trend which had been 
evident during the" ini tial phase" and also allowed for the development 
of a framework which could accomodate restrictions on freedom of 
services as consumer interests had been clearly identified by the Court 
of Justice in Commission v Germany as a basis for limiting the effect 
of Article 59. 
64 See R. L. Carter, "Towards an Internal Market for Insurance 
Companies", 25 Cahiers de Droit Europeen (1989) 552. 
65As noted above, the prohibition on cumulation has been removed 
by the "Framework" Directives. 
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The Court did not define the scope of consumer interests in the 
different categories of insurance. However, its identification of 
consumer interests as a key factor in the delimitation of permissible 
restrictions on freedom of services clearly influenced the provisions 
of the "second generation" Directives. The separation of the "profes-
sional" and "consumer" markets resulted in the adoption of a two-tier 
regulatory structure for the purposes of services business in non-life 
insurance: the effect was that consumer business (referred to as "mass" 
risks) was subject to a more restrictive regime than business conducted 
between professionals (referred to as "large" risks). Implicit in this 
was the acceptance of the potential distortion to competition resulting 
from the creation of a two-tier market in services: such distortion 
could be said to arise due to the fact that the two-tier structure 
would limit freeedom of services to those insurers operating in the 
"large" risk market, and thereby exclude some companies from writing 
small commercial and mass risks on a services basis. However, as the 
services market was relatively small and the "second generation" 
Directives were an interim solution on the road to a Single Market, 
this shortcoming cannot be regarded as a major defect. 
The two-tier system introduced by the Second Non-Life Directive66 was 
based on category of risk. A liberal regime applies to "large" 
risks 67 , in which case the insurer need only notify the relevant 
authorities and may then begin writing business immediately. In the 
case of other ("mass") risks, the authorities in the Member State where 
the risk is located may still exercise substantial control: in 
particular, they may require special authorisation and may regulate 
scales of premiums and terms and conditions of policies. 
As regards technical reserves, the Second Non-Life Directive provides 
that where the provision of services is subject to authorisation (i.e. 
66Directive 88/357, OJ 1988 L172/1. 
67Article 5 defines "large" risks. Some classes are automatically 
considered large whilst others are dependent on the insured satisfying 
certain financial thresholds. The relevant thresholds were doubled for 
the period prior to 1st Jan. 1993. 
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in the case of "mass" risks), technical reserves shall be determined 
under the law of that Member State, as will the matching and localis-
ation of assets. For "large" risks, the supervision of technical 
reserves was passed to the State of the establishment covering the 
risk68 , but for other ("mass") risks it remained with the host State. 
The principle of a two-tier regime, justified on the basis of consumer 
protection, was also applied to the life sector by the Second Life 
Assurance Directive69 although the definition of the areas to which 
each regime applied was on a different basis. The liberal regime 
operates as in the non-life sector but is limited to cases where a 
prospecti ve policyholder actively seeks a policy in another Member 
State, by going there, by correspondence, or by instructing a broker 
("own initiative" cases). In all other cases the restrictive regime 
will apply. The rationale here was that the person acting on his "own 
initiative" was taken to have disregarded the safeguards provided by 
his state of residence and therefore did not require the protection 
which would normally be necessary for the protection of consumers 70 . 
2. Limi tations on Freedom of Services based on the Principle of 
Cumulation 
Both the Second Life and Non-Life Directives contain options allowing 
Member States to apply restrictions on freedom of services based on the 
principle of cumulation. For non-life business, the simultaneous 
pursuit of business on an establishment and a services basis may be 
prohibited in respect of "mass" risks but not in respect of "large" 
6S A limited exception exists in motor insurance. The Motor 
Insurance Services Directive (90/618, OJ 1990 L330/ 44) added motor 
insurance to the classes that may be considered "large", but left 
control of technical reserves to the host state for an interim period. 
69Directive 90/619, OJ 1990 L330/50. 
70The Directive set out a procedure by which the prospective 
policyholder would be made aware of the consequences of his action. 
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risks71 . The intention was to allow Member States to control access 
to "mass" risks within their national markets whilst allowing free 
access to "large" risks on either an establishment or services basis. 
A similar option was contained in the Second Life Directive72 in 
respect of commi tments not falling under the definition of "own 
initiative" cases: the rationale followed the reasoning applied in the 
non-life sector in respect of "mass" risks. 
These limitations on cumulation were regarded by the Commission as 
being consistent with the decision of the Court of Justice in the 
insurance cases as regards the protection of consumer interests as well 
as the ruling in van Binsbergen in respect of the use of the services 
regime to avoid the rules relating to establishment. However, as 
discussed below, the subsequent lifting of all restrictions on 
cumulation via the "Framework" Directives does not appear to respect 
the delimitation of the respective regimes of establishemnt and 
services as developed in the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
3. A Tighter Definition of Co-insurance 
Finally, it is worth making reference to the provision of the Second 
Non-Life Directive concerning classes of business which may be covered 
by means of Community co-insurance 73 , as this was an issue which had 
not been clearly defined by the Co-insurance Directive of 1978. Article 
26 of the Second Non-Life Directive provides that those classes of risk 
defined as "large" are those which may be the subject of Community co-
insurance. This provision effectively removed the discretion allowed 
to the Member States in the fixing of thresholds for the operation of 
71Article 13 of the Second Non-Life Directive. 
72Article 16. 
73Within the meaning of the Co-insurance Directive. 
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Community co-insurance which was recognised by the Court of Justice in 
Commission v France74 . 
E. THE COMPLETION OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
1. Estimating the Benefits 
The Single European Act of 1986 established a timetable 75 for the 
completion of the Single Market which envisaged adoption of all 
necessary measures by the end of 1992. However, until the publication 
of the Cecchini Report 76 in 1988, there was an absence of in-depth 
quantification of the economic benefits likely to be achieved as a 
result of the operation of the Single Market. 
Cecchini estimated the net overall saving to consumers 77 from the 
liberalisation of financial services as being in the range ECU 11-33bn 
(£9-28bn) per annum, with insurance accounting for between ECU 0.7bn-
2.5bn (fO.6-f2.1bn). This projected saving represents less than one 
percent of total insurance premiums within the Single Market. 
However, those figures included only the direct ("microeconomic") gains 
to consumers and did not allow for the broader ("macroeconomic") 
benefits. Cecchini concluded that the macroeconomic gains arising from 
the liberalisation of capital markets, which would allow for the 
diversification of investment portfolios, was likely to be very 
substantial. If adjustment were made for this influence, it is likely 
that the relative benefit to the insurance market by comparison with 
the banking sector would be increased. A secondary macroeconomic 
benefit identified by Cecchini and excluded from the figures shown 
74Case 220/83, [1986] ECR 3663 (considerations 27-28). 
75This was incorporated in the new Article 8A of the EEC Treaty. 
76Commission of the European Communi ties, Research on the "Cost of 
Non-Europe" (Vol. 9 - Financial Services). 
77 This was based on likely price movements in an integrated 
financial market. 
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above was the likely equalisation of interest rates among the Member 
States. 
The inclusion of the effect of macroeconomic gains on the scale 
indicated by Cecchini makes it possible to envisage savings to 
consumers much larger than the one percent indicated above. In 
particular, Cecchini's conclusion that the integration of capi tal 
markets could generate substantially higher returns on investment 
portfolios represents a potential boost to insurers' profitability. If 
such returns were achieved, it is possible to envisage much larger 
savings being passed on to consumers. Thus, whilst the direct benefits 
to consumers of the Single Market in insurance may appear relatively 
modest, the longer-term benefits could be substantial. 
2. Measures to Complete the Single Market 
(a) The "Framework" Directives 
(i) Home Country Control 
The recent adoption of the "Framework" Directives 78 will result in the 
introduction of a "single licence" system under which authorisation and 
supervision will be the sole responsibility of the home State. This 
will enable an insurer authorised in one Member State to write 
insurance, on ei ther a "branch" 79 or "services" basis, in any other 
Member State on the strength of its home state authorisation. Under the 
regime of the second generation Directives this right could only be 
exercised in respect of services business falling within the category 
of "large" risks in the non-life sector and "own initiative" cases in 
the life sector. However, where an establishment in another Member 
78Directive 92/49, OJ 1992 L228/1 (non-life) and Directive 92/96, 
OJ 1992 L360/1 (life). 
79 A branch is defined in Article 1 of each of the Framework 
Directives by reference to the Second Directives which followed the 
ruling of the Court of Justice in Commission v Germany by treating 
branches ( and any other permanent presence ) as a form of establish-
ment. 
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State is formed under the laws of that State, the principle of the 
"single licence" is not applicable and authorisation must be sought 
from the Member State of establishmentBO . 
(ii) Abolition of Prior Approval of Policy Conditions and Rates 
In the non-life sector, the Second Directive had allowed Member States 
to require prior approval of premium rates and policy conditions for 
"mass" risks. The Third Non-Life Directive aims to abolish that 
discretion, although an examination of the relevant provisions suggests 
that some uncertainty remains as regards the legality of such systems 
for prior approval. 
The issue is referred to in two places in the Third Non-Life Directive: 
the first is Article 6(3) which forms part of Title II entitled "The 
taking up of the Business of Insurance"; the second is Article 39 which 
is contained in Title IV entitled "Provisions related to the Right of 
Es tablishment and the Freedom to Provide Services". Article 6 (3) 
provides that Member States shall not adopt provisions requiring prior 
approval or systematic notification of policy conditions: it goes on 
to say that Member States may not retain or introduce prior notifica-
tion or approval of proposed increases in premium rates except as part 
of general price control systems. Article 39(2) provides that a host 
Member State shall not adopt prior approval of policy conditions or 
premium rates. However, unlike Article 6(3), it goes on to say that a 
host state may only require non-systematic notification of policy 
conditions or other documents. Article 39(3) restates the provisions 
of Article 6(3) in respect of the exceptional circumstances of general 
price-control systems. 
Thus, it is not entirely clear whether Article 6(3) allows for the 
retention of systems for the control of policy conditions and other 
documents which are already in place. It is, however, clear from 
Article 39(1) that such systems will not be applicable to the 
BO This would apply where a subsidiary was incorporated in a Member 
State other than the home State. 
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operations of insurers subject to the control of another Member State. 
The result may therefore be that non-life insurers will be subject to 
varying levels of prior approval of policy condi tions and documentation 
according to the home state under whose control they fall. 
A similar argument can be made in respect of the provisions of the 
Third Life Directive. Article 29, which is the counterpart of Article 
6 (3) of the Third Non-Life Directive, prohibits Member Sates from 
adopting systems for the prior approval of policy condi tions or 
premium rates. It also makes clear that prior approval of premium rates 
may not constitute a prior condition for an undertaking to carryon its 
business, but does not make any similar provision in respect of policy 
conditions. Article 39, the counterpart of Article 39(2) of the Third 
Non-Life Directive, makes clear that a host Member State may not 
require prior approval of policy conditions or premium rates as a prior 
condition for carrying on business. Thus, as in the non-life sector, 
there remains some doubt as to whether existing systems for prior 
approval of policy conditions may be applied to insurers subject to the 
control of the relevant Member State81 . 
(iii) Technical Reserves 
The provisions in respect of technical reserves in the Non-Life 
"Framework" Directive implement the principle of home country control 
by providing that supervision by the home state shall include the 
technical reserves in respect of an insurer's entire Community 
business 82 . This removes the competence left to the host Member State 
by the Second Non-Life Directive to control technical reserves in 
respect of risks other than "large" risks written on a services basis. 
The definition and calculation of technical reserves is left to the 
81 The Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry in the 
United Kingdom take the view that the Framework Directives create a 
total prohibition on prior approval of policy conditions and premium 
rates. See DT1 Consultative Documents on the Framework Directives. 
82 Art icle 9. 
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Insurance Accounts Directive83 • The condi tions covering the invest-
ments represented by technical reserves, their admissibility, 
diversification and curency-matching are governed by the "Framework" 
Directive. 
The principle of home country control of technical provisions is also 
applied to the life sector. The Life Framework Directive84 provides 
for the harmonisation of actuarial principles used to determine life 
technical reserves but leaves considerable discretion85 to the Member 
States as regards the detailed rules. 
In both instances, and particularly in the case of life assurance, 
where Member States are keen to protect the long-term savings of their 
citizens, it is questionable whether the degree of harmonisation which 
has been introduced is sufficient to preclude a host Member State into 
which services are provided from requiring compliance with its own 
rules in respect of technical reserves. Such action would of course 
infringe the insurance Directives but might fall within the "judicial 
exception" to Article 59 if it could be established that the rules of 
the home Member State did not provide an equivalent degree of 
protection. 
83Directive 91/674, OJ 1991 L374/7. Article 28 provides that the 
provision in the balance sheet for claims outstanding, the major 
component of technical reserves, shall comprise: 
" .. the total estimated ultimate cost to an insurance undertaking of 
settling all claims arising from events which have occurred up to the 
end of the financial year, whether reported or not, less amounts 
already paid in respect of such claims." 
Article 60 prohibits implicit discounting of claims provisions to take 
account of investment income likely to be earned prior to settlement: 
it does, however, permit Member States to allow explicit discounting 
subject to certain safeguards and disclosure of the process in the 
accounts. 
84Article 18. 
85This extends to the determination of the interest rates used in 
establishing technical reserves and the extent to which such reserves 
may be covered by resources other than premium income. 
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(iv) Cumulation 
The "Framework" Directives abolish86 the limited option of prohibiting 
cumulation which had been left to the Member States in the Second Life 
and Non-Life Directives. As the home member State will be responsible 
for all aspects of an insurer's business within the Community, 
irrespective of whether it is on an "establishment" or "services" 
basis, it is argued by the Commission87 that there is no longer any 
justification for restrictions on freedom of services as consumers will 
be protected by equivalent measures in force in an insurer's home 
State. As argued by de Boissieu88 , this approach does not seem to 
respect the delimitation of the regimes of establishment and services 
developed in the case-law of the Court of Justice. Two issues 89 in 
particular can be regarded as contentious once the "Framework" 
Directives take effect. First, can an insurance undertaking which 
writes a transfrontier contract from its head office, covering a risk 
located in another Member State in which it has an establishment use 
this establishment for contract administration purposes? Secondly, is 
an insurance company entitled to conduct transfrontier business from 
its head office into a Member State on the terri tory of which it 
already has an establishment authorised to write the same risks? The 
latter is likely to be a particularly prominent issue as it gives rise 
to questions of reverse discrimination against establishments in the 
host Member States into which services are being provided, in that such 
86Article 9 of the Non-Life Directive (92/49) and Article 37 of 
the Life Directive (92/96). 
87See COM (90) 348 final (Non-Life) and COM (91) 57 final (Life). 
88Jean-Luc de Boissieu, "La directive libre prestation de service 
dommages", l'Europe de l'assurance, l'Assurance FR 16,30 juin 1988 
(extracted from CEA XII Colloquium Documents op.cit. p17) remarks: 
"the intentions of the drafting commi ttee [of the Second Non-Life 
Directive] indeed contradict the rulings handed down by the Court: if 
the thinking of the Court of Justice is respected, establishments 
located in one country cannot be used to work in that country under 
freedom of services, without deviating the right of establishment from 
its original purpose." 
89These were raised by the German delegation at the CEA' s XI I 
Annual Colloquium: see documents, op.cit. p43. 
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establishments may be subject to a more restrictive regulatory regime 
than the provider of services. 
(b) The Insurance Committee 
The adoption of a Directive90 setting up an Insurance Committee allows 
for the amendment of the insurance Directives by the Commission, 
subject to the agreement of the Committee. The latter will be composed 
of representatives of the Member States91 , chaired by the representa-
tive of the Commission, and will operate on the basis of qualified 
maj ori ty voting. Areas in which the Committee will be capable of 
exercising its power of amendment include: changes to the list of items 
which can count against the solvency margin; relaxation of currency-
matching rules; and modifications to the list of assets which are 
admissible as cover for technical reserves92 . The establishment of the 
Commi ttee can be seen as an exception to the principle of mutual 
recognition of the supervisory systems of the Member States in that it 
represents a transfer of authority to the Community, but the limited 
nature of the powers given to the Committee, in what are essentially 
technical matters, leaves the principle of mutual recognition 
intact 93 . 
90Directive 91/675, OJ 1991 L374/32. 
91Article 1 of Directive 91/675 governs the composition of the 
Committee but leaves appointment of representatives to the discretion 
of Member States. 
92These powers, inter alia, are contained in Article 47 of the 
Third Life Directive and Article 51 of the Third Non-Life Directive. 
93 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has, however, objected 
to the delegation to the Insurance Commi ttee of control over the 
minimum guarantee fund and the composition of technical reserves on the 
basis that these are fundamental issues on which insurers should be 
consulted. See ABI Memorandum to the House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Communities, Session 1990-91 12th Report, "A Single 
Market in Insurance". 
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(c) The Insurance Accounts Directive 
The recent adoption of the Insurance Accounts Directive94 marks an 
important step in the Single Market programme for insurance. As noted 
above, it contains detailed rules for the harmonisation of non-life 
technical reserves (which alone makes its adoption necessary for the 
introduction of the "single licence"), but it also serves a broader 
purpose. The proper functioning of the Single Market requires that 
insurance buyers should be able to compare the financial position of 
insurers from different Member States so as to reach a view as to the 
quality of the security which is being offered. This will be achieved 
through the requirement in the proposed Directive that insurers publish 
a profi t-and-loss account and balance sheet in a standard format. 
Moreover, insurers will be required to publish consolidated accounts 
(i. e. in respect of all their operations) and not just those in 
respect of parent companies as is currently the case in some Member 
States. 
(d) Intermediaries 
Most insurance products are purchased through intermediaries, in the 
widest sense of the word, rather than directly from insurers. The 
preamble to the Commission Recommendation95 on Insurance Intermediar-
ies recognises their importance in the distribution process: 
" .. whereas the creation of the internal market will entail an 
increasing range of products as a result of the freedom to provide 
services; whereas the professional competence of insurance intermediar-
ies is an essential element for the protection of the policyholders and 
those seeking insurance;". 
As discussed above96 , the "ini tial phase" of liberalisation in the 
insurance sector saw the adoption of a Directive97 which provided for 
freedom of establishment and services within the profession of 
94Directive 91/674, OJ 1991 L374/7. 
95 92 / 48 , OJ 1992 L19/32. 
96Section B.3. 
97 77 / 92 , OJ 1977 L26/14. 
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insurance intermediary. The main objective of the Recommendation is to 
ensure that intermediaries 98 are subject to professional requirements 
and registration. Three factors are particularly important from the 
perspective of consumer protection. First, it is proposed that direct 
legal or economic ties to insurers which might affect the 
intermediary's freedom of choice in placing business should be 
disclosed. Secondly, it is proposed that Member States require 
insurance intermediaries to satisfy standards of professional 
competence, although the determination of standards may be left to 
professional organisations recognised by Member States. Finally, it is 
proposed that adequate sanctions be applied to those who pursue the 
activi ty of intermediary wi thout being registered or who cease to 
fulfill the requirements. 
It is likely that further action will have to be taken by the Community 
to address issues arising from the different national regimes under 
which intermediaries operate99 . The need for action has been stated 
by Pool100 in the following terms: 
"Within the last ten years or so, there has been a proliferation of 
legislation in various Member States affecting the way in which 
intermediaries work. Most of this legislation is there ostensibly to 
protect the public, the policyholders, the people who might be buying 
insurance. No doubt, any piece of this legislation looked at on its own 
is admirable. The trouble is that it goes in different directions and 
there is a serious risk that if nothing is done there will be a 
fragmentation of the market at least at the intermediaries' level." 
98 The definition of intermediary follows Article 2(1)(a) to (c) of 
Directive 77/92. This includes independent brokers, tied agents and 
sub-agents whose main business is not insurance. 
99 The Commission has indicated that it intends to propose rules 
for the conduct of business by investment firms: see ISEC/B27/92 -
Background Report, "Financial Services: The Single Market is Complete". 
In the United Kingdom, conduct of business rules introduced pursuant 
to the Financial Services Act 1986 include most life assurance products 
within their ambit. 
lOOW. Pool, "Communi ty obj ecti ves and plans for insurance", in 
"1992-The Single European Market" (A collection of articles published 
by IFR Publishing). 
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F. THIRD COUNTRY INSURERS IN THE SINGLE MARKET 
The scope of the right of establishment and freedom to provides 
services is governed by Articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty respectively. 
The extent to which third country insurers 101 have access to the 
Single Market within the Community is dependent on whether they fall 
wi thin the scope of those Treaty provisions. As discussed below, 
subsidiaries are in a stronger position than branches or agencies. 
Third country insurers are therefore likely to form subsidiaries if 
they wish to benefit fully from the Single Market. Alternatively, they 
may choose to co-operate with Community insurers in a manner which 
enables them to avoid becoming established within the Community. 
1. Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries of insurers whose head office is in a State which is not 
a member of the Community have similar rights in respect of freedom of 
establishment and services as insurers whose head office is within the 
Communi ty. This follows from the defini tion of the scope of those 
freedoms wi thin the EEC Treaty. They apply to nationals 102 of the 
Member States and companies or firms formed in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and having their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the Communityl03. 
lOlThiS term refers to insurers wi th head offices outside the 
Community. 
l02Articie 52 (freedom of establishment) and Article 59 (freedom 
of services). 
l03Articie 58 (freedom of establishment) and Article 66 (freedom 
of services). 
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As subsidiaries104 satisfy these criteria, they are entitled to 
freedom of establishment. 
2. Branches and Agencies 
Branches and agencies of insurers whose head office is in a State which 
is not a member of the Communi ty do not have access to the Single 
Market in insurance in the same manner as insurers whose head office 
is within the Community. Restrictions exist both in respect of freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide services. 
(a) Freedom of Establishment 
Branches and agencies of third country insurers do not fall within the 
scope of Article 52 in respect of nationals of a Member States or 
Article 58 in respect of companies or firms formed in accordance with 
the law of a Member State. They do not therefore have a right of 
establishment. This is reflected in the provisions105 of the insurance 
Directives relating to the authorisation of branches and agencies of 
third country insurers: the Member States have discretion in granting 
an authorisation and there is no provision for an appeal against 
rejection of authorisation. 
(b) Freedom of Services 
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Council may extend the 
provisions of the Treaty in respect of freedom of services to nationals 
of third countries who provide services and who are established within 
the Communi ty. The Council has chosen not to extend freedom of services 
l04The term "subsidiary" is defined by Article 1 of the two 
"Framework" Directives for the purpose of the supervision of the 
ownership of insurers. The definition follows that of Directive 83/349 
(OJ 1983 LI93/1) which defines "subsidiary" for the purposes of the 
preparation of consolidated accounts. The scope of the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services 
is not directly related to those definitions: the essential point is 
that the company or firm has legal personality within the Community. 
l05Title III of the First Life and Non-Life Directives. 
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to branches or agencies of third country insurers106 . However, it is 
open to such insurers to form subsidiaries, which fall within the scope 
of "nationals of Member States" under Article 59, in order to benefit 
from freedom of services. Thus, the option chosen by the Council is 
unlikely to deter third country insurers who are commi tted to competing 
in the Single Market. 
3. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is an important issue for Community insurers in view of the 
ease with which third country insurers can gain access to the entire 
Community market. The issue is addressed in two ways by the insurance 
Directives. The first is the possibilty of the negotiation of 
agreements 107 with third countries governing reciprocal market access. 
The second is the possibili tyl08 of the suspension of new authoris-
ations for branches or agencies of third country insurers in cases 
where those countries discriminate against foreign insurers or do not 
provide effective market access. As Loheac109 has argued, the opening 
up of the Communi ty market to third country insurers without any 
l06ThiS is achieved through the definition of "insurance undertak-
ing" to which the second generation and "Framework" Directives apply. 
The definition is limited to those insurers who have been authorised 
under Article 6 of the First Life or Non-Life Directives: this 
excludes insurers authorised under Ti tIe I I I of those Directives 
(applicable to branches and agencies of insurers with head offices 
outside the Community). 
l07Article 32 of the First Life Directive, Article 29 of the First 
Non-Life Directive. An agreement has been entered into with Switzer-
land: see Council Decision 91/370, OJ 1991 L205/2. 
108This is governed by Article 32b of the First Life Directive 
(inserted by Article 8 of the Second Life Directive) and Article 29b 
of the First Non-Life Directive (inserted by Article 4 of the Motor 
Services Directive (90/618) ). 
109 F . Loheac, "A l'horizon 1992, quelle libre prestation de 
services pour I 'assurance", Revue du Marche Commun no.317 (1988) 271. 
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reciprocal obligation on their part calls for reflection and the 
pursuit of a solution within the context of the GATTII0. 
G. THE SINGLE MARKET IN INSURANCE AND COMPETITION POLICY 
1. Background 
Historically, the transaction of insurance business has been character-
ised both by competition and by co-operation between insurers. 
Competition has resulted from the same forces at work in other sectors, 
namely the desire to increase market share, profits and returns to 
shareholders. However, co-operation has resulted largely from 
influences peculiar to the insurance sector. The statistical basis of 
premium calculation has necessitated co-operation in the compilation 
of claim statistics, particularly in the case of small companies who 
may lack a representative portfolio of risks. Moreover, limited 
financial resources have resulted in the development of forms of co-
operation, such as co-insurance, which allow insurers to participate 
in markets from which they might otherwise be excluded due to 
insufficient capi tal. In both instances of co-operation, it is possible 
to envisage a progression towards conduct which contravenes the free 
market principles on which the Single Market is based, thereby raising 
questions as regards the relevance of the Treaty provisions on 
competi tionll1 . 
The potential for insurers to contravene the Community's competition 
rules as laid down in Article 85(1) arises mainly in relation to the 
fixing of prices and terms of trade. Equally, the type of co-operation 
llOThe "Uruguay Round" of negotiations, launched in Sept .1986 t 
deals, for the firs t time, wi th international trade in services. 
Negotiations are still continuing. The position of European insurers 
was set out by the Comite Europeen des Assurances in "Liberalisation 
of Services in the GATT Negotiations", CEA Position Papers 1990. 
lllAnnetje Ottow, "An Internal Insurance Market before the Turn of 
the Century", 29 CMLRev (1992) 511, has argued that the increasing 
competition which will result from the liberalisation introduced by the 
insurance Directives will lead to a new phase in which competition 
rules will gain in importance. 
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between insurers outlined above has the potential to fall within the 
prohibi tion in Article 85 (1). Article 86 is of limi ted relevance: 
despi te recent consolidation, the insurance industry remains relatively 
fragmented l12 , and therefore issues arising from the abuse of dominant 
market position are less likely to arise. 
The application of the Treaty provisions on competition to the 
insurance industry was considered by the Court of Justice in the German 
Fire Insurance Case l13 . The Court held that the Treaty provisions on 
competition applied to the insurance industry and that Article 87(2), 
requiring the Council to adopt measures to define the scope of Articles 
85 and 86 in the various branches of the economy, did not exclude 
insurance despite the fact that no special rules had been adopted in 
the field of insurance. In reaching its decision, the Court stressed 
that where the Treaty intended exceptions to be made to its competition 
provisions, express derogation was provided for, such as in Article 42 
in respect of trade in agricultural products. Moreover, the Council 
Regulation114 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty had made no exception for insurance, 
al though it had in the case of certain sectors of the transport 
industry. 
2. The Regulation on Competition in the Insurance Sector 
Since the Court's decision, several hundred notifications have been 
received by the Commission from insurers and their associations under 
Article 85 (3), which provides for exemption from the provisions of 
112See Research on the Cost of Non-Europe (Commission of the EC, 
1988), Statistical Annex to vol.9. 
113Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e. V. v Commission of the 
European Communities [1987] ECR 405. The case arose from the 
Commission's refusal to grant an exemption under Article 85(3) to an 
agreement between German fire insurers: this was the first occasion on 
which the Commission had refused an exemption to an arrangement between 
insurers. 
114Council Regulation 17/62 (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-62, 
p87) . 
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Article 85(1). In order to clarify the situation, the Council adopted 
a Regulation115 on the application of Article 85 (3) to the insurance 
sector. It authorises the Commission to grant "block exemptions" 
specifying agreements and practices to which Article 85(1) will not 
apply116. The Council Regulation provides117 that "block exemptions" 
may cover the following areas11B : 
(a) Common Risk Premium Tariffs 
The Commission's view, based on the decision of the Court of Justice 
in the German Fire Insurance case, is that tariffs must satisfy two 
criteria: first, they must be common actuarial calculations based on 
loss statistics to the exclusion of any loadings for instance for 
commission paid to intermediaries, administrative costs or profi ts; and 
secondly, the tariffs must be purely advisory and therefore non-binding 
on the members of an association. 
(b) Common Standard Policy Conditions 
In principle, the Commission favours standard policy conditions as they 
provide greater transparency to the consumer, who may have difficulty 
in comparing differing policy wordings. However, standardisation will 
115Council Regulation 1534/91 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in the insurance sector, OJ 1991 L143/1. 
116The Commission has published a draft Regulation providing for 
block exemptions in respect of the agreements specified in the Council 
Regulation: see OJ 1992 C207/2. 
117Article 1. 
118The explanatory memorandum to the (draft) Council Regulation 
(COM (89) 641 final) provides a broader view of the Commission's 
approach in the light of decisions made by the Commission in respect 
of exemptions under Article 85(3). 
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not be permitted to restrict competition and therefore any standard 
terms and conditions must be non-binding119 . 
(c) Co-operation on Co-insurance and Reinsurance 
These forms of co-operation are viewed favourably where they open the 
market for companies which otherwise could not enter it alone. due to 
limited capacity or expertise, or if they lead to a coverage of risks 
which is not usually undertaken by individual companies. 
(d) Accelerated and Simplified Procedures for the Settlement of Claims 
This is not generally regarded by the Commission as a restriction on 
competition, but is likely to be included in any block exemption for 
the purpose of clarification. 
(e) Co-operation in the Testing and Acceptance of Security Devices 
Exemption of this form of co-operation will be subject to the 
requirements that the arrangements are open to all manufacturers and 
that the devices are judged on purely objective and quali tative 
criteria. Recommendations on how test results affect ratings or cover 
will only be subject to exemption if they are non-binding. 
(f) Registers of Aggravated Risks 
The Commission's view is that although this form of co-operation is not 
normally aimed at restricting competition, participation in such 
systems should not be obligatory and should not deprive companies of 
the possibili ty of insuring such risks on the basis of their own 
evaluation. 
119practical examples can be seen in the Commission's decisions in 
the following two cases relating to proceedings under Article 85: 
Concordato Incendio (decision 90/25, OJ 1990 L15/25); and TEKO 
(decision 90/22, OJ 1990 L13/34). 
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3. The Impact of the Regulation on Insurers 
The impact on the insurance industry of the block exemptions is 
unlikely to be substantial in view of the clarification of the Treaty 
provisions on competition provided by the German Fire Insurance case. 
The ruling of the Court of Justice in that case made clear that binding 
recommendations in respect of rates which included provision for 
operating costs as well as claims were not in accordance with Article 
85. The other examples of co-operation to be covered by block 
exemptions effectively apply the principle that recommendations of 
industry associations must be non-binding rather than extending the 
boundaries of the type of activity which will be exempt from Article 
85. 
However, taken together, the decision in the German Fire Insurance 
case and the proposed block exemptions are likely to provide a spur to 
increased competition within the insurance sector. Whilst many 
companies will no doubt choose to operate wi thin the non-binding 
tariffs set by their associations, the freedom to operate independently 
of national associations is likely to increase competition in those 
markets, such as Germany, where tariffs have exerted an important 
influence. The experience in the United Kingdom, which has over the 
last thirty years seen the abandonment of a series of tariffs in the 
insurance market, suggests that tariff-based pricing supports higher 
profit margins than are likely to be achieved in an environment of free 
and open competi tion120 . Thus, given that the regulatory controls 
within the Community are designed primarily to ensure the solvency of 
insurers, competi tion policy should resul t in better value being 
provided to the consumer without any material increase in the risk of 
default by insurers. 
120 See Insurance, Competition or Regulation?, Institute of Fiscal 
Studies (1985). 
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H. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR 
1. The Regime for Public Service Contracts 
The Directive121 relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public service contracts includes insurance within its scope. 
The provisions of the Directive apply to public service contracts 
valued at ECU 200,000 or more. In the case of insurance contracts the 
value is determined by the premium. The Directive applies to central 
and local government and bodies governed by public law. 
There are three procedures which apply to the award of public service 
insurance contracts. The open procedure allows all interested parties 
to submit a tender during a period of between 36 and 52 days. The 
restricted procedure limits the process to service providers invited 
to tender by the authority within a period of between 26 and 37 days. 
Under the negotiated procedure, the authority consults service 
providers of its choice and negotiates contract terms with one or more 
of them: the same time limits apply as in the case of the restricted 
procedure. Provision is made for a shortening of the time limi ts 
applicable to the restricted and negotiated procedures in cases where 
urgency renders them impracticable. 
The choice of procedure for the award of public sector contracts is 
governed by Article 11. The basic rule is that the open or restricted 
procedure should be used except in the limited circumstances in which 
the negotiated procedure is permitted. There are two instances in which 
the negotiated procedure could be used in the field of insurance. The 
first is in exceptional cases where the nature of the services or the 
risks do not permit prior over-all pricing122 . The second is where the 
nature of the services to be provided is such that contract specifica-
tions cannot be established with sufficient precision to permit the 
121Directive 92/50, OJ 1992 L209/1. 
122Article 11(2)(b). 
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award of the contract by selecting the best tender according to the 
rules governing open or restricted procedures 123 . 
2. The Impact of the new Regime 
The application of the Directive to the insurance sector may prove 
problematic. The level at which the threshold for the value of 
contracts has been set means that many local authority insurance 
policies will fall wi thin the scope of the Directive. As regards 
procedure, it is the negotiated procedure, which is to apply as the 
exception rather than the rule, which corresponds most closely to 
current practice in the insurance market. Moving to the open and 
restricted procedures is likely to add to the costs of public 
authorities. Although the cost of publication of invitations to tender 
in the Official Journal will be met by the Community, it seems likely 
that additional resources will have to be committed to the process of 
selection. 
Insurers may find the open and restricted procedures to be unattrac-
tive. The balance of price and policy conditions which are acceptable 
to an insurer may prove difficult to determine other than in an 
environment of negotiation. It may be, for example, that an uncompeti-
tive tender can be transformed into the most competitive by the 
insertion of a contract term which one insurer values more than 
another. The need for negotiation arises particularly where the terms 
offered by an insurer are determined by the reinsurance cover 
available, which in some cases can only be determined at short notice. 
It is therefore likely that insurers will encourage public authorities 
to use the negotiated procedure other than in cases where there is 




The success of the programme for the creation of a Single Market in 
insurance is best assessed by reference to the objectives which it 
seeks to achieve. As was made clear at the outset of this chapter, the 
primary objectives are the creation of a system of authorisation and 
supervision based on "home country control" and the extension to 
consumers of a wider choice in the selection of insurance products. 
The first objective has met with greater success than the second. 
Whilst the working of the system will no doubt identify scope for 
improvements, the "single licence" system represents an innovative, 
and, in the main, coherent, approach towards the regulation of 
insurance business within the Single Market. Two features in particular 
stand out. 
The first is that the "single licence" will have a de-regulatory impact 
on the insurance sector. The effect will be felt both in relation to 
the ease with which insurers can enter other Community markets and the 
extent to which insurance products are subject to controls. Market 
access will be improved by allowing the transaction of business on a 
branch or services basis subject only to the control of the home state. 
Product controls within the Community will be eased by the abolition 
of prior approval of policy conditions and premium rates. Although, as 
discussed earlier, some uncertainty may exist as regards the precise 
impact of the provisions of the "Framework" Directives in relation to 
approval of policy condi tions, there is no doubt that the overall 
objective is de-regUlation. 
The second important feature of the "single licence" is that it leaves 
scope for competition between regulatory systems of individual Member 
States. This follows from the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition which has left many of the provisions of national 
regulatory sys terns unchanged. Loheac124 has argued, in rela tion to 
insurance, that competition between regulatory systems is an undesir-
124 F. Loheac, op.cit., p273. 
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able by-product of the "single licence" on the basis that the Single 
Market is not based on such a model of competition. It is difficult to 
support this view. A more sustainable analysis is offered by Reich125 : 
this views competition between regulatory systems as an implici t 
objective of the principle of mutual recognition and regards it as 
viable so long as there is a willingness to eliminate elements of 
competi tion which are undesirable from the perspective of the Communi ty 
legal order126 . However, it is important that such competition should 
not lead to attempts to dilute the impact of Community Directives as 
a means of gaining competitive advantage127 . 
The objective of securing increased choice for consumers has met with 
less success. Two considerations are relevant in this respect. First, 
the Community's system of regulation has not fully addressed issues 
arising in relation to the role of intermediaries who play a crucial 
role in ensuring that a wide choice of products is available to 
consumers. The Court of Justice avoided the issue in the insurance 
cases and the Commission recommendation on intermediaries represents 
a limited and transitional measure. However, as the Single Market in 
insurance becomes a reality, differences in national regulations 
governing the qualifications, status and conduct of intermediaries will 
have to be addressed. Secondly, in contrast to the trend in trade in 
goods, insurers have not, in the main, responded to de-regulation by 
developing products to be sold on a pan-European basis or by selling 
their existing product range in other countries. Instead, attention has 
focused on expansion into other Community countries by way of 
establishment, wi th products being tailored for each individual market. 
This reflects a variety of influences which lie outside the regulatory 
125Norbert Reich, "Competi tion between legal orders: a new paradigm 
of EC law?", 29 CMLRev (1992) 861. 
126 d h Reich, op. ci t., conclu es tat insurance regulation in the 
Community is an example of such competition. 
127The Economic and Social Commi ttee has recommended that the 
Commisssion study the possibility of setting up a European supervisory 
body designed either to replace existing national supervisory bodies 
or to put right their differences in interpreting and applying 
Directives (see OJ 1992, C14/11). 
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framework for the Single Market : they include the absence of fiscal 
harmonisation; the need to establish a local presence to service 
business; and differences in insurance practice and consumer preferenc-
es between the different Member States. However, as will be argued in 
subsequent chapters, the failure to secure increased choice for 
consumers can also be attributed to the manner in which the Community 
has approached insurance contract law. Initial efforts to harmonise 
insurance contract law failed and led the Community to adopt a complex 
sys tem of rules governing the applicable law. The result is that 
insurance contracts purchased wi thin the Single Market will be governed 
by differing provisions of contract law. Such differences alter the 
fundamental nature of insurance contracts and also limit the extent 
to which products lawfully marketed in one Member State can be marketed 
in other Member States. It will be demonstrated later in this thesis 
that consumer choice would be better served by a renewed effort to 
harmonise the essential provisions of insurance contract law. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW IN THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the way in which the programme for the creation 
of the Single Market in insurance has dealt with issues arising from 
differences in the insurance contract laws of the Member States. It 
begins with an overview of the relevance of contract law to the Single 
Market programme. The development of the Community's approach is then 
analysed in the context of the move to limit harmonisation measures 
which occurred in the early 1980's. Finally, consideration is given to 
the regime which will govern insurance contract law in the Single 
Market. 
A. THE RELEVANCE OF CONTRACT LAW TO THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 
1. Problems arising from Differences in Contract Law 
Contract law has an impact on the operation of the Single Market in 
insurance both as regards establishment and services business1. Rules 
governing the choice of applicable law are particularly relevant for 
services business as the insurer and the policyholder will normally be 
resident in different Member States. However, considerations relating 
to competition, consumer protection and conditions of insurance apply 
equally to establishment business. 
(a) Choice of Law in respect of Services Business 
In a situation in which insurance is purchased from an insurer on a 
services basis, it is important that the law governing the contract is 
clearly identified. In addition to the need to provide for certainty 
as regards the applicable law, there may also be considerations of 
IThe scope of establishment and services, within the meaning of 
Articles 52 and 59 respectively of the EEC Treaty, was discussed in 
chap.I. 
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consumer protection in that Member States may wish to limit the extent 
to which policyholders can be deprived of the protection provided by 
their own national law when they purchase insurance on a services 
basis. 
(b) Competition 
Contract law has an impact on competi tion through its effect on 
insurers' claims costs and the regulatory regime with which insurers 
must comply in the conduct of their business2• Within a single Member 
State, these considerations have little impact on competition as all 
insurers are subject to the same regime. However, in a single market 
in which different systems of contract law are present, competition may 
be distorted as some Member States may appear more attractive than 
others from the perspective of contract law. Whilst this may not be the 
most important consideration in insurers' decisions on which markets 
they are to operate in, it does form part of an assessment of the 
regulatory environment in individual markets 3. 
(c) Consumer Protection 
Contract law is relevant to considerations of consumer protection in 
the context of the Single Market in insurance, as it regulates the 
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, the Communi ty lacks a 
coherent consumer policy, but the objective of protecting the consumer 
is nevertheless explicitly recognised by the Treaty4 in relation to 
harmonisation measures which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the Single Market. 
2This includes costs such as the provision of information to a 
proposer for life assurance. 
3See , for example, Insurance in the EC and Switzerland, a 
Financial Times Business Information Publication (1992). 
4Article 100A(3). Article 129(a) of the Treaty on European Union 
elevates consumer protection to a formal Community policy. See chap.4, 
section B. 
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(d) Conditions of Insurance 
The ruling of the Court of Justice in the case of Commission v 
Germany5 made clear that consumer protection may form a basis for 
restrictions on freedom to provide services. The application of this 
principle to conditions of insurance led the Court to the conclusion 
that, in the absence of harmonisation, a host state was justified in 
requiring compliance with its rules relating to such conditions. The 
Framework Directives6 limit the scope of controls over policy condi-
tions by providing that prior approval cannot be made a condition for 
authorisation. 
However, the issue of consumer protection in the field of conditions 
of insurance arises not only in respect of administrative control of 
contract terms, but also in relation to contract law as in some cases 
contract law governs the conditions of insurance. An example of this 
function of contract law can be seen in French insurance contract law 
where many of the requirements 7 of the policy are laid down in a 
manner which precludes their amendment by the contracting parties. 
2. Solutions to Problems arising from Differences in Contract Law 
(a) Harmonisation 
Harmonisation of the fundamental elements of the insurance contract 
laws of the Member States would aim to resolve the problems identified 
above through the elimination of the most important areas of diver-
gence. It would not eliminate the need for choice-of-law rules in 
respect of services business as the national law which governed the 
5Case 205/84, [1986] ECR 3755. See chap. 1, section C. 
6Directive 92/49, OJ 1992 L228/1 (non-life) and Directive 92/96, 
OJ 1992 L360/1 (life). 
7The Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA) , EEC-Insurance Contract 
Law (1990) lists many of the mandatory requirements. The French law is 
discussed in chap. 3. 
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contract would still have to be identified. However, the need for 
restrictions on choice of law in order to ensure that policyholders 
benefited from the protection provided by their own national law would 
be reduced. 
(b) Choice of Law 
Choice-of-Iaw rules seek to resolve only the issue of the contract law 
applicable to services business and do not address issues related to 
competi tion, the impact which contract law has on condi tions of 
insurance or the role of contract law in consumer protection. They may 
provide for either a free choice of law or may impose restrictions on 
the contracting parties' choice. 
(i) Free Choice of Law 
A free choice of law may be appropriate in two situations. The first 
is where the parties to the contract are sufficiently well-informed as 
to be able to judge the consequences of any particular choice of law. 
The second is where the laws of the relevant Member States are 
sufficiently similar to ensure that the rights and obligations of the 
parties are not materially different irrespective of the choice of law. 
In this instance there is no interest to protect in a Member State 
attempting to apply its own law to services contracts entered into by 
its citizens as an equivalent level of protection is provided by other 
Member States. 
(ii) Restricted Choice of Law 
Restrictions on choice of law may be regarded as necessary where Member 
States feel that their citizens must not be deprived of the protection 
provided by their own law when they purchase insurance on a services 
basis. Implicit in this position is the proposition that the protection 
provided by the laws of other Member States is not adequate: if it 
were, there would be no need for restrictions as equivalent protection 
would be provided by the laws of other Member States. 
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY'S APPROACH 
1. The Initial Approach to Contract Law 
Contract law was not a major issue in the early phase of the liberal-
isation of the insurance market. The emphasis on the creation of a 
framework for the exercise of freedom of establishment meant that the 
focus was on contracts concluded between an insurer established in the 
Member State in which the insured was resident and in which the risk 
was located: in most cases this did not involve questions of choice of 
applicable law. However, the movement towards the implementation of 
full freedom of services meant that the regulatory framework had to 
encompass issues of choice of law which would inevitably arise. An 
obvious example would be a situation where insurance was concluded with 
an insurer not established in the Member State in which the risk is 
located and the insured resides. 
2. The draft Insurance Contract Law Directive 
A draft Insurance Contract Law Directive8 was proposed by the Commis-
sion and later amended9• Al though the movement towards a services 
regime in insurance acted as an impetus in formulating the Commission's 
approach, it is clear from the provisions of the draft Directive and 
the explanatory memorandum that the rationale for a Directive extended 
beyond business transacted on a services basis lO . This is implied in 
the opening comments of the explanatory memorandum : 
8COM (79) 355 final. 
9COM (80) 854 final. 
laThe preamble to the Directive suggests a different interpreta-
tion of services business to that subsequently adopted by the Court of 
Justice in Commission v Germany (case 205/84) [1986] ECR 3755 but does 
not affect the validity of this comment as the Directive was intended 
to apply to all relevant business , irrespective of where the dividing 
line between establishment and services lay. 
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"The harmonisation of contract law in connection wi th freedom to 
provide services and freedom of choice of applicable law has a twofold 
objective. Firstly, to guarantee the policyholder that whatever the 
choice of applicable law, he will receive identical protection as 
regards the essential points of the contract. Secondly, to eliminate 
as competition factors for undertakings the fundamental differences 
between national law." 
As the objectives of the draft Directive relate to the substance of 
contract law in each Member State, they affect establishment as well 
as services business. 
The most important provisions of the draft Directive are in respect of 
the declaration of the risk11 and changes in the risk. Declaration of 
the risk is governed by Article 3 of the draft Directive. The original 
terms of this article required disclosure of any circumstances of which 
the policyholder was aware might influence the insurer's assessment or 
acceptance of the risk. However, the second draft incorporated the 
European Parliament's view12 that disclosure should be in relation to 
what a reasonable policyholder would expect to influence a prudent 
insurer's judgement. 
Both the first and second drafts implemented the principle of 
proportionality. In relation to situations where the insured has not 
fulfilled the duty of disclosure and where a claim arises before a 
policy is amended or terminated, this provides that the insurer shall 
be liable to provide only such cover as is in accordance with the ratio 
between the premiums paid and the premium that should have been paid 
if the insured had declared the risk correctly. The second draft 
modified this to allow for repudiation of a claim if it were clear that 
the insurer would not have accepted the risk regardless of the premium 
rate or that acceptance would have been conditional on certain 
condi tions. Changes in the ri sk were dealt with by two separa te 
articles of the Directive dealing wi th increase13 and reduction14 in 
110therwise referred to as the duty of disclosure. 
12Minutes of the proceedings of the si tting of 19.9 1980 (PE 
66.785, p27). 
13 Article 4. 
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risk. The former laid down a procedure for amendment of the policy and 
provided the insurer with a right to terminate the contract: the latter 
provided that the insured was entitled to a reduced premium and could 
terminate the contract if this was not agreed to by the insurer. 
The scope15 of the draft Directive was limited to non-life insurance, 
excluding certain classes which were regarded as having special 
characteristics: marine, aviation and transport were excluded owing to 
the international nature of the business and the long-established 
tradition of freedom of choice of applicable law, whilst credit and 
suretyship were regarded as requiring further examination. Deferring 
to the wishes of the Economic and Social Committe16 and the European 
Parliamemt17 , the second draft of the Directive limited its scope in 
two respects: first, harmonisation was limited to contracts covering 
risks situated in the Member States of the Community; and secondly, 
sickness insurance was added to the list of excluded classes. 
As regards implementation, the draft Directive provided that only the 
parties to the contract could agree on more favourable terms for the 
policyholder: the obligation of the Member States was to implement the 
Directive as an absolute and not a minimal standard. Some delegations 
had argued 18 for Member States to be allowed the option to change the 
content of the Directive to give increased protection to policyholders 
on the basis that an absolute standard would have involved some Member 
States in reducing their level of consumer protection. However, this 
approach was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that it would 
frustrate the process of harmonisation and allow freedom of choice of 
applicable law to become an element of competition, which was 
unacceptable. 
14 Art icle 5. 
15 Article 1. 
16 See : OJ 1980, C146/1. 
17See note 12, above. 
18This point is made in the notes to Article 12 in the first draft 
of the Directive. 
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3. The Abandonment of Harmonisation 
The draft Directive failed to secure the approval of the Council with 
the result that a question mark hung over the Community's commitment 
to harmonisation. By the time of the adoption of the Second Non-Life 
Directive in June 1988, the prospects for the adoption of the draft 
Insurance Contract Law Directive had deteriorated. This was implicit 
in the adoption within that Directive of rules relating to choice of 
law. By contrast with the preamble to the draft Insurance Contract Law 
Directive (above), the preamble to the Second Non-Life Directive adopts 
a very limited view of the significance of differences in contract law: 
"Whereas the provisions in force in the Member States regarding 
insurance contract law continue to differ; whereas the freedom to 
choose, as the law applicable to the contract, a law other than that 
of the State in which the risk is situated may be granted in certain 
cases, in accordance with rules taking into account specific circum-
stances." 
In adopting this approach, the Commission largely ignored the views of 
the European Parliament, which commented19 on the Commission's 
proposal20 for a Second Non-Life Directive as follows: 
"Emphasizes .... the need for the Commission to submi t proposals for co-
ordinating the laws relating to insurance contracts as soon as possible 
and not later than three years after promulgation of this Directive, 
for it is only by this means that the freedom to provide services in 
the insurance sector wi thin the common market can be effectively 
promoted. t, 
A year after the adoption of the Second Non-Life Directive, the 
abandonment of the objective of harmonisation had become clearer. Sir 
h C . . . bl f' . d
21 . Leon Bri ttan, t e ommlSS10ner responSl e or lnsurance sal ln 
November 1989: 
19Resolution of the European Parliament on a proposal for a Second 
Non-Life Insurance Directive: OJ 1978 C36/14. 
20 0J 1976, C32/2. 
21 An address to the Comite Europeen des Assurances, extracted from 
Regulation of Insurance in the United Kingdom and Ireland (editors T.H. 
Ellis and J.A. Wiltshire). 
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"The forthcoming Non-Life Framework Directive will need to cover 
certain issues relating to contract law and policy conditions ... but 
it is already certain that we will either withdraw or substantially 
amend the proposal for a contracts directive which has, in any case, 
made no progress in the Council." 
By the time of the adoption of the Third Non-Life Framework Directive 
in June 1992, the Commission's position had been transformed into an 
explicit rejection of the arguments which it had previously advanced 
in favour of harmonisation. The preamble to this Directive22 states: 
" Whereas the harmonisation of insurance contract law is not a prior 
condition for the achievement of the internal market in insurance; 
whereas, therefore, the opportunity afforded to the Memeber States of 
imposing the application of their law to insurance contracts covering 
risks situated within their territories is likely to provide adequate 
safeguards for policyholders who require special protection;" 
Biancarelli23 takes the view that the abandonment of harmonisation, 
contrary to the wishes of the Comite Europeen des Assurances 24 , was 
based on the Commission's assumption that dynamic liberation by way of 
provision of services in the insurance market, should lead, inevi tably, 
to co-ordination of the different national legal systems25 . However, 
two other factors also lay behind the Commission's change of view in 
respect of the need for harmonisation of insurance contract law. The 
first, and probably the most important, was that it was not possible 
22Consideration 18. 
23Jacques Biancarelli, "Insurance Contract Law in the Single 
European Market - Law Applicable, Public Policy Provisions, Interna-
tional Conventions", XII International Colloquium of Magistrates and 
Insurers (Avignon 4-7 October 1991). 
24This is a federation of national insurance associations from 
Community countries which speaks on behalf of its members in inter-
national organisations. 
25Evidence presented to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities (session 1990-91, 12th Report, A Single Insurance 
Market) by Humbert Drabbe, Head of the Insurance Division in DG XV 
makes clear that the Commission continued to favour harmonisation 
despite the official abandonment of its proposals: 
"I t would be a logical approach if contract law in the EC was 
harmonised so that policy conditions had the same main elements in 
them, which would be helpful for consumers and al so for insurance 
companies in marketing their products. They would be bound by the same 
elements of contract law. This has proven to be impossible. Consequent-
ly, the Commission has taken a different approach." 
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to secure the agreement of the Member States to a Directive, which at 
that time would have required unanimi ty26. A major consideration in 
the breakdown of negotiations was that the draft Directive was based 
largely on French law and practice and would have required fundamental 
changes in law in other Member States, particularly in the United 
Kingdom. The second influence was the absence of a formal framework 
wi thin which a contract law Directive could be developed. In the 
absence of a fully-fledged Community consumer policy, contract law 
could be approached only as an adjunct of the Single Market programme, 
which meant that full consideration was not given to the merits of 
harmonisation as a measure of consumer protection27 . 
The adoption by the Community of a new approach to harmonisation in the 
early 1980's also played a part in the demise of the draft Insurance 
Contract Law Directive by limiting the scope of harmonisation measures 
and stressing the principle of mutual recognition of laws and 
regulations of Member States. In order to place the issue of the 
harmonisation of insurance contract law within the framework of the 
Communi ty' s overall approach to harmonisation, it is helpful to examine 
the development of the new approach 
The original Treaty basis for harmonisation (Article 100) had three 
essential features: its scope was measures which affected the 
establishment or functioning of the common market; it required 
unanimi ty in the Council; and directives were the only instrument 
through which action could be taken. Two influences in particular led 
26 The Treaty basis of the draft Directive was Articles 57(2) and 
66. The amendments to article 57(2) introduced by the Single European 
Act would probably allow for its adoption by qualified majority voting. 
Alternative Treaty bases are discussed in chapter 4. 
27 The Economic and Social Committee ("Opinion on Consumer 
Protection and Completion of the Internal Market", OJ 1991 C339/16) 
referred to the draft Directive in the context of the following 
comment: 
"Many proposals have been killed, weakened or delayed because they fell 
outside the remit of the Community institutions, not because they were 
faulty in themselves." 
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to changes which were eventually incorporated in the Single European 
Act. Each is discussed below. 
(a) The Court of Justice 
The first influence was the development of the case-law of the Court 
of Justice in a direction which gave greater force to Treaty provisions 
on the free movement of goods and thereby reduced the need for 
harmonisation. This process is best typified by the Cassis de Dijon28 
case, in which the Court of Justice set out the foundations of the 
principle of "equivalence" as a test for the legality of barriers to 
the free movement of goods. Prior to this case, there was some doubt 
as to whether measures which were indistinctively applicable to all 
products, whether domestic or imported, fell within the prohibition in 
Article 30 of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions. In Cassis de Dijon, the Court of Justice held that such 
measures could constitute measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 30 unless they 
were justified by "mandatory requirements ,,29. This approach, which 
permitted the free circulation within the Community of goods lawfully 
28 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur 
Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. The Court of Justice held that German 
regulations in respect of the minimum alcohol content of potable 
spirits constituted "measures having an effect equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions on imports" within the meaning of Article 30EEC, 
despite the fact that they were applied without discrimination as to 
country of origin. 
29Mandatory requirements were recognised by the Court as compati-
ble with Article 30 where they serve a purpose which is in the general 
interest and are the least restrictive means of achieving their 
objective. The list of mandatory requirements is not closed, although 
the Court referred specifically to four categories: the effectiveness 
of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness 
of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer. See Wyatt 
& Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the European Community (2nd edn.) 
p142. 
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produced or marketed in their country of origin, formed the basis of 
the principle of "equivalence"30. 
The impact of the development of the principle of "equivalence" on 
financial services can be seen in the development of the concept of 
"mutual recognition" of the regulatory systems of individual Member 
States as the basis for freedom of services. In the insurance cases, 
the Court held that non-discriminatory measures were illegal if they 
duplicated measures applied by an insurer's home state which provided 
eqUivalent protection in the host state31 . More recently, the princi-
ple of "mutual recognition" has been incorporated into the "Framework" 
Directives as the basis on which the "single licence" will operate. 
(b) The New Approach 
The second influence was the development of a new approach to harmonis-
ation which was advocated in the Commission's White Paper32 in 1985. 
Its essential feature was that harmonisation should be limited to areas 
regarded as essential for the operation of the Single Market and that 
the principle of mutual recogni tion of national regulations should 
apply in non-essential areas 33 . 
300liver, Free Movement of Goods, para. 6.55, notes that it was 
not until later that the Court referred explicitly to the prinCiple of 
equivalence. 
31 In doing so, it followed its decisions in van Binsbergen, case 
33/74 [1974] ECR 1299 and Webb, case 279/80 [1981] ECR 3305. 
32Completing the Single Market, COM (85) 310 final. The draft 
Insurance Contract Law Directive was listed (p26) as one of several 
measures which were to be adopted in the process of completing the 
Single Market in insurance. The likely date for adoption by the Council 
was given as 1988. 
33The essence of the Commission's new approach was communicated to 
the Member States shortly after the Court's decision in Cassis de 
Di.1on: see Communication from the Commission to the Member States, OJ 
1980 C256/2. See also the Council Resolution on a new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards, OJ 1985 C136/1. 
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The rationale for the new approach was that the recognition of the 
principle of "equivalence" had narrowed the scope of harmonisation 
measures, in that harmonisation was no longer necessary in order to 
ensure the free circulation of goods within the Community. The 
Commission, in its White Paper, emphasised the need for harmonisation 
in respect of mandatory health and safety requirements which may be 
used to justify measures having equivalent effect to quanti tative 
restrictions. 
The new approach influenced the Single European Act which modified the 
existing Treaty provisions on harmonisation (Article 100) through the 
introduction of a new Article IOOA. Of most significance to the 
programme for the liberalisation of the insurance market is that voting 
under Article IOOA is by qualified majority34. Under the new approach, 
adoption of the draft Directive would be possible by qualified majority 
voting. However, as noted above, the Commission has made clear that it 
does not regard the harmonisation of insurance contract law as 
necessary at this stage. Instead, a solution has been sought through 
the medium of harmonisation of rules of private international law. This 
represents a major shift in the stance of the Commission which had 
previously regarded harmonisation as a necessary precursor of the 
limi ted freedom of services introduced by the "second generation" 
Di recti ves35 . 
C. THE PROPOSED REGIME FOR INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW 
The ostensible aim of the provisions of the insurance Directives in 
respect of choice of law is to harmonise rules of private international 
law, but the influence of harmonisation of substantive law can still 
be seen. Indeed, the combination of provisions falling into the two 
separate categories under the heading of choice of law introduces an 
34The extension of legislative instruments to include Regulations 
as well as Directives has been less significant as the bulk of the 
Single Market programme in insurance is comprised of Directives. 
35 The implementation date set by the draft Insurance Contract Law 
Directive was 1st July, 1983. 
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element of confusion into the approach to contract law. Harmonisation 
of substantive law and harmonisation of private international law rules 
represent different, albeit complementary, techniques: the former 
effectively eliminates the areas of divergence, whereas the latter 
ensures that different national rules can co-exist in an orderly 
fashion. In recognition of this distinction, it is most useful to 
analyse the existing provisions and proposals in respect of contract 
law in terms of those which represent harmonisation of rules of private 
international law and those which represent harmonisation of substan-
tive (insurance contract) law. 
1. Harmonisation of Private International Law 
Two general principles apply to the harmonisation which has taken place 
in both the life and non-life sectors. The first is that the provi-
sions 36 of the Communi ty Directives are to be applied by way of 
derogation from a Member State's general rules of private international 
law37 : thus, the insurance Directives introduce a new layer of rules 
which complicate the overall structure of private international law in 
the field of insurance contracts. Secondly, as in the case of the 
"second generation" Directives, the policy of establishing a liberal 
regime for "large" non-life risks and a more restrictive regime for 
other risks has been applied to the choice-of-Iaw rules. The effect is 
that freedom of choice of contract law has been substantially limited 
in the case of "mass" risks and life assurance. 
The extent to which the choice-of-Iaw provisions of the insurance 
Directives are relevant to the public law38 provisions of the Member 
States is not clear. The issue is of importance as public law 
36They are set out in Annex 1 to this chapter. 
37Article 7(3) of the Second Non-Life Directive, Article 4(5) of 
the Second Life Directive. 
38The law of insurance regulation (authorisation and supervision 
of insurers) forms part of public law. 
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provisions in the field of insurance can have a direct bearing on the 
contractual relationship between insurer and policyholder, for example 
by fixing the terms of the contract39 . The Rome Contracts Conven-
tion40 , which served as the model for several of the provisions of the 
insurance Directives, does not provide clear guidance. Jackson41 has 
argued that the Rome Convention encompasses rules of public law on the 
grounds that there is no express exclusion and that the categorisation 
of laws as public or private does not represent a valid boundary within 
the process of conflict of laws. However, Philips42 has argued for the 
exclusion of public law rules from the scope of the Rome Convention on 
the basis that choice-of-law rules have traditionally been confined to 
private law and that public law rules are superior to choice-of-law 
rules, or "internationally mandatory" in the sense discussed below. 
Philips' argument appears to be the more convincing of the two, in 
that, as discussed below, both the Rome Convention and the insurance 
Directives contain provisions which ensure the superiority of public 
law rules of the forum over choice-of-law rules. 
39 In this case, the public law prOV1Sl0n is described as self-
executing: see Kimball and Pfennigstorf, "Legislative and Judicial 
Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of 
American and European Practice", 39 Indiana Law Journal (1964) 675. 
400J 1980, L266/1, as amended following the accession of new 
Member States (OJ 1984, L146/1). 
41 Chap . 4, "The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractu-
al Obligations: A Comparative Study", in Contract Conflicts: the EEC 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: A 
Comparative Study (editor, P.M. North). 
420p . ci t. North (edi tor), chap. 5, "Mandatory Rules, Public Law 
(Political Rules) and Choice of Law in the EEC Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations". 
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(a) Non-Life Insurance 
(i) Basic Principles 
The regime governing choice of law is contained mainly in Article 7 of 
the Second Non-Life Directive: the Third Directive leaves this regime 
largely intact 43 . The provisions of both Directives are limi ted to 
risks si tuated44 wi thin the Member States. A distinction is drawn 
between "large" risks in respect of which the parties to the contract 
are allowed complete freedom in the choice of law and other risks 
("mass" risks) in respect of which the aim is to apply the most 
appropriate national law. The rules for the selection of the most 
appropriate national law represent a minimum level of choice: 
individual Member States are free to allow the parties greater freedom 
of choice45 . 
The central principle for the selection of the applicable law for 
"mass" risks is the identification of the Member State with which the 
contract is most closely connected. Where a policyholder has his 
habi tual residence wi thin the Member State in which the risk is 
situated, the law applicable to the insurance contract shall be the law 
of that Member State46 . If the risk is situated in a Member State 
other than the home country of the policyholder, the parties may choose 
the law of either Member State47 . In the latter case, where the law 
43Earlier drafts of the Third Directive had proposed several 
amendments to Article 7 of the Second Directive. However the final text 
of the Third Directive (Article 27) contains only one change to Article 
7: it extends the category of risks in respect of which the parties may 
choose any law to all "large" risks within the meaning of Article Sed) 
of the First Directive. Article 7 of the Second Directive had limited 
this category to Article S(d)(i} of the First Directive. 
44The words "situated within" are defined in Article 2(d} of the 
Second Non-Life Directive. See Annex 1 for the wording of this Article. 
45Article 7(1)(d) of the Second Non-Life Directive. 
46Article 7(1}(a} of the Second Directive. 
47Article 7(1)(b) of the Second Directive. 
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A choice of law must be expressed or demonstrated wi th reasonable 
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case. If this is not so, or if no choice has been made, the contract 
shall be governed by the law of the country, from amongst those 
considered in the provisions governing the applicable law in the 
absence of choice 48 , with which it is most closely connected. Never-
theless, a severable part of the contract which has a closer connection 
with another country, from amongst those considered in the provisions 
on choice, may, by way of exception, be governed by the law of that 
other country (the principle of "depec;age"). The contract shall be 
rebuttably presumed to be most closely connected with the Member State 
in which the risk is situated49 . 
The Framework Directive50 provides that, before an insurance contract 
is concluded, the insurer shall inform the policyholder of the 
applicable law, where there is no choice, or the proposed choice of law 
where there is a choice. The insurer must also inform the policyholder 
of arrangements for handling policyholders' complaints. 
(ii) Limitations on Freedom of Choice 
Freedom of choice in respect of "large" risks and the rules applicable 
to "mass" risks are qualified by certain other provisions. The most 
important is the possibility of the application of mandatory rules of 
another law. As noted by Smulders and Glazener51 , Article 7 of the 
Second Directive refers to two categories of mandatory rules: first, 
those from which no derogation is possible by means of a contract 52 ; 
48Article l(a), (b) and (g). 
49 ThiS paragraph paraphrases the provisions of Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Second Directive. 
50Article 31. The obligation applies only where the policyholder 
is a natural person. 
51"Harmonization in the Field of Insurance Law through the 
introduction of Community Rules of Conflict" 29 CMLRev (1992) 775. 
52Article 7(1)(g). The French Code des Assurances contains many 
examples of such rules: see chap. 3. 
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those from which no derogation is possible by means of a contract 52 ; 
and secondly, rules which apply irrespective of the law applicable to 
the contract53 . 
As regards the first category, Article 7(1)(g) provides that the 
exercise of a choice of law under the provisions of Article 7(1)(a) or 
Article 7(f) shall not prejudice the application of mandatory rules 
where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
choice are connected with one Member State only54. The purpose of this 
provision is to ensure that, in a purely domestic situation, choice of 
a foreign law will not deprive a policyholder of the protection 
afforded by the law of his own Member State55 . 
The second category56 refers to rules that apply irrespective of the 
law otherwise applicable to the contract57 . The first paragraph of 
Article 7(2) provides a general escape from the choice-of-Iaw rules of 
the Second Directive by providing for the application of such laws 
where they form part of the law of the forum. The second paragraph of 
Article 7(2) provides a discretion to a Court to apply such rules where 
52Article 7(1)(g). The French Code des Assurances contains many 
examples of such rules: see chap. 3. 
53 Article 7 (2) . 
54Article 7 (1) (g) refers only to a choice made under Article 
7(1)(a) and Article 7(1)(f) as in other cases falling within Article 
7 not all the elements are connected to the law of a single Member 
State. 
55 It is modelled on Article 3(3) of the Rome Contracts Convention. 
56 Article 7 (2) . 
57 They are referrred to as rules of immediate application or 
internationally mandatory rules (regles d' application immediate or 
eingriffsnormen). Their origins in private international law appear to 
lie in the "sonderstatut" theory adopted by the Netherlands Supreme 
Court in the Alna tt i case (BGHZ 59, 82) of 1966. Smulders and 
Glazener, op.cit., and Phillips, op.cit., maintain that the House of 
Lords adopted a similar rule in 1957 in the case of Regazzoni v K.C. 
Sethia Ltd. [1958] AC 301, but Richard Plender (The European Contracts 
Convention, p153) maintains that the principle has found no favour in 
English law. 
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they form part of the law of the Member State in which the risk is 
si tuated or the Member State imposing the obligation to take out 
insurance58 . The first paragraph of Article 7(2) clearly envisages the 
application by the forum of its own rules of public law as well as 
private law, but it is not clear that the discretion referred to in the 
second paragraph extends to the public law of another Member State59 . 
Freedom of choice of law is limited in respect of compulsory insurance 
by the provision that a contract shall not satisfy an obligation, 
imposed by a Member State, to take out insurance, unless it is in 
accordance with the specific provisions laid down by that Member State 
in respect of that insurance60 . When, in the case of compulsory insur-
ance, the law of the Member State in which the risk is situated and the 
law of the Member State imposing the obligation to take out insurance 
contradict each other, the latter shall prevail. 
(b) Life Assurance 
Although there are some similarities in approach, freedom of choice of 
applicable law is much more restricted in the life sector than in the 
non-life sector, reflecting the greater senSitivity with which Member 
Sates have approached consumer interests in respect of life business. 
The provisions for the harmonisation of private international law in 
the life sector are less complex than in the non-life sector. The 
58 This prOV1Slon is modelled on Article 7(1) of the Rome Contracts 
Convention. Richard Plender, op.cit. p22, notes that, on ratification, 
the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the FRG and Ireland exercised the 
option under Article 22 to declare that they would not apply the 
provisions of Article 7(1) of that Convention. 
59Comparison can be made with Article 7(1) of the Rome Contracts 
Convention (RCC) on which the second paragraph of Article 7(2) of the 
Second Non-Life Directive is modelled. Philips, op.cit. pl0S, takes the 
view that the legislative history of Article 7(1) of the RCC indicates 
that its scope includes public law rules. In this respect, he argues 
that it represents an exception to the general rule of the RCC, which 
he maintains to be that a choice of law does not encompass rules of 
public law. 
60Article 8(2) of the Second Directive. 
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complications in the non-life provisions resulting from the risk and 
the insured being in separate Member States are not generally present 
as the risk and the policyholder are generally the same individual. 
However, although the rules are less complex, the same general 
principles apply as in the non-life sector: first, the rules apply by 
way of derogation from a Member State's general rules of private 
international law61 ; and secondly, Member States are free to make 
provision for a wider choice of law than is prescribed by the Second 
Life Directive. 
The basic principle62 is that the law applicable to contracts shall 
be the law of the Member State of the commitment63 . A wider choice may 
be available in two situations. First, where the law of that state so 
allows, the parties may choose the law of another country. Secondly, 
where the policyholder has his habitual residence in a Member State 
other than that of which he is a national, the parties may choose the 
law of the Member State of which he is a nationa164 . 
As regards reference to the mandatory rules of another law, the Member 
States retain greater discretion than in the case of non-life 
insurance. The Second Life Directive makes no reference to rules from 
which no derogation is possible by means of contract. Thus, it appears 
that, unlike the position in respect of non-life risks65 , it is left 
to the laws of the Member State to decide whether a choice of law can 
61 Article 4 (5) . 
62Article 4( 1) . 
63AcCording to Article 2(e), the Member State of the commitment: 
"means the Member State where the policyholder has his habi tual 
residence, or if the policyholder is a legal person, the Member State 
where the latter's establishment, to which the contract relates, is 
situated;". 
64Article 4(2). 
65Article 7(l)(g) of the Second Non-Life Directive limits the 
application of rules from which no derogation is possible by contract 
through a requirement that the other elements of the situation must be 
connected with the relevant Member State. 
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prejudice the application of its mandatory rules 66 • In the case of 
rules which apply irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract (internationally mandatory rules), the provisions of the 
Second Life Directive (Article 4(2) ) are similar to those of the 
Second Non-Life Directive (Article 7(2) ). 
The Third Life Directive67 makes no material change to the choice-of-
law provisions of the Second Life Directive. The explanatory memoran-
dum68 makes clear that the normal procedure will be for a Member 
State, having received notice from an insurer established in another 
Member State to the effect that it intends to supply insurance on a 
services basis, to make clear that it expects its own law to govern the 
contract. 
2. Harmonisation of Contract Law 
(a) The Consumer Contracts Directive 
Before moving on to consider the specific provisions of the insurance 
Directives which impinge on the substance of contract law, reference 
should be made to the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts69 . The purpose of the Directive is to approximate the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating 
to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and 
a consumer. Only terms which have not been individually negotiated 
(i.e. standard form contracts) are included within the scope of the 
Directive. Several categories of contract are excluded from the scope 
66 This is the interpretation of Article 4 of the Second Life 
Directive adopted by Smulders and Glazener, op. cit. p787. 
67Directive 92/96, OJ 1992 L360/1. 
68This accompanied the Commission's proposal: COM (91) 57 final. 
69Directive 93/13. OJ 1993 L95/29. The Directive applies to 
contracts concluded after 31 December 1994. 
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of the Directive70 . The definition of "consumer" is intended to cover 
only individuals acting in a private capacity, whereas the definition 
of "seller or supplier" relates to individuals or firms acting in a 
business capacity. Unfair terms are defined by Article 3 as follows: 
"A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall 
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, 
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obliga-
tions arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer." 
The concept of good faith is clarified by the preamble 71 which 
provides that: 
" .. whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard 
shall be had to the strength of the bargaining position of the 
parties .. " 
Article 4(2) of the Directive is of particular relevance to insurance. 
It provides that: 
"Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to 
the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the 
adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the 
services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other, in so far as 
these terms are in plain intelligible language." 
Paragraph 19 of the preamble clarifies Article 4(2) as follows: 
" ... whereas it follows, inter alia, that in insurance contracts, the 
terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the 
insurer's liability shall not be subject to such assessment since these 
restrictions are taken into account in calculating the premium paid by 
the consumer;" 
Two issues arise in relation to the treatment of insurance in this 
Directive. First, as noted by Duffy72, it is possible to question the 
use of a preamble for the purposes of clarifying or qualifying the text 
of a Directive. However, there are two reasons why the exclusion of 
70These are: contracts of employment; contracts 
succession rights; contracts relating to rights under 
contracts relating to the incorporation and organization 
and partnership agreements. See para.lO of the preamble. 




72peter Duffy, "Unfair contract terms in the draft EC Directive", 
1993 JBL 67. 
88 
the preambles to Communi ty measures such as Directives 73. Secondly. 
it would be possible to interpret Article 4(2), even in the absence of 
paragraph 19 of the preamble, as leading logically to the conclusion 
expressed in that paragraph. 
The second issue is the question of whether there are any insurance 
contract terms which fall wi thin the Directive. This depends on a 
judgement as to the scope of the phrase "terms which define or 
circumscribe the insured risk and the insurer's liabili ty" in paragraph 
19 of the preamble. It is submitted that there are insurance contract 
terms, such as those governing claims notification, which fall outside 
the scope of this phrase and are therefore covered by the Directive. 
This leads to the unsatisfactory conclusion that the fundamental terms 
of an insurance contract are excluded from the Directive but that less 
important terms may be covered. 
(b) The Insurance Directives 
The provisions of the insurance Directives which represent harmoni-
sation of contract law are those in respect of the "cooling-off" period 
and those which are entitled "transparency". The latter have not been 
generally recognised as impinging on the substance of contract law
74
, 
but, as argued below, they can be seen in this light. 
(i) "Cooling-off" 
73Duffy, op.cit., cites case (C-I06/89) Marleasing S.A. v La 
Commercial [1990] ECR 4135 in support of this view. In that case, the 
Court referred to the preamble to the Firs t Company Law Oi rect i ve 
(68/151) . 
74Smulders & Glazener, op.cit. p778, take the view that: 
"the present insurance directives harmonise only one rule of contract 
law, enabling a policyholder who concludes an individual life insurance 
contract to cancel it within a certain time limit." 
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(i) "Cooling-off" 
The purpose of the "cooling-off" period is to allow a policyholder a 
period of time in which to cancel a contract which, under the normal 
principles of contract law, would be binding. The Second Li fe Directive 
provides that where a contract is entered into on a services basis, a 
policyholder shall have a period of between 14 and 30 days from the 
time he was informed that the contract had been concluded within which 
to cancel the contract. This right is extended by the the Third Life 
Directive to include business transacted on an establishment as well 
as a services basis75 : however, where the policyholder is not in need 
of special protection, Member States need not allow for a right of 
cancellation76 . 
The consequences of failure to comply with the requirement to provide 
the policyholder with a "cooling-off" notice are not made clear: this 
is left to be determined by the law applicable to the contract as 
defined in Article 4 of the Second Directive. Thus, it has been 
observed that, as far as English law is concerned, this might appear 
to provide the policyholder with a right, unlimited in time, to cancel 
the contract 77. Nevertheless, this deficiency does not change the 
nature of the "cooling-off" period as a modification of the substance 
of the normal rules of contract law which do not allow cancellation on 
the grounds that one party has simply had a change of mind. 
75 Article 30 (1) . 
76Article 30(2). Member States may also decide whether or not to 
apply the cancellation rules to contracts of six months' duration or 
less. 
77This point was made by The English Law Society in its response 
to the Consultative Document on the Third Life Directive published by 
the DTI. I t was also observed tha t there was no provision for a 
"cooling-off" period where a third party interest is concerned (e.g. 
a mortgage-linked policy). 
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(ii) Transparency 
The second example of harmonisation of contract law within the 
insurance Directives is contained in the provisions of the Third Life 
Directive regarding "transparency". These relate to matters in respect 
of which the policyholder is required to receive information before he 
enters into a contract (such as distribution of profit participation 
and surrender values) and issues78 on which he must be kept informed 
throughout the term of the contract (mainly changes to the initial 
information). Once again, the legal effect of failure to comply would 
be determined under the applicable law, but it seems clear that the 
creation of the obligation of disclosure impinges on the substance of 
contract law. 
3. Insurance within the General Rules of Private International Law 
As has already been noted, the provisions of the insurance Directives 
on the harmonisation of rules of private international law apply by way 
of derogation from the general rules of the Member States in this 
field. Those general rules are to a substantial degree founded on two 
Conventions: the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 79 ; and the 
1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions 80 • 
The Brussels Convention is based on the fourth indent of Article 220 
of the Treaty of Rome. The Rome Convention has no formal Treaty basis: 
78 The required items are listed in Annex 2 of the Third Life 
Directive. 
79 0J 1978, L304/36. The Convention is in force for all Member 
States. The Lugano Convention 1988 (OJ 1988 L319/9) extended the 
Brussels Convention to EFTA countries. 
800J 1980, L266/1, as amended following the accession of new 
Member States (OJ 1984, L146/1). The Rome Convention is in force for 
all Member States except Spain, Ireland. the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Under the terms of the Convention, the date for entry into force in the 
UK was 1 April 1991. See also chap. 5, part 1. 
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however, only Member States of the Community may sign it and there is 
some basis for holding that it should be interpreted in the light of 
the EEC Treaty81. Both Conventions are expressly subordinated82 to 
existing or subsequent acts of Community institutions which relate to 
particular matters within the scope of the respective Conventions, so 
that the provisions of the insurance Directives take precedence over 
the provisions of the Conventions. 
(a) Jurisdiction 
The insurance Directives do not deal with issues of jurisdiction (being 
confined to choice of applicable law). Jurisdiction is governed by the 
Brussels Convention83 , whose general rule84 of jurisdiction is that 
persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their 
nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. However, this is 
subject to special rules85 in the case of insurance. The objective of 
the parties to the Treaty was to protect the insured who was seen as 
being in a weaker economic position than the insurer86 . The result is 
that the following courts have jurisdiction in respect of a defendant 
insurer, when the insurer is domiciled in a Contracting State; 
1. Courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant insurer 
is domiciled; 
8lThis contention is made by Richard Plender, op.cit. p8, on the 
basis of the decision of the Court of Justice in Tessili v Dunlop, case 
12/76 [1976] ECR 1473; 
"Accordingly, the Convention must be interpreted having regard both to 
its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the [EEC] 
Treaty" (p.1484). 
82Article 20 of the Rome Convention, Article 57 of the Brussels 
Convention. 
830n the Brussels Convention's approach to insurance see P. Kaye, 
Civil Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements, Part 5, 
Section IV (A) . 
84Article 2. 
85Title II, Section 3 (Articles 7 to 12) of the Brussels Conven-
tion deals with insurance. 
86 See the Jenard Report on the Convention, OJ 1979 C59/1 and 66, 
pp 28-33. 
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2. Courts for the place in which the insurer's branch, agency or 
other establishment is situated, as regards a dispute arising out 
of the operations thereof; 
3. Courts of the place of the policyholder's Contracting State 
domicile at the date of the institution of proceedings; 
4. Where the defendant is a co-insurer, courts of a Contracting 
State in which proceedings are brought against the leading 
insurer; 
5. In liability insurance and insurance of immovable (and in 
ceratin cases, movable) property, courts of the place where the 
harmful event occurred; 
6. In respect of liability insurance, courts in which the insured 
is sued by the injured party. 
The rules governing jurisdiction in actions brought by insurers are 
more restrictive. They provide that the following courts have 
jurisdiction: 
1. Courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is 
domiciled; 
2. Courts seised of a direct action by an injured party against 
an insurer; 
3. A court in which an original claim is pending in accordance 
wi th Section 3 (governing insurance) on a counterclaim by a 
defendant insurer against the plaintiff; 
4. As regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a 
branch, agency or other establishment, courts for the place in 
which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated. 
Thus, even before the issue of applicable law falls to be considered, 
the question of jurisdiction in insurance cases raises special 
considerations. 
(b) Applicable Law 
The insurance Directives take precedence over the Rome Convention, but 
the latter, as part of the general rules of the Member States in 
relation to private international law, applies in situations not 
covered by the Directives: these include reinsurance and risks outside 
the Community. This results from the fact that the scope of the Rome 
Convention excludes insurance (but not reinsurance) of risks situated 
in the territories of the Member States87 , but not risks outside those 
terri tories, whilst the insurance Directives apply only to direct 
insurance risks situated within the Community. 
87Article 1(3). 
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Thus, insurance can be split into four different categories 88 as 
regards the applicable rules of private international law: 
1. Direct life and non-life risks within the Community are 
governed by the provisions of the insurance Directives. 
2. Direct life and non-life risks outside the Community are 
governed by the Rome Convention. 
3. Reinsurance is governed by the Rome Convention. 
4. Direct life and non-life risks wi thin the Community but 
outside the scope of the insurance Directi ves B9 are excluded 
from the provisions of both the insurance Directives and the Rome 
Convention and are governed by the national choice-of-Iaw rules 
of the forum. The latter also govern contracts concluded prior 
to the entry into force of the Rome Convention90 or insurance 
Directives. 
There is some similarity in approach between the Rome Convention and 
the provisions on choice of law in the insurance Directives. Smulders 
and Glazener have argued that9l : 
"in essence there are not so many differences between the rules of the 
Directives and the [Rome] Convention." 
However, there are important differences. Two aspects in which they 
differ are particularly important. First, the Rome Convention allows 
greater freedom in the choice of law than do the insurance Directives, 
although both incorporate special measures to protect the consumer. The 
Rome Convention looks primarily to the contracting parties' choice of 
law: it protects the "consumer" primarily by ensuring that he is not 
depri ved of the protection afforded by the mandatory rules of the 
B8 The alternatives are illustrated diagramatically in Annex 2 at 
the end of this chapter. 
B9 See Article 2 of the First Life and Non-Life Directives: the 
scope of subsequent Directives is defined by reference to the First 
Directives. 
90 Article 29. 
9lop.cit. p788. 
94 
country in which he has his habi tual residence92 . By contrast, the 
insurance Directives, as already noted, aim to restrict choice of law 
in respect of "mass" risks and life assurance. Secondly, as regards the 
applicable law in the absence of choice, the Rome Convention gives an 
important place to the doctrine of "characteristic performance,,93: 
Article 4 (2) provides that, in the absence of choice, it shall be 
presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country 
where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteris-
tic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his 
habitual residence. This doctrine is absent from the provisions of the 
insurance Directives. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The Community's approach to insurance contract law within the Single 
Market programme shows an abandonment of the original proposals for 
harmonisation in favour of a complex set of rules of private interna-
tional law. However, elements of the original approach through 
harmonisation can still be seen in the approach to cancellation rules 
and "transparency". 
The presence of two different sets of rules governing choice of law in 
insurance contracts, in the form of the Rome Contracts Convention and 
the insurance Directives, creates a number of difficulties. First, the 
applicable law may vary depending on whether it is governed by the Rome 
Convention, the insurance Directives or national choice-of-law rules. 
Secondly, the problem of "parallelism", or competition between 
different rules of private international law within a single State, is 
compounded. Thirdly, the choice-of-Iaw rules in the insurance 
Directives complicate the regime governing the applicable law. Where 
~2Articles 5(2) and 5(3) of the Rome Convention.In this context 
"mandatory rules" has the same meaning as in Article 3(3) of the Rome 
Convention and Article 7(1)(g) of the Second Non-Life Directive. See 
Richard Plender, The Rome Contracts Convention, chap.? 
93 The doctrine is of Swiss origin and has attracted considerable 
criticism (see I.F. Fletcher, Conflict of Laws and European Community 
Law, chap. 5). 
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an agent or broker is involved in a transaction the agency relationship 
will be governed by the normal rules 94 of private international law 
of the Member State even if the contract of insurance is not subject 
to those rules due to the operation of the provisions of the insurance 
Directives. The complexi ty of this si tuation can only hinder the 
development of cross-border trade in insurance services, as not only 
"consumers" but also small and medium-sized businesses are unlikely to 
have the resources to provide a proper analysis of their rights and 
obligations. 
Special rules applicable to insurance can also be criticised in the 
context of the Community's aim of establishing a level playing field 
between providers of financial services and improving the transparency 
of financial products. As banking is subject to the Rome Contracts 
Convention and insurance to the special regime of the insurance 
Directives, there is an additional complication introduced into the 
legal regime governing products which may serve similar purposes. This 
is to be regretted at a time when the trend towards financial 
conglomerates (bancassurance/allfinanz) calls for equivalence in the 
treatment of the providers of financial services. 
94 The relationship of principal and agent is covered by the Rome 
Convention as is the relationship of agent and third party but the 
relationship of principal and third party is excluded. 
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ANNEX 1 to CHAPTER 2 
CONTRACT LAW PROVISIONS OF THE INSURANCE DIRECTIVES 
A. NON-LIFE INSURANCE 
Article 2(d) of Directive 88/357 (The Second Non-Life Directive) 
"Member State where the risk is situated" means: 
- the Member State in which the property is situated, where the 
insurance relates either to buildings or to buildings and their 
contents, in so far as the contents are covered by the same 
insurance policy, 
- the Member State of registration, where the insurance relates 
to vehicles of any type, 
- the Member State where the policy-holder took out the policy 
in the case of policies of a duration of four months or less 
covering travel or holiday risks, whatever the class concerned, 
- the Member State where the policy-holder has his habi tual 
residence or, if the policy-holder is a legal person, the Member 
State where the latter's establishment, to which the contract 
relates, is situated, in all cases not explicitly covered by the 
foregoing indents; 
Article 7 of Directive 88/357 (The Second Non-Life Directive) 
1. The law applicable to contracts of insurance referred to by this 
Directi ve and covering risks si tuated wi thin the Member States is 
determined in accordance with the following provisions: 
(a) Where a policy-holder has his habitual residence or central 
administration within the territory of the Member State in which 
the risk is situated, the law applicable to the insurance 
contract shall be the law of that Member State. However, where 
the law of that Member State so allows, the parties may choose 
the law of another country. 
(b) Where a policy-holder does not have his habitual residence 
or central administration in the Member State in which the risk 
is situated, the parties to the contract of insurance may choose 
to apply either the law of the Member State in which the risk is 
situated or the law of the country in which the policy-holder has 
his habitual residence or central administration. 
(c) Where a policy-holder pursues a commercial or industrial 
activity or a liberal profession and where the contract covers 
two or more risks relating to these activities and situated in 
different Member States, the freedom of choice of the law 
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applicable to the contract shall extend to the laws of those 
Member States and of the country in which the policy-holder has 
his habitual residence or central administration. 
(d) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (b) and (c), where the Member 
States referred to in those subparagraphs grant greater freedom 
of choice of the law applicable to the contract, the parties may 
take advantage of this freedom. 
(e) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), when the 
risks covered by the contract are limited to events occurring in 
one Member State other than the Member State where the risk is 
situated, as defined in Article 2(d), the parties may always 
choose the law of the former State. 
(f) For the risks referred to in Article 5(d)(i) of the first 
Directive, the parties to the contract may choose any law. 
(g) The fact that, in the cases referred to in subparagraph (a) 
or (f), the parties have chosen a law shall not, where all the 
other elements relevant to the si tuation at the time of the 
choice are connected with one Member State only, prejudice the 
application of the mandatory rules of the law of that Member 
State, which means the rules from which the law of that Member 
State allows no derogation by means of a contract. 
(h) The choice referred to in the preceding subparagraphs must 
be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. If this 
is not so, or if no choice has been made, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country, from amongst those considered 
in the relevant subparagraphs above, wi th which it is most 
closely connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract 
which has a closer connection with another country, from amongst 
those considered in the relevant subparagraphs, may by way of 
exception be governed by the law of that other country. The 
contract shall be rebuttably presumed to be most closely 
connected with the Member State in which the risk is situated. 
(i) Where a State includes several territorial units, each of 
which has its own rules of law concerning contractual obliga-
tions, each uni t shall be considered as a country for the 
purposes of identifying the law applicable under this Directive. 
A Member State in which various territorial units have their own 
rules of law concerning contractual obligations shall not be 
bound to apply the provisions of this Directive to conflicts 
which arise between the laws of those units. 
2. Nothing in this Article shall restrict the application of the rules 
of the law of the forum in a si tuation where they are mandatory. 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. 
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If the law of a Member State so stipulates, the mandatory rules of the 
law of the Member State in which the risk is situated or of the Member 
State imposing the obligation to take out insurance may be applied if 
and in so far as, under the law of those States, those rules must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. 
Where the contract covers risks situated in more than one Member State, 
the contract is considered for the purposes of applying this paragraph 
as constituting several contracts each relating to only one Member 
State. 
3. Subject to the preceding paragraphs, the Member States shall apply 
to the insurance contracts referred to by this Directive their general 
rules of private international law concerning contractual obligations. 
Article 8 of Directive 88/357 (The Second Non-Life Directive) 
1. Under the conditions set out in this Article, insurance undertakings 
may offer and conclude compulsory insurance contracts in accordance 
with the rules of this Directive and of the first Directive. 
2. When a Member State imposes an obligation to take out insurance, the 
contract shall not satisfy that obligation unless it is in accordance 
with the specific provisions relating to that insurance laid down by 
that Member State. 
3. When, in the case of compulsory insurance, the law of the Member 
State in which the risk is situated and the law of the Member State 
imposing the obligation to take out insurance contradict each other, 
the latter shall prevail. 
4. (a) Subject to subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, the 
third subparagraph of Article 7(2) shall apply where the insurance 
contract provides cover in several Member St~tes of which at least one 
imposes an obligation to take out insurance . 
(b) A Member State which, on the date of notification of this 
Directive, requires that any undertaking established within its 
territory must obtain approval for the general and special conditions 
of its compulsory insurance, may also, by way of derogation from 
Articles 9 and 18, require such conditions to be approved in the case 
of any insurance undertaking offering such cover, wi tnin its terri tory, 
under the conditions provided for in Article 12(1). 
(c) A Member State may, by way of derogation from Article 7, lay down 
that the law applicable to a compulsory insurance contract is the law 
of the State which imposes the obligation to take out insurance. 
95Article 30 of Directive 92/49 (The Third Non-Life "Framework" 
Directive) deletes the reference to subparagraph (b) of Article 8(4). 
96This subparagraph is deleted by Article 30 of Directive 92/49. 
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(d) Where a Member State imposes compulsory insurance and the insurer 
must notify the competent authorities of any cessation of cover, such 
cessation may be invoked against injured third parties only in the 
circumstances laid down in the legislation of that State. 
5. (a) Each Member State shall communicate to the Commission the risks 
against which insurance is compulsory under its legislation, stating: 
- the specific legal provisions relating to that insurance, 
- the particulars which must be given in the certificate which an 
insurer must issue to an insured person where that State requires proof 
that the obligation to take out insurance has been complied with. A 
Member State may require that those particulars include a declaration 
by the insurer to the effect that the contract complies wi th the 
specific provisions relating to that insurance. 
(b) The Commission shall publish the particulars referred to in 
subparagraph (a) in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
(c) A Member State shall accept, as proof that the insurance obligation 
has been fulfilled, a certificate, the content of which is in 
conformity with the second indent of subparagraph (a). 
B. LIFE ASSURANCE 
Article 2 of Directive 90/619 (The Second Life Directive) 
( d ) t' commi tmen t " : 
means a commitment represented by one of the kinds of insurance or 
operation referred to in Article 1 of the First Directive; 
(e) "Member State of the commitment": 
means the Member State where the policy-holder has his habi tual 
residence or, if the policy-holder is a legal person, the Member State 
where the latter's establishment, to which the contract relates is 
situated; 
Article 4 of Directive 90/619 (The Second Life Directive) 
1. The law applicable to contracts relating to the activities referred 
to in the First Directive shall be the law of the Member State of the 
commitment. However, where the law of that State so allows, the parties 
may choose the law of another country. 
2. Where the policy-holder is a natural person and has his habitual 
residence in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, 
the parties may choose the law of the Member State of which he is a 
national. 
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3. Where a State includes several territorial units, each of which has 
its own rules of law concerning contractual obligations, each unit 
shall be considered a country for the purposes of identifying the law 
applicable under this Directive. 
A Member State in which various territorial units have their own rules 
of law concerning contractual obligations shall not be bound to apply 
the provisions of this Directive to conflicts which arise between the 
laws of those units. 
4. Nothing in this Article shall restrict the application of the rules 
of the law of the forum in a situation in which they are mandatory, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. 
If the law of a Member State so stipulates, the mandatory rules of the 
law of the Member State of the commitment may be applied if and in so 
far as, under the law of that Member State, those rules must be applied 
whatever the law applicable to the contract. 
5. Subject to the preceding paragraphs, the Member States shall apply 
to the assurance contracts referred to in this Directive their general 
rules of private international law concerning contractual obligations. 
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ANNEX 2 to CHAPTER 2 
1. CHOICE OF LAW IN NON-LIFE INSURANCE 
Ri sks si tua ted97 
within the EC 
I 
Risks situated 
outside the EC 
Reinsurance 
1 
Is the Rome Convention applicable? 
! 
Yes 
Generally a free choice 
of law subject to rules 
on consumer contracts 
(Article 5) and mandatory 




Choice of law 
rules of the 
forum apply. 
Subject to Article 7 of the Second Non-Life Insurance Directive 
No Choice Limited Choice Expanded Free Choice 
Choice 
1 1 1 1 
Article 7(l)a Articles 7 ( 1 ) , Articles 7(1)a, "Large" risks, 
-first sentence. b,c and e. in fine and d, or where the 
where the law of expansion of 
the relevant choice results 
Member State so in a free choice. 
allows. 
! 1 1 
All subject to "mandatory rules" (Article 7(1)g) and 
"internationally mandatory rules" (Article 7(2) ) 
97 See Article 2(d) of the Second Non-Life Directive. 
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2. CHOICE OF LAW IN LIFE ASSURANCE 
Commitments enter~d into 
in a Member State . 
Commitments not entered into 
in a Member State. 
! 
Is the Rome Convention applicable? 
! 
Yes 
Generally a free choice 
of law subject to rules 
on consumer contracts 
(Article 5) and mandatory 
rules (Article 7). 
! 
No 
Choice of law 
rules of the 
forum apply. 













in fine, where 






relevant Member in a free choice. 
State so allows. 
! 
All subject to "mandatory rules" (Article 4(4)} and 
"internationally mandatory" rules (Article 4 (4) ale 2) 
98 See Article 2(d) of the Second Life Directive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine differences in insurance 
contract law in the context of the three largest national insurance 
markets in the Community - Germany, the United Kingdom and France - so 
as to allow an assessment to be made, in chapter 4, of their signifi-
cance for the working of the Single Market. Part 1 examines two 
important aspects of the general body of contract law which are 
relevant to insurance: first, the principle of good faith and secondly 
consumer protection legislation. Part 2 then focuses on rules of 
contract law which are specific to insurance. By way of introduction 
to part 2 there is a brief overview of the relevant laws l in France, 
Germany and the Uni ted Kingdom. Reference is also be made to the 
administrative control2 of insurance contracts which takes place in 
France and Germany, but not in the United Kingdom. 
PART 1: GENERAL RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH 
For the purpose of analysis, it is convenient to approach the concept 
of good faith in contract law by distinguishing between the role of 
good faith in the formation of the contract and in its performance3. 
lSee Kimball & Pfennigstorf, "Legislative and Judicial Control of 
the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and 
European Practice", 39 Indiana Law Journal (1964) 675. 
2See Kimball & Pfennigstorf, "Administrative Control of the Terms 
of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study", 40 Indiana Law Journal 
(1964) 143. 
3This distinction is recognised by Steven Burton in "Breach of 
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith", 94 Harvard 
Law Review (1980) 369. 
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The two situations are different in that in the former the contract has 
not yet come into existence, whereas in the latter it has. In a 
strictly legal sense, the two situations can therefore be categorised 
as pre-contractual and contractual. 
From an economic perspective, however, there may be similari ties 
between the two si tuations in terms of the costs which have been 
incurred by either party4. The costs incurred in performance of the 
contract can be said to be similar to those incurred in reliance on the 
contract coming into existence as both are elements of the total cost 
of securing the benefits of the contract. This economic relationship 
is recognised to varying degrees by the erosion of the legal division 
between contractual and pre-contractual relationships, but, as outlined 
below, the distinction does nevertheless remain important. 
1. Negotiation of the Contract 
Considerations of good fai th are present in many aspects of the 
negotiations leading up to a contract. Examples are the rights of the 
parties in a situation where negotiations are terminated, the status 
of agreements which have not yet been formalised and the abuse of the 
negotiating process such that a benefit is secured by one party who had 
no intention of concluding a contract. However, from the perspective 
of insurance, the most revealing aspect of good fai th in the pre-
contractual phase is the existence and extent of a duty to disclose 
information to the other party. Information is a valuable commodity in 
the negotiation of contracts: it forms the basis on which each party 
is able to assess the benefits which will flow from the contract and 
may in some cases only be accessible at considerable cost. The extent 
to which parties are obliged to share information during the negotia-
tion of a contract therefore represents an important aspect of the way 
in which the law governs the economic relationship which is represented 
by the contract. 
4An example would be a house survey undertaken by a prospective 
purchaser prior to conclusion of the contract. 
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The delimitation of an obligation of disclosure can be said to lie 
between two extremes. The first is that in which there is no obligation 
to provide information: this represents the most extreme form of the 
principle of caveat emptor and finds its economic justification in the 
argument that those who have incurred costs in acquiring superior skill 
and knowledge should be allowed to retain the benefi ts of their 
endeavours. The second is that in which a general duty of disclosure 
applies between the parties consistent with the principles of good 
faith and fair dealing: here the economic justification lies in the 
efficiency which resul ts from the disclosure of information by the 
party which can supply it at the least cost. 
The divergence between the civil and common law approach to the pre-
contractual disclosure of information is less marked than these two 
extremes, but there are nevertheless important differences. The 
dominance of the principle of caveat emptor in the United Kingdom has 
led to a refusal to recognise any general duty of disclosure in 
contract law. France lacks an express formulation of such a duty in its 
civil code or jurisprudence, but there is some recognition that the law 
is gradually moving towards the formulation of such a duty. Meanwhile, 
Germany, through its recognition of the doctrine of culpa in contra-
hendo, has adopted a general system of pre-contractual liability which 
encompasses a duty of disclosure. 
(a) United Kingdom5 
It has been argued by Nicholas 6 that: 
"there are some signs in the later eighteenth century that the approach 
through a general principle of good faith might have been capable of 
taking root in England". 
5The law in the United Kingdom is taken to be that of England 
other than where the law of Scotland differs. 
6Barry Nicholas, "The Obligation to Disclose Information" in 
Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (editors, D.Harris and 
D.Talllon) p168. Nicholas cites Lord Mansfield's outline of the 
principle of good fai th in Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 as 
evidence of such a trend. 
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However, the the dominance of the principle of caveat emptor in the 
common law approach towards good faith in contract is evident in the 
case-law relating to disclosure of information during the formation of 
the contract. In Smith v Hughes 7 it was held that: 
"whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there is no legal 
obligation on [a] vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a 
mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor". 
In Fletcher v Kre11 8, it was held that a person who applies for the 
post of governess is not bound to divulge the fact that she is a 
divorcee. More recently, in Walford v Miles 9, the House of Lords has 
reaffirmed the absence of any general duty of disclosure arising from 
considerations of good faith: 
"A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it 
is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating 
party. ,,10 
The common law position is summed up by Treitel 11 as folows: 
"As a general rule, a contracting party is under no duty to disclose 
material facts known to him but not to the other party". 
The impact of considerations of good faith on the creation and 
evolution of rules which modify the strict approach of the common law 
has been described by O'Connor12 in the following terms: 
"The principle of good faith in English law is a fundamental principle 
deri ved from the rule pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules, 
distinctively and directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonable-
ness, the application of which is determined at a particular time by 
the standards of honesty fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the 
Community which are considered appropriate for formulation in new or 
revised legal rules." 
7(1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
8(1872) 42 L.J.Q.B. 55. 
9[1992] 1 All ER 453. 
10Ibid. pp460-461. 
lIThe Law of Contract (8th edn.), p349. 
I2 J . F . O'Connor, Good Faith in English Law, p102. 
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Several examples illustrate the extent to which good fai th, whilst 
absent as a principle of law in the sense that it exists in many civil 
law systems, has nevertheless exerted an influence. Contracts uberrimae 
fidei, of which insurance is the prime example, have since the 18th 
century13 been regarded as an exception to the general rule in 
imposing a pre-contractual duty of disclosure. Where there is a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties, the requirements of good 
faith may go beyond a duty of disclosure. Effect will not be given to 
unduly onerous or unusual contract terms unless they are fairly and 
reasonably brought to the attention of the other party prior to 
entering into a contract 14 . The law relating to misrepresentation also 
gives rise to instances of a positive duty of disclosure15 . Moreover, 
even in the absence of a contract, the law may recognise a claim for 
services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit 16 . 
Legislation has also modified the harshness of the common law approach: 
in sale of goods for example, a seller acting in the course of business 
is subject to implied contract terms in respect of the "merchantable 
quality" of the goods and their fitness for the purpose for which they 
are bought17 . The requirements for disclosure of information by an 
insurer to a proposer for life assurance introduced by rules adopted 
pursuant to the Financial Services Act 1986 18 are another example of 
13The case of Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 is generally 
regarded as the basis of the common law rule of disclosure in 
insurance. 
14Interfoto Picture Library v Stilletto Visual Programmes Ltd. 
[1989] OB 433. 
15 See Trei tel, op. ci t., p352. A person may have to disclose 
material facts which come to his notice before the conclusion of a 
contract if they falsify a representation previously made by him. A 
person is guilty of misrepresentation, though all the facts stated by 
him are true, if his statement is misleading as a whole because it does 
not refer to other facts affecting the weight of those stated. 
16Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd. [1936] 2KB 403. 
17 Sale of Goods Act 1979: sections 14(2) and 14(3). 
18 See chap. 5, part 1. 
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legislative intervention. Incorporation of the Vienna Convention19 
into the law in the United Kingdom would give specific recognition to 
the principle of good faith as it provides that it is to be interpreted 
having regard to the observance of good faith in international 
trade20 . However, despite its modification, the principle of caveat 
emptor is still sufficiently dominant to preclude any meaningful move 
towards a general duty of disclosure21 in the formation of con-
tracts22 . 
The posi tion in Scotland differs from that in England in several 
respects. First, it is possible to argue that Scots law imposes a 
general obligation of disclosure on contracting parties. This has been 
suggested by the Scottish Law Commission23 on the basis that referenc-
es by Scottish judges to "bona fides" in insurance cases24 in the 19th 
century were based on a principle applicable to contracts generally and 
not the narrower principle of uberrima fides which was developed by 
the English courts. Thus, the Commission concluded25 that: 
19 For text, see J.O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales 
under the 1980 UN Convention, p649. The Convention is expected to 
become part of the law in the United Kingdom in the near future. 
20 Article 7 (1). Honnold, op. ci t. para. 94, observes that the 
Convention rejects good faith as a general requirement and uses it 
solely as a principle of interpretation. 
2I For a general commentary on disclosure in contractual negotia-
tions see: I. Brown, "The Contract to Negotiate: A Thing Wri t in Wa tertI 
1992 JBL 353. 
22 By contrast, it has been noted that the common law in the United 
States has moved closer towards a general obligation to disclose 
information through an extension of the notion of representation, 
principally in the case of sales of land. See: Nicholas, "The 
Obligation to Disclose Information", in Harris & Tallon (edi tors) 
op.cit. p179. 
23Scottish Law Commission Memorandum no.42, "Defective Consent", 
June 1978. 
24 An example is Life Association of Scotland v Foster (1873) 11M 
351 (Lord President Inglis at p359). 
25Memorandum no. 42, para. 3.68. 
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"It may well be that in Scots law there is a general duty to disclose 
material facts when they are specially within the knowledge of one 
contracting party and the other must consequently rely on him for 
information." 
Secondly, it may be possible to claim recompense in the absence of a 
contract if one person has benefited from the work of another. However, 
the conditions which have to be met by a successful claimant are very 
restrictive
26 
and do not constitute a general rule of pre-contractual 
liability. A third difference may exist in the law relating to error. 
Unlike the position in England, it has been held in Scotland that if 
a party knows that an offer has been made under a definite mistake in 
fact, that party is not entitled to accept it27. 
(b) France 
The French civil code has no express provisions governing pre-
contractual disclosure of information. The articles governing fraud 
(dol) 28 and mistake (erreur) 29 cover a sub-set of the circumstances 
encompassed by the concept of pre-contractual disclosure of informa-
tion, but do not in themselves represent a general duty of disclosure. 
26McBryde, Contract, p37, lists the conditions as: (i) the pursuer 
must show a loss (ii) the pursuer must not have had the intention of 
donation (iii) the defender must have gained (iv) the expense must not 
have been incurred for the pursuer's benefit (v) reimbursement must be 
equitable. 
27 Steuart's Trustees v Hart (1875) 3R 192. Gloag, The Law of 
Contract, (2nd edn.) p438 refers to the difficulty of applying this 
rule in practice. However, Steuart's Trustees was recently applied in 
the case of Angus v Bryden 1992 SLT 884. 
28Article 1109 provides that any contract is capable of annulment 
where the consent of one of the parties has been secured by fraud. 
29 Article 1110 governs error. I t is interpreted by Aubry & Rau 
(Droit Civil Francais, 6th edn.) as meaning that error is a cause of 
nullity of the agreement only when it is certain that one or both of 
the parties would not undertake the obligation if the true state of 
things were known. 
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However, it has been argued that it is possible to identify a general 
duty to disclose information. This was asserted in 1945 by de 
Juglart30 , based on a survey of legislative provisions and judicial 
decisions. Ghestin31 contends that de Juglart's identification of the 
duty was premature and that, until relatively recently, it was possible 
to hold that there existed no pre-contractual obligation of disclosure. 
He then identifies in French law the elements of a developing synthesis 
leading to a general duty of disclosure. The first element of the 
synthesis is the proliferation of particular statutory or regulatory 
requirements of disclosure. The second element derives from the 
development of the droi t civil through jurisprudence: Ghestin contends 
that cases involving defects of consent in areas such as fradulent 
silence (reticence dolosive), delictual liability for pre-contractual 
fault, and latent defects provides a basis for holding that the law is 
moving towards a general duty of disclosure. 
Von Mehren-Gordley32 adopts a more direct approach in arguing that an 
obligation of good faith has been clearly recognised by the courts and 
cites a case 33 which supports that view: 
" .. it must be recognised, in actual fact, that in the preliminary phase 
of negotiations, during which the condi tions of the contemplated 
contract are studied and discussed, certain obligations of rectitude 
and good faith rest on the parties; these obligations clearly relate 
not to the conclusion of the eventual contract but to the conduct of 
the negotiations themselves." 
Nevertheless, doubt has been expressed regarding the existence of such 
a rule. Aubry & Rau's view34 was that: 
lilt is questionable whether reticence, that is to say, the silence 
intentionally kept as to a fact ignored by the other contracting party 
30 de Juglart, ilL' obliga tion de Renseignements dans les Contra t s" , 
Rev. trim. dr. civ. 1945, ppl-22. 
31 J . Ghestin, "The Obligation to Disclose Information", in Harris 
& Tallon (editors), op.cit., chap.4. 
32 The Civil Law System, (2nd edn.), extracted from O'Connor, 
op.cit., p97. 
33Societe Muroiterie Fraisse v Micon et Autres (Cour d'Appel de 
Pau, 14 Jan 1969, D&S 1969 J716(note) ). 
34AUbry & Rau, Droit Civil Francais, 6th edn., para. 343. 
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and on which his consent may depend, constitutes a fraud in contracts 
other than insurance contracts". 
This view is supported by Lambert-Faivre 35 who contends that there is 
no general obligation of disclosure outside insurance contracts. 
Ghestin I s view is based on developments in jurisprudence which 
occurred in between Aubry & Rau's analysis and that of Lambert-Faivre, 
and finds support from Nicholas 36 who concludes that recent cases have 
resulted in the following formula: 
"Dol (fraud) can consist of the silence of one party concealing from 
the other a fact which, if he had known it, would have prevented him 
from contracting." 
Moreover, in addition to this expansive interpretation of dol, Nicholas 
takes the view that both jurisprudence and doctrine have imported, 
in reliance on the general principle of delictual liability, a 
requirement of good faith into pre-contractual negotiations 37 . 
Recent developments in French insurance contract law cast doubt over 
the general rule identified by Ghestin and Nicholas. Amendment of the 
law in 1989 has resulted in the abolition of a positive duty of 
disclosure in insurance which had been one of the prime examples of a 
specific duty of disclosure imposed by statute. 
35Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Droit des Assurances, Precis Dalloz, 7th 
edn., p183. 
36Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract, p99. 
37 He cites as an example a decision of the Cour de Cassation in 
1972 (Cass. com 20.3.1972, JCP 1973 II 17543). The plaintiff entered 
negotiations with the defendant to buy a machine made by an American 
firm, X, for whom the defendant was the exclusive French distributor. 
The plaintiff went to the USA to view the machines and subsequently 
asked the defendant for more information. The latter made no reply and 
witheld an estimate supplied by X. Two weeks later the defendant signed 
a contract to supply the plaintiff's competitor with a machine under 
a contract which stipulated that the defendant was not to supply 
another machine in the area for 42 months. The defendant was held 
liable in delict for breaking off negotiations. 
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(c) Germany 
German law in respect of pre-contractual liability has been influenced 
by the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo (fault in negotiating) and in 
particular by Jhering's38 analysis of the subject. The German common 
law was criticised by Jhering as deficient because it did not 
adequately resolve problems which arose from the dominance of will 
theory in contract law and the requirement for a "meeting of the 
minds". The essence of his doctrine of culpa in contrahendo was that 
where one party has relied on the validity of a contract to his injury, 
the law should restore the status quo by reimbursing the injured party 
for costs incurred in reliance on the validity of the contract. Kessler 
and Fine 39 express the meaning of the doctrine in an even simpler 
formulation: 
"The careless promisor has only himself to blame when he has created 
for the other party the false appearance of a binding obligation". 
The German civil code does not incorporate a general theory of culpa 
in contrahendo but it is generally accepted40 that case law with the 
aid of the legal literature began to treat individual provisions of the 
code as instances of a general scheme of pre-contractual liability. 
Particular emphasis has been placed on fair dealing and the security 
of transactions: each party is bound to disclose such matters as are 
clearly of importance for the other party's deci s ion, provided the 
38 Jhering' s famous article on the subj ect ("Culpa in contrahendo, 
oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion gelangten 
Vertragen") was published in 1861 ( 4 Jahrbucher fur die Dogmatik des 
Heutigen Romischen und Deutschen Privatrechts 1) 
39"Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of 
Contract: A Comparative Study" 77 Harvard Law Review (1964), 401 
( 402 ) . 
40 The point is made by Kessler and Fine, op.cit. p403, on the 
basis of several German authorities, principally 3 Larenz, Lehrbuch des 
Schuldrechts Chapter 4V at 38-43 (5th ed .1962). Later edi tions of 
Larenz confirm this view (see 14th edn. 1987: chap.l0, "Das Prinzip von 
Treu und Glauben"). A similar view is taken by Foster, German Law and 
Legal System (1993) who says (para.5.3): 
"The combination of Article 242 with 133 and 157 applies the require-
ment of good faith to all aspects of the law of obligations." 
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latter is unable to procure the information and the non-disclosing 
party is aware of that fact 41 . 
2. Performance of the Contract 
The duty to perform a contract in good faith is more clearly recognised 
in the French and German legal systems than is the duty to act in good 
fai th during the pre-contractual phase: both the French and German 
civil codes have express provisions setting out a requirement of good 
faith in the performance of contracts. However, the law in the United 
Kingdom does not recognise a general duty to perform contracts in good 
fai th: there are mechanisms which can effectively resul t in the 
application of the concept of good fai th, but these fall short of 
providing a framework which is sufficiently broad to consti tute a 
general rule42 . 
( a) Uni ted Kingdom43 
The English common law does recognise instances in which good faith is 
required in the performance of a contract, such as where there is a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties or where the contract falls, 
as does insurance, into the category of contracts referred to as 
uberrimae fidei. However, it is clear that those instances are 
exceptions to, rather than examples of, the general rule governing the 
41Kessler and Fine, op.cit., quote an example from Larenz, op.cit. 
The owner of a house negotiating for its sale fails to inform a third 
party that it has been sold. The latter then makes a trip to view the 
house. The seller has failed in his duty of good faith. 
42This contrasts with the position in the United States where a 
majori ty of jurisdictions, the Res ta tement (second) of Contracts 
(section 205) and the Uniform Commercial Code ( section 1-203) 
recognise a duty to perform a contract in good fai th. See Burton, 
op.cit. note 3, above. 
43 AS in the previous subsection, English law is assumed to be that 
of the United Kingdom except where Scots law differs. 
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standards expected in performance of the contract. Powel1 44 advances 
three reasons for this proposition: 
(i) The existence of a special class of contracts uberrimae fidei 
indicates the absence of a general rUle45 ; 
(ii) The development, in England, of the law in respect of quasi-
estoppel has been necessary due to the absence of any general 
requirement of good faith46 ; 
(iii) It is possible for "standard form" contracts to include 
provisions such that one party's obligations are considerably reduced 
even where it is clear that this was done in bad faith47 . 
Powell's case can be developed further by arguing that the frequent use 
by the courts of the device of the "implied term" to regulate the 
conduct of the parties in the absence of express contractual provisions 
is evidence of the lack of a general rule. One example is the approach 
taken towards hindrance of the other party's performance of a contract. 
In Barque Quilpe Ltd. v Brown48 , it was stated that: 
"There is an implied contract by each party that he will not do 
anything to prevent the other party from performing the contract or to 
delay him in performing it. I agree that generally such a term is by 
law imported into every contract." 
44Raphael Powell, "Good Faith in Contracts" 9 Current Legal 
Problems 16 (1956). 
45Powell regarded the use of the latin superlative as "a form of 
hyperbole" which failed linguistically to describe accurately the 
relationship between contracts "uberrimae fidei" and those that were 
not. The use of the term "utmost good faith" did not in his view imply 
the existence of a category of contract requiring ordinary good faith. 
46Powell quotes as an example the case of Central London Property 
Trust v High Trees House Ltd. [1947] KB 130 in which it was held that 
a promise to reduce the rent (set by a lease under seal) on a block of 
flats due to the outbreak of war bound the promisor to the extent that 
it would not allow him to act inconsistently with it, even although the 
promise was not supported by consideration. 
47powell's article was written prior to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 which has limited the use of "unfair" contract terms. 
48[1904] 2KB 264, 271 (per Vaughan Williams L.J.). 
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However, as Burrows 49 has observed, the use of the device of the 
implied term has fallen short of introducing even a general rule 
requiring positive co-operation in the performance of a contract: the 
emphasis is on what is necessarySO for the performance of the contract 
rather than what is reasonable in the circumstances. As regards the 
future, implementation in the United Kingdom of the Consumer Contracts 
DirectiveS1 will give explicit recogni tion to the concept of good 
faith in the context of the determination of unfair contract terms 52 . 
(b) France 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code provides that contracts must be 
performed in good faith. However, the code does not define good faith 
or the standards by which it is to be judged. The 'textbook of Planiol 
et Ripert53 suggests that Article 1134 provides for a reserve obliga-
tion of honest conduct where the duties of the parties are not laid 
down by their contract or by the law. Powell 54 takes the view that 
article 1134 has little independent force of its own but is merely 
ancillary to the interpretation of other provisions of the code. 
Nicholas55 notes that, unlike Germany, the French courts have made 
little use of the obligation to perform a contract in good faith. 
49 J. F. Burrows, "Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term" 
1968 32 MLR 390. 
SOThe law was made clear by Lord Blackburn in Mackay v Dick & 
Stevenson (1881) 8R (HL) 37; (1881) 6 AC 251, 263: 
"Where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed 
that something shall be done, which cannot effectively be done unless 
both concur in doing it, the construction of the contract is that each 
agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the 
carrying out of the thing, though there may be no express words to that 
effect." 
51Directive 93/13, OJ 1993 L95/29. The Directive applies to 
contracts concluded after 31 December 1994. 
52See chap. 2 (section C.2) for an outline of the Directive. 
53Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais (2nd edn., 1952) p509. 
54 't 31 Op.Cl ., P . 
55 . t h 4 Op.Cl ., cap .. 
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Nevertheless, Weill and Terre56 regard the content of the obligation 
of good fai th in the execution of contracts as being more clearly 
defined than the aforementioned texts. In particular, they take the 
view that the obligation comprises two elements: first, an obligation 
of fairness (loyaute) which is not rigid but takes account of 
surrounding circumstances; and secondly, an obligation of co-operation 
in the execution of the contract 57 . Marty and Raynaud58 point to the 
link between Article 1134 and Article 113559 on the interpretation of 
contracts and conclude that the content of a contract is determined not 
only by its literal sense but by reference to the principle of good 
faith. 
(c) Germany 
Article 242 of the German Civil Code provides that: 
"The debtor is obliged to perform in such a manner as good fai th 
requires, regard being paid to general practice." 
Whilst the substance of the duty does not appear materially different 
from Article 1134 of the French Civil Code, Article 242 has developed 
into a much broader system of control60 . One commentary refers to the 
concept of good faith in Article 242 in the following terms 61 : 
"It expresses itself in many different rules, but qui te unsystematical-
ly. These rules constitute a realm of law of their own, whose function 
56Droit Civil, Les Obligations (Precis Dalloz, 4th edn. 1986 
paras. 355-357). 
57 It is not clear that Weill and Terre regard the obligation of 
co-operation as a general principle as they cite only specific 
instances of such an obligation rather then a general rule. 
58Droit Civil, Les Obligations (2nd edn. 1988 para 246). 
59 Article 1135: Agreements are binding not only as to what is 
expressed, but also as to all the consequences which equit~ usage or 
statute imposes upon the obligation according to its nature. (Transla-
tion by Berman, de Vries, Galston, French Law (looseleaf/updated) ). 
60 Horn , Kotz and Lesser make this point in German Private and 
Commercial Law, p136 as does Powell, op.cit., p37. 
61 Horn , Kotz & Lesser, op.cit. p145. 
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is typically one of control. In functional terms it is quite comparable 
with the role of equity vis-a-vis common law in the Anglo-American 
systems." 
Several examples of the application of Article 242 provide some 
indication of the extent to which it is regarded as the dominant 
principle of contract law. Between 1919 and 1923, hyperinflation 
reduced the value of the mark to one-billionth of its 1914 value and 
led to disputes over the repayment of long-standing debts. In 1923 the 
Reichsgericht decided62 , on the basis of Article 242, that mortgages 
should be revalued in terms of the value of the money at their time of 
creation. Good fai th has also been held to prevent a landlord of 
several properties leasing a property adjoining a tenant to the 
latter's competitor63 and to restrict the extent to which a standard 
form contract could limit the obligations of a seller of furniture 64 . 
B. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Consumer protection is a feature of the insurance contract laws of all 
three Member States under examination. There are two specific 
objectives which are generally pursued in the protection of the 
consumer in the field of insurance. The first is to ensure that a 
proposer for insurance has sufficient information to enable a proper 
decision to be made as to the suitability of the contract. The second 
is to ensure that, once a contract has been concluded, the insured is 
protected from contract terms which unduly favour the insurer, thereby 
causing an imbalance in the contractual relationship. However, the 
approach to these two issues, and their relationship with the general 
body of insurance contract law, varies significantly among the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany. 
62 RGZ 107, 78,86: extracted from Horn, Kotz & Lesser, op. ci t. , 
p140. 
63 1931 RGZ 131,274: extracted from Horn, Kotz & Lesser, op.cit., 
p138. 
64 1956 , BGHZ 22,90: extracted from Horn, Kotz & Lesser, op.cit., 
p143. The General Conditions of Business Act 1976 subsequently consoli-
dated the rules developed by the courts. 
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1. The Provision of Information65 
French law is most explicit as regards the insurer's duty to provide 
information to a proposer for insurance. Following an amendment in 
1989, the Code des Assurances 66 provides that the insurer must provide 
the insured with details of the cover and rates prior to conclusion of 
the contract. There is no similar obligation of a general nature in the 
insurance contract laws of ei ther the United Kingdom or Germany. 
However, in the United Kingdom, rules adopted by various agencies under 
the authority of the Financial Services Act 1986 in respect of those 
classes of life assurance which fall within the category "investment 
business" ensure that most purchasers of life assurance are provided 
with details of the product before committing themselves to a contract. 
In the case of Germany, the existence of a general pre-contractual duty 
of disclosure provides some measure of protection to a proposer as 
regards the suitability of the contract. 
2. Protection from Unfair Contract Terms 
In 1976, The Council of Europe adopted a resolution67 recommending 
Member States: 
"to create effective instruments .. in order to protect consumers from 
abusive contract clauses". 
The United Kingdom, France and Germany all susequently adopted laws in 
respect of unfair contract terms, but the impact which those laws have 
had on insurance contracts differs among the three Member States. 
The simplest and arguably the most effective solution has been that 
adopted by Germany. The Law Concerning Standard Contract Terms (AGB-
65 The impact of the completion 
on the provision of information 
considered in chap. 2. 
66Article LI12-2. 
67Resolution dated 16.11.1976. 
of the Single Market in insurance 
to proposers for insurance was 
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Q)68 of 1976 applies to standard contract terms of all kinds including 
insurance contracts. Moreover, the administrative control exercised by 
the Insurance Supervisory Authority over the standard terms of 
insurance contracts does not preclude judicial control under the AGB-G. 
However, the special nature of insurance business is recognised by the 
provision69 that the courts are to consult the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority before reaching a decision on standard terms and the partial 
exemption70 granted to insurers in respect of the rules relating to 
prohibited clauses, duration, tacit renewal and termination of 
contracts. The Insurance Contract Law 190871 provides additional 
protection from unfair contract terms by providing that certain of its 
provisions cannot be varied by contract whilst others can only be 
varied to the benefit of the policyholder. 
In France, the loi Scrivener72 of 1978, which governs contract terms, 
applies to insurance. However, the mechanism by which this law operates 
means that its impact on insurance contract law is indirect. The loi 
Scrivener transferred to an ad hoc body, the Commission des Clauses 
Abusives, the determination and sanctioning of unfair contract terms. 
The Commission has the power to issue "recommendations", which are 
publicised and exert influence over the relevant professional 
organisations to which they are addressed, but the courts are only able 
to strike down unfair contract terms if they are subsequently 
incorporated in a decree. Nevertheless, a recommendation issued by the 
Commission in 1985 73 was instrumental in the reform of insurance 
contract law which occurred in 1989. Another aspect of the control of 
unfair contract terms in insurance contracts in France is that many of 
68Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschaftsbedingungen. See Pfennigstorf, German Insurance Laws. 
69 AGB- G, section 16. 
70 AGB - G, section 23. 
71See part 2 of this chapter, section C.2. 
72 Loi no. 78-23 du 10.1.1978: J.O. 11.1.1978, p301. 
73Recommendation no. 8S-04/CCA du 20 Sept.198S relative aux 
Contrats Multirisques Habitation, RGAT 1986 plSl. 
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the provisions of the Code des Assurance are mandatory, which means 
that they cannot be overriden by conflicting contract terms: the effect 
is to introduce a range of compulsory contract terms from which no 
derogation is possible. 
The position in the United Kingdom is that the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 does not cover insurance contracts, which are subject to the 
self-regulatory control exercised by the Statements of Insurance 
Practice to which the vast majority of insurers subscribe. Thus, 
although it is difficult to find convincing evidence that the 
policyholder is less well protected than in France or Germany, it is 
notable that the United Kingdom is the only one of the three Member 
Sates under examination which does not have a statutory framework for 
the control of unfair terms in insurance contracts. 
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PART 2: RULES OF CONTRACT LAW SPECIFIC TO INSURANCE 
C. LEGAL SOURCES 
1. France 
(a) Insurance Contract Law 
The Insurance Contract Law of 193074 is the foundation of French 
insurance contract law. The volume of subsequent amendments to the law, 
as well as changes necessitated by the advent of the Single European 
Market, resulted in a codification of the law which was completed in 
1976 and resulted in the Code des Assurances 75 . The Code is divided 
into three parts: legislative, reglementaire and arretes76 . This 
structure reflects the separation of the domains of legislation and 
administration contained in the French Constitution. 
A revision of the law was undertaken in 198977 . The title of the new 
law78 suggests that it was mainly concerned wi th the conformi ty of 
French law with European Community Directives, but, as will become 
clear, it went far beyond this by introducing a range of amendments 
which strengthened the position of the consumer. The 1989 law is now 
incorporated in the Code des Assurances. 
Much of the legislative section of the Code des Assurances is 
mandatory in the sense that its provisions are generally not capable 
74 Loi du 13 Juillet 1930. 
75 J . O. 21 Juillet 1976. See Code des Assurances (L'Argus, 8th 
edn., 1991). 
76Reference to the provisions of each part is preceded by the 
prefix L, R, and A respectively. 
77 Loi no.89-1014 du 31 Dec. 1989: J.O. 3 Jan. 1990. 
78"portant adaption du code des assurances a I' ouverture du marche 
europeen". 
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of amendment by contract terms 79 . The limitation of freedom of 
contract through this device is regarded as justifiable in the 
interests of consumer protection. 
(b) Administrative Control of Insurance Contracts 
In France, there is a requirement to submi t copies of standard 
conditions and other documents which are to be issued to the public to 
the Ministry of Finance, who may require changes to be made according 
to the regulations in force BO . Premium ratesB1 must also be communi-
cated to the Ministry of Finance, whose approval is required in the 
case of life business. In the case of "large risks" within the meaning 
of the Second Non-Life DirectiveB2 , there is no requirement of prior 
approval ei ther in respect of policy forms (and other connected 
literature) or rates B3 . As discussed in chapter 1, the completion of 
the Single Market will involve the dismantling of prior approval of 
policy forms and rates for all classes of business. 
2. Germany 
(a) Insurance Contract Law 
The German law is to be found in the 1908 Insurance Contract Law 
(VVG)B4, as amended. It is divided into several sections: the first 
79Article L 111-2. The Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA) has 
published a comprehensive survey of such provisions in EEC-Insurance 
Contract Law (1990). 
BO Code des Assurances, Articles L310-8 and R310-6. 
B1Code des Assurances, Article R310-6. 
B2See chap. 1. 
B3 Code des Assurances, Articles L351-4 and R351-1 to R351-6. 
B4Gesetz tiber den Versicherungsvertrag, hereafter referred to as 
the VVG. See W.Pfennigstorf, German Insurance Laws (Karlsruhe, 1986; 
supplement, 1991). 
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deals with provisions applicable to all types of insurance85 and the 
remainder deal wi th speci fic categories of insurance. The VVG contains 
certain provisions from which no deviation is permissible through 
contract terms and others from which deviation is permissible if the 
change is in the policyholder's favour. 
(b) Administrative Control of Insurance Contracts 
The German authorisation procedure involves the submission of a 
business plan which must include standard contract terms and, in the 
case of life, accident and sickness insurance, the premium rates and 
method of calculation86 . Motor vehicle liability insurance rates are 
also subject to approval, though for different reasons: the relevant 
statute
87 
provides that the considerations are the need to ensure a 
reasonable relation between premiums and benefi ts and the need to 
ensure that injured third parties are adequately protected. The 
completion of the Single Market will lead to the the dismantling of the 
German system of prior approval of conditions of insurance and premium 
rates. As it has been in place for many years, it is clear that the 
advent of the Single Market involves a significant change in approach 
in Germany as regards the regulation of insurance. 
3. The United Kingdom 
Insurance contract law in the Uni ted Kingdom88 was codified by the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 (hereafter referred to as the MIA 1906). 
850ther than marine, which is subject to the Commercial Code: law 
of 10th May 1987. 
86The authorisation procedure is set out in Article 5 of the Law 
Governing the Supervision of Insurance Enterprises (Gesetz tiber die 
Beaufsichtigung der Versicherungsunternehmen, generally abbreviated to 
VAG). See Pfennigstorf, German Insurance Laws. 
87The Law Concerning Obligatory Insurance for Motor Vehicle 
Keepers 1965 (as amended), section 8. 
88 A more detailed examination of the law in the United Kingdom is 
undertaken in chap.5. 
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Although the Act expressly excludes 89 its application to other 
classes, its general principles have been applied by the courts to 
other classes of business. As regards policyholders who have purchased 
insurance in a private capacity, Statements of Practice adopted by 
insurers modify, on a self-regulatory basis, the strict application of 
the law. 
D. NEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT 
An examination of the rights and obligations which arise during the 
negotiations for an insurance contract shows that there are substantial 
differences between the laws of the individual Member States. 
1. The Formulation of the Duty of Disclosure 
The formulation of the duty of disclosure at the inception of the 
contract varies in four important respects in the three Member States 
under examination: 
(a) The requirement of spontaneity; 
(b) Reciprocity; 
(c) The application of the disclosure rule to different 
policyholders; 
(d) The role of freedom of contract. 
Each of these is dealt with separately below. 
(a) The Requirement of Spontaneity 
The formulation of the duty of disclosure in the Uni ted Kingdom 
requires spontanei ty on the part of the insured in volunteering 
information to the insurer. This is made clear in the formulation of 
the duty in the MIA 19069°: 
89Section 2 (2) . 
90Section 18(1). For a more detailed discussion of the development 
of the law in the United Kingdom, see chap.S. 
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"Subject to the prOV1Sl0ns of this section, the assured must disclose 
to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material 
circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed 
to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, 
ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, 
the insurer may avoid the contract." 
A similar approach has been followed by the Courts in respect of non-
marine classes of business. As regards insurance purchased in a private 
capacity, the Statements of Insurance Practice limit the obligation of 
disclosure to what the insured could reasonably be expected to 
disclose91 . 
The formulation of the duty in Germany92 is similar in most respects 
to the United Kingdom: 
"The policyholder must, at the time of the making of the contract, 
inform the insurer of all circumstances known to him that are material 
for the assumption of the risk. Circumstances of the risk are material 
if they are of a nature to have an influence on the insurer's decision 
whether to enter into the contract at all, or whether to do so under 
the agreed terms. A circumstance about which the insurer has inquired 
expressly and in writing is, in case of doubt, deemed to be material." 
However, this is qualified in the case of circumstances not included 
in the proposal form 93 : 
"If the policyholder had to report the circumstances of the risk on the 
basis of written questions supplied by the insurer, the insurer may 
rescind on account of omitted information about a fact that was not 
expressly asked about only in the event that there was fraudulent 
concealment." 
In France, the formulation of the duty of disclosure is narrower than 
in the United Kingdom and Germany, following amendment to the law in 
198994 . As it now stands, the formulation of the duty of disclosure 
91 para 2(b) (i) of the Statement of General Insurance Practice, 
para 2(a)(iii) of the Statement of Long Term Insurance Practice. 
92VVG section 16. Translation by Pfennigstorf, German Insurance 
--' 
Laws. 
93 VVG , section 18. 
94Under the old law, spontaneity was required on the part of the 
proposer in bringing information to the attention of the insurer. 
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in France does not require spontaneity95. A proposal form is mandatory 
under the new law and a proposer is reqUired96 only: 
"De repondre exactement aux questions posees par l'assureur, notamment 
dans Ie formulaire de declaration du risque par lequel l' assureur 
l' interroge lors de la conclusion du contrat, sur les circonstances qui 
sont de nature a faire apprecier par l'assureur les risques qu'il prend 
en charge;". 
As regards marine insurance, the law governing such contracts in France 
and Germany is distinct from the law governing other classes of 
business. In France, the formulation of the duty of disclosure in 
marine insurance97 requires spontaneity: it is closely related to the 
formulation of the duty in section 18 of the MIA 1906 although it 
refers to information which is material to the particular insurer 
rather than the hypothetical prudent insurer referred to in the MIA 
1906. In Germany, the formulation of the duty of disclosure in marine 
insurance98 is similar to that applied to non-marine classes. 
(b) Reciprocity 
In the United Kingdom, the duty of disclosure applies to both parties 
to the contract. Although the duty of the insured to disclose 
information material to the risk is the most obvious element of the 
rule of disclosure, the House of Lords has held in Banque Financiere99 
that the duty is mutual and as far as the insurer is concerned extends 
to disclosing all facts known to him which are material either to the 
risk to be insured or the recoverability of a claim under the policy 
95 See Christian Bouckaert, "The Declaration of Risks, the Aggrava-
tion of Risks and Relevant Sanctions", a paper presented at the 
Insurance and the Law Seminar, Cambridge 6-7 April 1993. 
96 Code des Assurances, Article LI13-2. 
97Code des Assurances, Article LI72-19. 
98Commercial Code, section 806. 
99Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. 
[1991] 2AC 249. 
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which a prudent insured would take into account in deciding whether or 
not to place the risk for which he sought cover with the insurer. 
In both France and Germany, the duty of disclosure is formulated as a 
duty of the insured, with no mention made of the insurer. However, this 
omission has to be considered within the context of the role of the 
principle of good faith in general contract law which was discussed in 
part 1. It is possible to argue that the overriding principle of good 
faith applied to both the negotiation and performance of contracts in 
Germany imposes an obligation of disclosure on the insurer during the 
negotiations for an insurance contract. Given the weakness of the 
argument in favour of a general rule of pre-contractual disclosure in 
France, it seems likely that there is no general rule of contract law 
which imposes a duty of disclosure on the insurer in pre-contractual 
negotiations. However, as already noted in section B above, the Code 
des Assurances lOO does impose on the insurer an obligation to provide 
a proposer with relevant information as to rates and cover. 
(c) The Application of the Disclosure Rule to Different Policyholders 
As already noted, French and German law distinguishes between marine 
and non-marine classes as regards the formulation of the duty of 
disclosure. However, all policyholders purchasing the same class of 
insurance are treated in a similar manner. 
In the Uni ted Kingdom, the effect of the Statements of Insurance 
Practice is that the formulation of the duty of disclosure differs 
depending on whether the insurance was purchased in a "pri va te 
capacity" or not. Where it has been purchased in a private capacity, 
the insured is required to disclose only material facts which a 
reasonable insured could be expected to disclose 101 . Although the law 
has not been amended by the Statements of Practice, the effect is that 
a policyholder is treated differently in respect of different purchases 
100Article Ll11-2. 
101 Para. 2 (b) (i) of the Sta tement of General Insurance Practice and 
para. 3(a)(iii) of the Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice. 
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of insurance within the same class of business: thus, for example, a 
small businessman is subject to a different rule of disclosure in 
respect of fire insurance for his house and his shop. 
(d) Freedom of Contract 
In the United Kingdom, the substance of the duty of disclosure cannot 
be altered to the disadvantage of the proposer in cases where insurance 
is purchased in a private capacity. This situation arises due to the 
commitment of most insurers to the Statements of Insurance Practice, 
which modify, on a self-regulatory basis, the strict common law duty 
of disclosure in favour of the insured102 . However, as far as commer-
cial insurances are concerned, it would be possible to amend the common 
law duty of disclosure in favour of ei ther partyl03. 
The position in Germany bears some resemblance to the United Kingdom 
as there is limited scope to alter the duty of disclosure, which may 
be amended by the contracting parties in a manner which favours the 
policyholder104 . 
France adopts the strictest approach in that it does not allow 
considerations of freedom of contract to permit modification of the 
duty of disclosure: in common with many other provisions of the Code 
des Assurances, the duty of disclosure cannot be amended105 by 
contract terms. 
l02 The Statements are discussed in greater detail in chap. 5. 
l03 See Pan Atlantic Ins. Co. Ltd. v Pine Top Ins. Co. Ltd. [1992] 
1 Lloyds Rep 101 and Court of Appeal (The Times 8.3.1993). 
l04 VVG section 34 (a) provides that a contract deviating from 
section:u5 to the disadvantage of the policyholder cannot be relied on 
by the insurer. Although this allows for some measure of freedom of 
contract, it is within the context of a system of administrative 
control which requires prior approval of standard contract terms. 
l05Article Ll13-2 is mandatory, by virtue of Article Llll-2, and 
therefore cannot be amended by the contracting parties. 
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2. The Information to be Disclosed 
It is a common feature of the insurance contract laws of the three 
relevant Member States that the information to be disclosed by the 
proposer to the insurer must be "material" to the risk. However, the 
delimitation of information material to the risk varies between the 
three in several important respects, with the result that the proposer 
for insurance is subject to a different standard in each country. 
(a) Materiality 
The starting point here is that the information must be material to the 
insurer in respect of the risk being considered. However, it is 
possible to apply either a subjective test, which relates the 
information to the particular insurer or an objective test which 
relates the information to a hypothetical insurer. 
In the United Kingdom, the test is objective in that materiality is 
judged by the standard of the hypothetical prudent insurer. The MIA 
1906106 provides that: 
"Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgement of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will 
take the risk." 
A similar test has been applied by the courts to other classes of 
business107 . However, this rule has been modified in respect of 
insurances purchased in a private capaci ty by the Statements of 
Insurance Practice 108 which provide that insurers will not repudiate 
liability for non-disclosure of information which a reasonable 
policyholder could not be expected to have disclosed. 
106Section 18(2). 
107Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
485. 
l08 See note 101 above. 
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In France, the test is a subjective one as the reference in Article 
Ll13-2 of the Code des Assurances is to the particular insurer. The 
trial courts have the sovereign power to determine whether or not non-
disclosure had an influence on the insurer's appreciation of the risk. 
An example can be seen in a decision of the Cour de Cassation109 which 
upheld a lower court's decision to reject repudiation of a motor policy 
due to non-disclosure of three minor accidents on the basis that they 
could not have had a bearing on the insurer's appreciation of the risk. 
The German test is also subjective as section 16 of the VVG refers to 
"the insurer", with no mention being made of a hypothetical insurer. 
(b) The Knowledge of the Proposer 
It is possible to distinguish an objective and a subjective test in 
respect of the information which the proposer for insurance is deemed 
to know. 
The test in the United Kingdom is objective. The MIA 1906 provides that 
the issue of whether any particular circumstance is material is a 
question of fact 110 and the courts have taken the view that it is the 
actual or presumed knowledge of the proposer which is re1evant
ll1 
However, this has been modified in respect of insurances purchased in 
f I I P t
· 112 
a private capacity by the Statement 0 Genera nsurance rac lce 
which provides that the declaration at the foot of the proposal form 
should be restricted to completion according to the proposer's 
knowledge and belief. 
109premiere Chambre Civile, 10 Mar. 1987: RGAT 1987 p392. 
llOSection 18(4). 
lllWoolcott v Sun Alliance [1978] 1 WLR 493. 
112 para . l(a). 
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In France, the amendment to the law in 1989 abolishing the spontaneous 
duty of disclosure reduces the scope for insurers to dispute the 
knowledge of the insured, as such issues can only now be related to 
questions asked by the insurer. Prior to this amendment, the proposer 
was obliged to disclose circumstances known to him which might 
influence the judgement of the insurer. Whilst this was essentially a 
subjective test, the courts had been prepared to take a broad view of 
actual knowledge. For example, the Cour de Cassation l13 in 1980 upheld 
an appellate court decision which had found that an insured under a 
policy covering bodily injury could not have been unaware of the risk 
to which he was exposed owing to the potential reprisal of the lover 
of his mistress, after he had assaulted the latter and received threats 
from the former. The courts have also taken the view that the proposer 
cannot hide behind inexcusable ignorancel14 . 
As noted above, the insured's duty of disclosure in Germany is framed 
so as to be subjective, although section 16(2) of the VVG makes clear 
that the proposer is in breach of the duty of disclosure if he has 
fraudulently avoided knowledge of circumstances material to the risk. 
(c) The Judgement of the Insurer 
In the United Kingdom, the MIA 1906115 provides that: 
"Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgement of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will 
take the risk." 
Until 1984, it was accepted that this should be interpreted as meaning 
that the relevant information should be of such a nature as would have 
resulted in different action by the insurer as regards either the 
113Decision of June 4, 1980. Extracted from "The Making and 
Breaking of Insurance Contracts: The Duty of Disclosure under French 
Law", a paper presented by Christian Bouckaert and Robert Byrd II at 
the British Insurance Law Association Conference, July 12-14 1989. 
114 Civ . 5 avr. 1949: RGAT 1949 p161. In this case it was held that 
the proposer should have been aware of the pregnancy of his mare. 
115Section 18(2). 
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decision to write the risk or the premium rate and terms on which it 
was writtenl16 . However, following the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in CTI v Oceanus 117 , it is no longer necessary to prove that the 
prudent insurer's decision would have been altered: it is sufficient 
to show that the disclosure would have had an impact on the formation 
of his opinion wi thout necessarily changing the decision to accept, the 
premium or the terms. This decision represents an expansion of the 
previous duty of disclosure in the United Kingdoml18 and distances it 
from the position in France and Germany. 
In France, prior to the 1989 amendment of the duty of disclosure, it 
was necessary to prove that the particular insurer would have changed 
his decisionl19 . The trial courts have the sovereign power to deter-
mine whether in fact the relevant information would have had this 
effect. Following the amendment of the duty of disclosure in 1989, 
questions involving the judgement of the insurer are unlikely to arise 
frequently as the proposer's duty is limited to answering questions 
posed by the insurer. 
In Germany, section 16 of the VVG makes clear that the relevant 
information must have affected the particular insurer's decision to 
enter the contract or whether to do so under the agreed terms. 
3. Non-Disclosure and Misrepresentation 
It is not only the formulation of the duty of disclosure at the 
inception of the contract which varies among the three Member States. 
116 A leading case is Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Ontario Metal 
Products [1925] AC 344. 
117 Container Transport International v Oceanus Mutual Underwri ting 
Association [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476. 
118The law in the United Kingdom is discussed in greater detail in 
chap. 5, part 2. 
119 See Georges Durry, "Assurances Terrestres", para 141 in Dalloz, 
Encyclopedie Juridique. 
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The consequences of the insured's120 breach of the duty of disclosure 
also vary. The law in the United Kingdom treats the insured particular-
ly severely although it has been modified by insurers on a voluntary 
basis in the case of insurances purchased in a "private capacity". In 
the case of both France and Germany, the insurer who wishes to avoid 
liability for non-disclosure is subject to several constraints which 
protect an insured who has acted in good faith. In contrast to the 
voluntary and limited modification of the law in the United Kingdom, 
the safeguards in France and Germany apply to all policyholders 
purchasing categories of insurance covered by the insurance contract 
law statutes 121 . 
No material distinction is made in any of the three Member States 
between non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Each gives rise to the 
same consequences in the Uni ted Kingdom122 . In Germany, sections 16 
and 17 of the VVG, dealing with non-disclosure and misrepresentation 
respectively, treat each in a similar fashion. The Code des Assurances 
in France deals with non-disclosure and misrepresentation in the same 
section123 and provides for similar remedies. 
(a) The Relevance of Good Faith 
Despite the constant reference made in case-law in the United Kingdom 
to uberrima fides as the guiding principle of insurance contract law, 
the good faith of a proposer who is in breach of the duty of disclosure 
is of little relevance to the remedies available to the insurer. This 
120 In the United Kingdom, the consequences of the insurer's breach 
of the duty of disclosure are the same as those in respect of the 
insured. In France and Germany the insurance contract law statutes do 
not impose a specific duty of disclosure on the insurer: however, the 
general principle of good faith may apply. 
121 In Germany, reinsurance and marine business are not subject to 
the VVG (s .186). In France, reinsurance and credi t insurance are 
excluded from the Code des Assurances (Article L111-1). 
122 This point is discussed in greater detail in chap.5, part 2. 
123 Art icle L113-8. 
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principle was settled at an early stage in the leading case of Carter 
v Boehm124 , where Lord Mansfield said: 
"Although the suppression should happen through mistake, without any 
fraudulent int~Qtion; yet still the underwriter is deceived and the 
policy is voidlL~." 
However, where the insured has acted in good faith, the premium is 
recoverable on the grounds that the risk never attached126 . 
By contrast, the insurance contract laws in France and Germany both 
provide a measure of protection to the insured who has acted in good 
faith. As already noted, the amendment of the French law has restricted 
the scope of the duty of disclosure to questions asked by the insurer. 
Additional protection is available in the case of an insured acting in 
good faith. The Code des Assurances 127 provides that prior to a loss, 
the insurer may either demand an increased premium or, having given due 
notice to the insured, cancel the contract and return the unexpired 
premium to the insured. After a loss has occurred, the insurer is 
obliged to pay the claim but the principle of proportionali ty is 
applied: the payment is reduced by the ratio of the premium actually 
charged to that which would have been charged had the risk been 
properly disclosed128 . Proportionality is a mandatory provision of the 
Code des Assurances and cannot therefore be avoided by contract terms. 
In Germany, the insurer is not entitled to avoid the contract for non-
disclosure where the insured has acted in good fai th129 . However, it 
is for the insured to prove that non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
124(1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
125 This reference to void has been taken by commentators to mean 
voidable. 
126Feise v Parkinson (1812) 4 Taunt. 640. 
127 Article L113-9. 
128 The principle of proportionali ty does not apply in marine 
insurance where the non-disclosed information would have led the 
insurer to decline the risk (Code des Assurances, Article L172-2). 
129Sections 16(3) and 17(2) of the VVG provide for this in respect 
of non-disclosure and misrepresentation respectively. 
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was not a result of any fault on his part. An example of this can be 
seen in a case 130 involving a proposal for sickness insurance in which 
the insurer expressly requested information about any in-patient 
treatment, investigations, operations or out-patient treatment and 
whether any such had been recommended during the last five years. The 
proposer had given a negative and thus inaccurate answer to the last 
question and only a partial answer in respect of in-patient treatment. 
It was held that the insurer was entitled to avoid the contract ab 
initio according to sections 16(1) and 17(1) of the VVG. 
(b) The Consequences of Bad Faith 
There is no material distinction in the United Kingdom between non-
disclosure made in good or bad faith as in both cases the insurer can 
avoid the contract. However, where the proposer has acted fraudulently, 
he cannot recover any premiums paid131 . 
A more substantial distinction is made in France between good and bad 
faith, in that the protection extended to an insured who has acted in 
good faith is not available to an insured who has acted in bad faith. 
The Code des Assurances 132 provides specifically for avoidance of the 
contract by the insurer where a non-disclosing proposer has acted in 
bad faith. Moreover, the premiums paid are vested in the insurer who 
is entitled to payment of outstanding premiums by way of damages. In 
Germany, the insurer is similarly entitled to avoid the contract where 
there is non-disclosure accompanied by bad fai th133 , al though this 
remedy is subject to a requirement of causality (see below). 
130District Court, 
1988/398. 
Stuttgart 23.12.1986: Versicherungsrecht 
131Feise v Parkinson (1812) 4 Taunt. 640. 
132Article L113-8. 
133 VVG , sections 16 (2) and 17 (1) provide for rescission in the 
event of non-disclosure and misrepresentation respectively. 
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(c) Causality between Non-Disclosure and Loss 
A significant difference between the United Kingdom and France, on the 
one hand, and Germany on the other, relates to the issue of causality 
between the non-disclosure and the loss suffered by the insured. In the 
United Kingdom, the MIA 1906 contains no requirement of causality and 
the courts have followed this in respect of other classes of busi-
ness
134
. In France, the Code des Assurances provides specifically 
that causali ty is not required in the case of intentional non-
disclosure on the part of the insured 135 : nor is there a requirement 
of causality in the case of unintentional non-disclosure136 . 
However, in Germany, section 21 of the VVG provides that an insurer 
who rescinds after a loss is bound to pay a claim prior to rescission 
if there is no causal connection between the non-disclosure and the 
loss. 
(d) Partial Rescission 
The provisions of the VVG which provide for partial rescission137 of 
the contract distinguish German insurance contract law from that of the 
United Kingdom 138 and France. The VVG provides that where the insurer 
has the right to rescind for non-disclosure in respect of a part of the 
134Jones and James v Provincial 1929 Ll LRep 135. 
135 Article Ll13-8. 
136Article Ll13-9. Causality is not relevant to the prOV1S10ns of 
the article relating to the discovery of unintentional non-disclosure 
prior to a loss as the principle relates pre-contractual information 
to the occurrence of a loss. 
131Section 30. 
138Spencer Bower, Turner & Sutton (Actionable Non-Disclosure (2nd. 
edn.) para 14.15) state that rescission must be in toto or not at all, 
but recognise that where there are severable covenants or stipulations 
to be considered, one may be rescinded without interfering with others. 
However, as it is difficul t to find any examples in insurance of 
partial rescission, the basic rule of rescission in toto appears better 
established than the exception, and also has support in precedent: 
Urquhart v MacPherson (1878) 3 AC 831. 
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objects or the persons covered by the insurance, the insurer has the 
right to rescind or to terminate with respect to the other part only 
if it is to be assumed that the insurer would not have made the 
contract for that part alone with the same provisions. The effect is 
that the duty of disclosure is applied to severable and discrete parts 
of the contract and not necessarily the contract as a whole. 
Bearing in mind what has already been said regarding the insurer's 
right to rescind, it is clear that partial rescission in Germany can 
operate only in circumstances where the insured has acted in bad faith 
and even then the insurer may be liable for losses prior to rescission 
where there is no causal connection between the non-disclosure and the 
loss. 
E. OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE CONTRACT 
1. Change in Risk 
(a) Increased and Excluded Risks Distinguished 
A distinction can be drawn between risks covered by a policy which 
increase during the period of cover and those which are excluded from 
the cover139. This distinction is significant in France and Germany 
because of the duty imposed on the insured to disclose increases in 
risk during the course of the contract. The formulation of the duty 
varies between France and Germany, but in each case the intention is 
to ensure that the insurer is aware of any significant changes in the 
risk being covered. However, the distinction between increased and 
excluded risk is of little relevance to the United Kingdom, where the 
duty of disclosure generally ends on conclusion of the contract. 
139Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Droi t des Assurances (7th edn.) p188, 
provides several examples of the distinction in French law: prior to 
1985, the attachment of a trailer to a vehicle invalidated the 
insurance cover for the vehicle; failure to comply with safety measures 
have been categorised as both increase in risk and excluded risks 
depending on whether observance would have influenced the insurer's 
decision to accept (excluded risk) or simply have resulted in a higher 
premium (increased risk). 
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The difference in approach can be explained by the practice of tacit 
renewal of insurance policies in France and Germany, which allows the 
policy to be renewed without any action on the part of the insured. In 
those circumstances, difficul ties would arise if the duty of disclosure 
were limited to inception and renewal of the contract, due to the 
insured's lack of involvement in the renewal process. By contrast, the 
general practice in the United Kingdom is for the policy to be renewed 
annually by the active acceptance by the insured of the insurer's offer 
of renewal: in these circumstances a duty of disclosure which arises 
only at inception and renewal provides a workable solution. 
(b) The Duty to Disclose Increased Risk 
In the United Kingdom, the duty of disclosure applies at inception of 
a new insurance contract, at renewal or at the time of a modification. 
It follows that there is no general duty to disclose changes in risk 
during the currency of the policy. However, some policies stipulate 
that the insured is required to inform the insurer where information 
provided at inception has subsequently changed in a manner which may 
affect the premium or terms of insurance 140 . In the case of life 
assurance, the duty of disclosure extends until payment of the first 
premium141 . 
In Germany, the VVG provides 142 that if the policyholder acquires 
knowledge that the risk has been increased by a change made or 
permitted without the insurer's approval, he must inform the insurer 
without delay. 
In France, the duty to inform the insurer of increased risk is narrower 
than in Germany, following amendment of the law in 1989. The current 
position is that the insured is required to disclose all new circum-
140 See , for example, The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233, where the 
policy required notice of ships entering an "additional premium area" 
in the Arabian Gulf. 
141See chap.5, part 2. 
142Section 23(2). 
139 
stances which result in either aggravating the risk or creating new 
risks and thus render inaccurate or void the answers given to the 
insurer at the inception of the contract and in particular in the 
proposal form 143 . Prior to amendment, the duty had been to disclose 
circumstances specified in the policy which increased the risk. 
However, specific contract terms can no longer override the amended 
rule which is mandatory144 and cannot therefore be altered by the 
contracting parties. 
(c) The Effect of Declaration of Increased Risk145 
In France, the insurer's right to terminate the contract is limited to 
circumstances which would lead ei ther to declinature or a higher 
premium at inception or renewal of the contract 146 . No distinction is 
made between circumstances which do or do not result from the action 
of the insured. 
In Germany a distinction is made between circumstances which result in 
an increase in risk independently of the policyholder's will and those 
which result from his action or which he allows to occur. The basic 
principle is that the insurer must consent to an increase in risk and 
failure by the policyholder to inform the insurer of any form of 
increased risk allows the insurer to terminate the contract. However, 
as will be seen in the next subsection, the scope for the insurer to 
terminate for breach of the duty to inform is qualified by several 
caveats which operate in favour of the insured. 
143Code des Assurances, Article Ll13-2. 
144 By virtue of Article Llll-2. 
145 This subsection is not relevant to the law in the Uni ted 
Kingdom. 
146Code des Assurances, Article L113-4. 
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(d) The Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Increase in Risk 
The consequences of non-disclosure of increase in risk vary between 
France and Germany. The French approach is to provide for a narrow duty 
of disclosure of increased risk combined with strict sanctions, whilst 
the German law is based on a broad formulation of the duty accompanied 
by restrictions on the remedies available to the insurer. In the United 
Kingdom, the absence of any general obligation to disclose increase in 
risk means that it is only where the obligation is a specific term of 
the contract that the insurer can avoid liability for claims following 
the insured's failure to disclose. 
In France, the remedies available to the insurer for breach of the duty 
to disclose increased risk are generally the same as for non-disclosure 
at the inception of the contract147 . Thus, the issue of good or bad 
faith is relevant: the latter makes the contract void whilst the former 
resul ts in the application of the principle of proportionali ty148 , 
which reduces the indemni ty payable to the insured. An example of 
failure to inform increased risk is a case of a farmer with a public 
liability policy who did not disclose an increase in the area of land 
which he was farming 149 . The amendment of the law in 1989, has, 
however, complicated the remedies available to the insurer. It 
provides 150 that, where the contract provides for repudiation of 
claims by the insurer due to late notice of increased risk, repudiation 
is only possible if the insurer has suffered prejudice. This amendment 
has been criticised151 as introducing confusion into an area of law 
which previously operated in a rational and equitable fashion. 
147Georges Durry, op. cit. note 115 above, para 164. 
148 The application of the principle was set out in section D.3.a, 
above. 
149Georges Durry, op.cit. note 115 above, "Mise A Jour 1992" para. 
165, cites this case ( Civ. Ire 25 Nov. 1986, D. 1987 Somm. 181). 
150Code des Assurances, Article L113-2-4. 
151 See Lambert-Faivre, op.cit., p198. 
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In Germany, the remedies available to the insurer vary according to 
whether the increase in risk has been brought about by the insured or 
not. Where it has ( or the insured has permitted a third party to 
effect an increase in risk ), the insurer's right to terminate is 
dependent on the faul t of the insured152 . If the latter is at faul t 
in not disclosing the increased risk, the insurer has the right to 
terminate immediately. If there is no faul t on the part of the 
policyholder, termination is only effective after the expiry of a 
month. Where the increase in risk does not result from the action of 
the insured, failure to inform153 releases the insurer from liability 
for claims occurring more than one month after the insurer should have 
received notice (i.e. claims one month after the time the insured knew 
of the increase in risk). However, there are three caveats to this rule 
which operate in favour of the insured154 : 
(i) the insurer's obligation continues if it knew of the 
increased risk; 
(ii) the same applies if at the time of the loss the period for 
termination by the insurer (one month) has expired and a 
termination has not been effected or; 
(iii) if the increase in risk had no influence on the occurrence 
of the insured event or the extent of the insurer's liability 
(absence of causality). 
(e) Decrease in Risk 
Decrease in risk is a less contentious issue than increase as the 
probabil ty of loss is reduced rather than increased. However, the 
insured has a particular interest in decrease of risk as regards his 
right to demand a proportionate reduction in premiums. There is no 
difference in substance in this respect between the three Member States 
152 VVG , section 24, governs unauthorised increase in risk. 
153 The policyholder must inform the insurer without delay as soon 
as he acquires knowledge of the increase of the risk (VVG sect ion 
27[2]) . 
154 VVG section 28( 2) . --' 
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under examination but it is useful nevertheless to refer to the 
relevant laws in the context of the consideration of changes in risk. 
In the United Kingdom, there does not appear to be a specific duty to 
disclose reduction in risk. However, it is possible to argue that such 
a duty flows from the overriding principle of good fai th as the 
disclosure is relevant to the insurer for the purpose of calculating 
total values at risk and also in purchasing reinsurance. The right of 
the insured to demand a proportionate reduction in premium may also be 
regarded as flowing from the principle of good faith. 
The Code des Assurances in France does not provide specifically for a 
duty to inform the insurer of a decrease in risk. However, specific 
provision is made for the right of the insured to terminate the 
contract if the insurer refuses a reduction in premium following a 
decrease in risk 155 . 
The posi tion in Germany is similar to France in that there is no 
specific obligation imposed on the insured to inform the insurer of 
decrease in risk, but the insured has the right to demand a reduction 
. . i th . t s156 In premIum nose CIrcums ance . 
2. Compliance with Contract Terms 
(a) The Categorisation of Contract Terms 
A distinction can be drawn between the English and German approach to 
contract terms on the one hand and the French approach on the other. 
In the United Kingdom, a distinction is made between warranties and 
other terms of the insurance contract: warranties are fundamental terms 
155Code des Assurances, Article L113-4-14. 
156 VVG section 41 (a) . --' 
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of the contract whereas other terms are less important 157 . The German 
VVG distinguishes a particular category of obligation of the insured 
(obliegenhei t) from other insurance contract terms 
(versicherungsbedingungen). An obliegenheit does not translate 
precisely into English158 but covers many of the situations in which 
warranties are applied in the United Kingdom. However, unlike 
warranties in the United Kingdom, the main feature of the German 
obliegenheit is that it provides the insured with special protection 
in the event of breach. One commentator159 has described the position 
as follows: 
"A peculiarity of German law is the existence of 'Obliegenheiten'. 
These are obligations of a lesser intensity since the insured cannot 
be forced to comply with them and the failure to do so will not lead 
to a liabili ty for damages but it may endanger his insurance coverage." 
By contrast with the position in the United Kingdom and Germany, the 
French Code des Assurances makes no reference to the categorisation 
of policy terms, thereby leaving issues which in English law would be 
tackled under the specific law of warranties relating to insurance to 
be reconciled under the general principles of contract law. 
(b) The Consequences of Non-Compliance 
In the United Kingdom there is a strict requirement of compliance with 
warranties: they must be exactly160 complied with and if they are not 
the insurer is discharged from liabili ty as from the date of the 
157 For a more detailed discussion of the law of warranties in the 
United Kingdom, see chap.5. 
158Pfennigstorf, German Insurance Laws, comments (p132): 
" .. there is no English equivalent combining in the same way the 
concepts of a personal duty and of a condition and at the same time 
covering such a wide range of different situations." 















breach161 . However, the practice is modified in the case of insurances 
purchased in a private capaci ty by the undertaking162 that insurers 
will not repudiate liability on the ground of breach of warranty where 
the circumstances of the loss are unconnected with the breach (absence 
of causali ty) . 
The German VVG starts from the position that breach of an obliegenhei t 
releases the insurer from liability. However, there are several 
safeguards which operate in favour of the insured 163 : 
(i) the insurer is not released from liability if the breach has 
occurred without the fault of the insured; 
(ii) the insurer is only freed from liabili ty if there is a 
causal connection between the breach and the occurrence of the 
insured event or the amount of the loss; 
(iii) an agreement under which the insurer would have a right to 
rescind the contract upon the breach of an "obliegenhei til is 
void. This last section is one of the compulsory provisions of 
the VVG. 
An example of the importance of faul t in determining a breach of 
warranty can be seen in a case164 before the German Federal Supreme 
Court. It was held that, whilst by virtue of section 71 VVG, the 
insured was under a warranty to give notice to the insurer of any 
transfer of ownership of the subject-matter insured, fault must be 
present before the rights of the insured are forfeited and the remedy 
available to the insurer must not be disproportionate to the severity 
of the insured's breach of duty. 
161 The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233. 
162 para . 2(b)(iii) of the Statement of General Insurance Practice 
and para. 3(b) of the Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice. 
163 VVG , sect ion 6. 
164Federal Supreme Court decision of 11.2.1987, Versicherungsrecht 
1988/398. 
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As already noted above, no general distinction is made in France 
between the different terms of an insurance contract. 
3. Claims 
(a) The Duties of the Insurer 
In all three Member States under examination the insurer is subject to 
a duty of good faith during the claims process. However, in the United 
Kingdom, this represents a speci fic rule applicable to insurance, 
whereas in France and Germany it is the result of general rules of 
contract law. 
In the United Kingdom, the conduct of the insurer during the claims 
process is subject to the duty of good faith which operates for the 
dura t ion of the con tract 165. However, the insurer does not owe the 
insured a separate common law duty of care, such as would be actionable 
in tort 166. Moreover, the courts have been reluctant to extend the 
insurer's duty of good faith to persons other than the insured167 . 
In France, the conduct of the insurer during the claims process is 
subject to the overrriding principle of contract law that contracts 
must be performed in good faith 168 . The Code des Assurances does not 
provide for any similar rule to be applied specifically to insurance 
contracts. Similarly in Germany, the VVG does not make provision for 
the standard of the insurer's conduct during the claims process. The 
165 See Boulton v Houlder Bros. & Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 784. 
166Banque Financiere de la Cite v Westgate Insurance Co. [1988] 2 
Lloyd's Law Rep 513. That decision was later affirmed by the House of 
Lords on other grounds: [1991] 2 AC 249. 
167 See The Good Luck [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 238, 264 (per May LJ). 
That decision was later reversed by the House of Lords on other 
grounds: [1992] 1 AC 233. 
168Article 1134 of the Civil Code. See part 1 of this chapter. 
146 
situation is therefore governed by Article 242 of the German Civil Code 
concerning good faith in the performance of contracts 169 . 
(b) The Duties of the Insured 
In the United Kingdom, the insured as well as the insurer is bound by 
the duty of good faith during the claims process: 
"I t is an essential condition of the policy of insurance that the 
underwriters shall be treated with good faith, not merely in reference 
to the incr~tion of the risk, but in the steps taken to carry out the 
contract." 
In France, the primary duty of the insured on the occurrence of a 
claim, as set out by the Code des Assurances, is to give notice to the 
insurer. The amendment of the law in 1989 limited the use of contractu-
al terms whereby the insurer can avoid liabili ty for claims not 
reported within the limits set by the policy to situations in which the 
insurer has been prejudiced by the delay171. Whilst this amendment has 
restricted the abuse of repudiation for delay in reporting claims, it 
has beeen cri ticised l72 for confusing remedies available for breach 
of contract in the civil law with the specific contractual right of the 
insurer to avoid liability for late-reported claims 173 . 
In Germany, the provisions of the VVG 174 regarding the insured's 
duties on a claim cover both the provision of notice and the furnishing 
169 See part 1 of this chapter. 
170Boulton v Houlder Bros. & Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 784,791. 
171 The provisions of Article Ll13-2 in respect of the reporting of 
claims and repudiation of late-reported claims are not applicable to 
life assurance. 
172See Lambert-Faivre, op. cit., p280. 
173 The process by which the insured loses his right to indemnity 
for failure to report his claim within the time limit set by the policy 
is referred to as "d~ch~ance". This is a conventional sanction which 
must always be contained in a policy term which is printed in a manner 
which draws the insured's attention to its significance. 
174 Sect ions 33 and 34. 
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of information to the insurer. Moreover, the VVG contains a specific 
duty (obliegenhei t) obliging the insured to act so as to minimize 
10sses175 : however breach of this duty will only allow the insurer to 
avoid liability for a claim where the breach was intentional or due to 
gross negligence 176 . 
As with the duties of the insurer, the duties of the insured during the 
claims process in France and Germany are also regulated by the general 
principle of good faith in the performance of contracts 177 . 
(c) The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality distinguishes French insurance 
contract law from that of both the United Kingdom and Germany, neither 
of which adopt the approach of adjusting the claim. It has already been 
noted that the principle is applied in France for the purposes of 
reducing the claim in circumstances where avoidance of the contract by 
the insurer is regarded as an unduly harsh remedy. Those circumstances 
are first where the proposer has unintentionally breached the duty of 
disclosure at inception and secondly where the insured has unintention-
ally failed to disclose increase in risk. 
The position in the United Kingdom appears less flexible in that the 
insurer, having discovered that there has been non-disclosure on the 
part of the insured, is faced with a choice of either honouring the 
contract and paying the claim in full or rescinding the contract and 
°do 1° b·lit 178 aVOl lng la 1 y . 
175Section 62(1). 
176 VVG , section 62 (2) • 
177 See part 1 of thi s chapter. 
178Subject to the caveat in note 134 above. 
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In Germany, partial rescission179 offers a solution which avoids the 
cancellation of the entire contract for non-disclosure related to a 
particular aspect of the coverage. However, it does not seek to adjust 
the claim payable to the insured. Thus, although the circumstances in 
which rescission can be effected vary, the posi tion in the Uni ted 
Kingdom and Germany is similar in that the insured's claim will either 
be paid in full or not at all. 
F. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 
1. Non-Life Insurance 
The practice in France and Germany differs from the United Kingdom in 
that the former two Member States allow for the automatic extension of 
the insurance contract whereas the normal practice in the Uni ted 
Kingdom is for the contract to end at the expiry of the policy term in 
the absence of positive action by the insured to accept the insurer's 
offer of renewal. 
The normal practice in the United Kingdom is for the policy to remain 
in force for one year, expiring at midnight on the last day. Where the 
cover is for an indefinite period, it is likely that the courts will 
imply a term that cover shall not last beyond a reasonable time 180 . 
In Germany, the VVG 181 provides that where insurance is entered into 
for an indefini te period, the duration is deemed to be one year182. 
An agreement under which an insurance relationship is deemed to be 
tacitly extended unless notice is given prior to the expiration of the 
179 See section D.3.d above. 
180Allagar Rubber Estates Ltd. v National Benefit Assurance Co Ltd. 
(1922) 12 LI LR 110. 
181Section 8. 
182 VVG , section 9.The presumption does not apply if the premiums 
are measured by shorter intervals. 
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contract term is valid for extension of only one year in each case l83 . 
Termination of the contract by either party is possible at the end of 
each year, subject to notice during a period of between one and three 
months prior to the year-end184 . 
The French Code des Assurances provides that the duration of the 
contract and conditions for termination of the contract should be fixed 
by the policy185. However, both insurer and insured have the right to 
terminate the contract at the end of each year, subject to the 
provision of two months' notice l86 . Moreover, the policy must remind 
the insured of the right to cancel at the end of each year. 
2. Life Assurance 
Life assurance differs from non-life in that the cover is usually fixed 
in advance for a number of years. The concept of renewal of the policy 
applied in the non-life sector is not relevant as the premium and cover 
are based on the age and health of the individual at a point in time: 
at any subsequent date it is certain that the risk would be materially 
different. 
The termination of policies prior to the end of their fixed term has 
therefore been approached in a different fashion in the life sector. 
Two issues in particular have attracted the attention of the legisla-
ture and regulators. The first is the need to provide a "cooling-off" 
period to the consumer who has agreed to a life contract without fully 
considering his position. The second is the desire to extend a measure 
l83 This practice is common in Germany. WG section 8 refers to 
"the insurance relationship" ("versicherungsvertrag") as opposed to the 
"contract" ("vertrag") which is used in other contexts. 
l84 VVG section 8(2) provides that it is possible for the parties 
to waive their rights to terminate for up to two years. 
l85Code des Assurances, Article Ll13-2 governs termination of the 
contract. 
l86The annual right to terminate the contract need not be provided 
for in individual sickness policies and those covering commercial 
risks. 
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of protection to the insured who wishes to cancel ("surrender") the 
contract prior to maturity and who may face stiff penalties for doing 
so. 
(a) Cancellation Rules 
The "Cooling-Off" provisions of the Third Life (Framework) 
Directive187 will ensure harmonisation of one aspect of insurance 
contract law among the Member States. The result will be that most 
policyholders will have a period of between 14 and 30 days from the 
time of intimation of conclusion of the contract in which to cancel. 
This represents an important step in providing equivalent protection 
for the policyholder in each Member State188 . 
(b) Early Surrender Rules 
The absence of specific rules in the United Kingdom in respect of the 
early surrender of policies distinguishes it from both France and 
Germany. The distinction reflects a basic difference in approach to the 
regulation of life assurance. France in particular, and Germany to some 
extent, favour product rules, that is rules which determine in detail 
the rights of the parties under specific forms of life policy. The 
United Kingdom, by contrast, adopts a marketing based approach to the 
regulation of the life sector with the emphasis on controlling the 
methods in which life policies are sOld189 . 
187Directive 92/96, OJ 1992 L360/1. Article 30 extends the right 
of cancellation to all policyholders with two exceptions: first, those 
entering contracts of six months' duaration or less; and secondly, 
those whose status or circumstances at the time of entering the 
contract are such that they do not require special protection. The 
cancellation provisions of the Second Life Directive ( 90/619, OJ 1990 
L330/90, Article 15) apply only to "services" business. 
188However, as the Directive does not make clear the consequences 
of failure to comply wi th the "cooling-off" rules, they may vary 
between Member States. 
189 This is achieved through the Conduct of Business Rules 
introduced under the authority of the Financial Services Act 1986. 
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In the United Kingdom, life policies generally provide the policyholder 
with a right to a surrender value after the expiry of a certain period. 
The Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice provides190 : 
"Life assurance policies or accompanying documents should indicate 
... whether or not there are rights to surrender values in the contract 
and, if so, what those rights are." 
However, in most cases, there is no reference to the method of 
calculation191 . Instead, protection of the policyholder is pursued 
through a requirement that sample surrender values be disclosed to the 
proposer prior to entering into a contract 192 . 
The Code des Assurances in France provides that a life policy must 
refer to the fact that surrender values are regulated by decree 193 . 
The maximum proportion of policy funds which may be retained by the 
insurer is fixed by decree 194 . Moreover, where the insured has 
requested the surrender proceeds of the policy and the insurer fails 
to pay within two months, the proceeds are subject to penal interest 
rates. 
The German VVG is much less specific in its control of surrender 
values, providing that the insurer is enti tIed to a "reasonable 
deduction" from the policy funds which are to be returned to the 
insured. This is backed up by a procedure which enables the Insurance 
190 para . 2(b)(i). 
191 This is despi te the fact that the Securi ties and Investments 
Board (SIB) has indicated that, in 1991, 37% of unit-linked endowments 
and 23% of with-profits policies were terminated within two years of 
inception. The approach to surrender values in the UK has been 
criticised by the Director-General of Fair Trading: see "Fair Trading 
and Life Insurance Savings Products" (March 1993). 
192This forms part of the "product particulars" which are required 
to be provided by a life insurer to a proposer for life assurance under 
rule 5.14 of the Rulebook of the Securities and Investments Board. 
193Article L132-21. 
194 Code des Assurances, Article R 132-1 represents the decree and 
provides that the proportion may not exceed 5% of the mathematical 
provision. In the case of policies in force for more than ten years, 
no charge may be made by the insurer. 
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Supervisory Authority to intervene in cases where the surrender values 
provided by an insurer consistently fall below the industry aver-
age195 . 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The importance of good faith as a general principle of contract law 
varies among the Member States under examination. There has been little 
development of the principle of good fai th in the Uni ted Kingdom 
outside the confines of the duty of disclosure in insurance. By 
contrast, the duty of disclosure in France and Germany is framed within 
the context of a broader principle of good faith in the negotiation and 
performance of contracts. 
2. The approach to freedom of contract varies between France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. The Code des Assurances in France is largely 
manadatory in that its provisions cannot generally be altered by the 
contracting parties. The VVG in Germany also contains many mandatory 
provisions. By contrast, there are few mandatory provisions of 
insurance contract law in the United Kingdom. In France and Germany, 
the provisions of statutes relating to unfair contract terms apply to 
insurance, whereas insurance in the United Kingdom is exempt from the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The Statements of Insurance Practice 
protect policyholders in the United Kingdom who have purchased 
insurance in a private capacity, but do not amend the law. 
3. The substance of insurance contract law varies materially between 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Although Loheac has argued
196 
that the provisions of the laws of the Member States converge to a more 
marked degree than might have been imagined, there are important 
differences: as already discussed, these differences are visible at all 
stages of the contract from negotiation to performance of the contract 
and termination. Moreover, it is important to note that the common 
195 VVG , section 81 (c) . 
196Francis Loheac, Introduction to EEC - Insurance Contract Law (A 
CEA publication, 1990). 
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law/civil law distinction does not account for all the areas of 
difference. There are three important aspects on which the French and 
German laws differ: the first is in respect of the formulation of the 
duty of disclosure; the second is the principle of proportionality 
which is found only in France; and the third is the requirement of 
causality in Germany in cases of non-disclosure and breach of warranty 
(obliegenheit). 
4. Distinctions betweeen Categories of Policyholders 
It is only in the United Kingdom that a distinction is made between 
di fferent categories of policyholder. The Statements of Insurance 
practice "modify" the normal rules of insurance contract law in respect 
of individuals who purchase insurance in their "private capacity". The 
result is that a small businessman, for example, may be subject to 
different standards as regards his personal and business insurances. 
The approach in France and Germany is different. Certain categories197 
of insurance business are exempt from the provisions of the insurance 
contract law statutes but no distinction is made between different 
types of POlicyholder 198 . Thus, the approach differs from the British 
model in that there is equivalence of treatment between all policyhold-
ers purchasing the same policy. 
197 In Germany, reinsurance and marine business are not subject to 
the VVG (s. 186). In France, reinsurance and credi t insurance are 
excluded from the Code des Assurances (Article L111-1). 
198 A distinction is made between policyholders for the purposes of 
authorisation and supervision of insurers following the implementation 
of Communi ty Di recti ves 88/357 and 90/619 (the "second generat ion" 




HARMONISATION - AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO DIFFERENCES IN 
CONTRACT LAW? 
Introduction 
In this chapter, consideration is given to harmonisation as an 
alternative to the approach adopted by the insurance Directives to 
differences in contract law. Part 1 sets out the case for harmonis-
ation: this involves an examination of the Treaty basis for Community 
action, the functioning of the Single Market in insurance, the 
principle of subsidiarity and comparison of the approach in the United 
States wi th that in the Community. In Part 2, the draft Insurance 
Contract Law Directive is examined in order to determine if it still 
represents a suitable basis for action in the light of the completion 
of the Single Market programme. 
PART 1: THE CASE FOR HARMONISATION 
A. THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Alternative solutions to that adopted by the Community in the field of 
contract law fall into two categories: those which involve working 
within the choice-of-Iaw approach incorporated in the insurance 
Directives and those based on harmonisation of contract law. As 
discussed below, the principle of mutual recognition, which forms the 
basis of the Community's system of prudential supervision, has only a 
limited contribution to make to the resolution of issues arising from 
differences in contract law. 
1. Alternative Rules of Private International Law 
Solutions falling within this category would essentially be designed 
to simplify the rules of private international law in the field of 
insurance. The most obvious approach would be to apply the Rome 
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Contracts Convention to insurancel . Cousy2 advances three reasons for 
adopting such an approach: 
(i) it would avoid "parallelism"j in the rules of private 
international law and bring the insurance sector into line with 
the banking and investment services sectors which are subject to 
the Rome Convention4; 
(ii) the differences between the choice of law rules of the Rome 
Convention and the insurance Directives are not greatS; 
(iii) the Rome Convention strikes a better balance between free 
choice of law and the protection of the consumer. 
However, it is highly unlikely that Member States would agree to the 
substitution of the provisions of the insurance Directives by those of 
IThis solution was proposed by a Joint Working Party of the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions which reported in 1979 on the 
choice of law rules in the draft Second Non-life Directive: the 
complexity of the rules led it to the conclusion that it would be best 
to apply the rules of the draft Obligations Convention (which formed 
the basis of the Rome Contracts Convention) to "large" risks and leave 
"mass" risks to be governed by national rules of private international 
law. 
2Herman Cousy, "Concluding Report", in "Insurance Contract Law in 
the Single Market Law Applicable, Public Policy Provisions, 
In terna tional Conventions", XI I International Colloquium of Magis tra tes 
and Insurers (Avignon 4-7 October 1991). 
3This refers to competi tion among different sets of rules of 
private international law. Cousy takes the view that the very existence 
of different sets of rules gives rise to problems of this nature in 
relation to the demarcation of the scope of each set of rules. 
4Cousy also notes that the dispari ty in treatment between the 
banking and investment services sector on the one hand and the 
insurance sector on the other gives rise to concern as regards the 
"transparency" of products which are sold to the same customer base and 
are designed to meet similar objectives. The recent rapid growth of 
"bancassurance" makes this issue particularly relevant. 
Scousy does, however, concede that the Rome Convention gives a 
higher priority to freedom of choice than do the insurance Directives. 
As argued in chap.2, this represents an important difference. 
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the Rome Convention: that option was available at the time of the 
negotiation of the Second Directives and was rejected. Moreover. 
alternative solutions based on choice-of-law rules which did not apply 
the Rome Convention would do little to reduce the complexity of the 
existing system and would leave the insurance sector out of line with 
banking and investment services as regards choice of law. 
2. Harmonisation of Insurance Contract Law 
The attraction of solutions involving harmonisation is that they would 
dispense pro tanto with the restrictions on freedom of contract and 
choice of law which are currently justified in the area of "mass" and 
life risks for the purposes of consumer protection. However, in order 
to make a significant contribution, the harmonisation would have to 
cover all the essential provisions of insurance contract law: this 
would ensure that equivalent protection was available to a consumer 
irrespective of choice of law and would therefore open the way for a 
simplification of the rules of private international law, as restric-
tions on choice of law would no longer be justified6• 
A possible solution post-harmonisation would be the abandonment of the 
rules of private international law contained in the insurance 
Directives and the application instead of the Rome Contracts Conven-
tion. This combination would have the effect of providing a uniform 
standard of consumer protection throughout the Community, whilst also 
simplifying the rules of private international law. As discussed below, 
it is likely that such an approach would encourage the development of 
cross-border business and help in the realisation of the economic 
benefits identified in the Cecchini Report7 as likely to flow from the 
completion of the Single Market in insurance. 
6The original draft of the Second Non-Life Directive (1975) 
provided for a free choice of law: at that time it was thought that an 
insurance contract law Directive would be adopted prior to the 
liberalisation of freedom of services in insurance: see W. Pool, "Moves 
Towards a Common Market in Insurance" 21 CMLRev (1984) 123,143. 
7Commission of the EC, Research on the "Cost of Non-Europe" 
(1988). See chap.l. 
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3. The Relevance of the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
As discussed in chapter 1 t the regulation of the Single Market in 
insurance is based on the principle of mutual recognition of the rules 
of individual Member States. Harmonisation has been confined to those 
areas which have been regarded as necesary to allow the operation of 
a system of "home country control": these are essentially the 
authorisation procedure, solvency margins and the principles governing 
technical reserves. A different policy has been adopted in respect of 
conditions of insurance in that neither mutual recognition nor 
harmonisation has been pursued: the favoured solution has been the 
dismantling within the Community of all systems of prior approval of 
policy conditions and rates. 
In approaching the issues which arise from the existence of differences 
in insurance contract law between the Member States, it is relevant to 
look to the principle of mutual reCOgnitionS as the foundation of the 
rules governing the Single Market in insurance. Differing views have 
been expressed as regards the relevance of mutual recogni tion to 
differences in contract law. Roth9 takes the view that harmonisation 
of insurance contract law is not necessary and that choice-of-Iaw rules 
are more in keeping with the principle of mutual recognition. However, 
Biancarelli 10 argues that the principle of mutual recogni tion has 
little to contribute to issues of contract law within the Single Market 
in insurance: 
" .. to what extent can a financial contract, be it an insurance contract 
or for that matter a banking contract, be assimilated to a bottle of 
"Cassis de Dijon" liqueur, with regard to the freedom of circulation 
it is entitled to, in the Community area and in the future single 
market? 
SOn the history of the principle of mutual recognition, see A. 
Mattera, "L'Article 30 du Traite CEE, la jurisprudence "Cassis de 
Dijon" et Ie principe de la reconnaissance mutuelle", Revue du March~ 
Unique Europeen 1992 vol 4 p13. 
9"The European Economic Community's Law on Services: Harmonis-
ation" 25 CMLRev (1988) 35. 
10 "General Report", CEA XI I Interna tional Colloquium, op. ci t. 
p26. 
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It appears to me that the assimilation made, in this regard, by the 
Commission between the freedom of movement for merchandise and the 
freedom of movement for financial products, i.e. in the final analysis, 
for legal concepts, is somewhat excessive and based on a totally 
fictitious analogy." 
Biancarelli's case is the stronger, it is submitted, as the principle 
of mutual recognition and contract law are separate issues: the former 
governs the access of products to national markets and the latter the 
obligations of the provider and recipient of services. Nevertheless, 
there is an area of common ground between the policy underlying the 
principle of mutual recognition and the resolution of issues arising 
from differences in contract law. This common ground lies in the field 
of consumer protection. Mutual recognition is predicated on the 
proposition that a consumer in one country receives an equivalent level 
of protection when purchasing a product from a provider of services 
subject to the control of a different Member State. Harmonisation has 
ensured that this is so as regards the prudential supervision of the 
business of insurers. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the 
relationship of insurer to policyholder varies according to the 
applicable law, with the result that policyholders in different Member 
States do not have an equivalent level of protection. This divergence 
limits the possibility of recognising the laws of another Member State 
as providing an adequate degree of consumer protection and, as will be 
discussed later, opens the possibility to Member States of imposing 
restrictions on freedom of services. 
B. A TREATY BASIS FOR HARMONISATION? 
1. The Legal Framework for Community Action 
Article 190 of the Treaty provides that: 
"Regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and of the 
Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall 
refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained 
pursuant to this Treaty." 
In order to satisfy this requirement, Community measures must include 
a statement of the facts and law which led the competent Institution 
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to adopt them11 . Moreover, the choice of a legal basis for a measure 
may not depend simply on the Institution's conviction as to the 
objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are 
amenable to judicial review12 . Barents13 notes that this requirement 
serves two purposes: first, it allows the Community to attain the 
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty; and secondly, it has a 
guarantee function as it protects Member States, insti tutions and 
indi viduals from acts with respect to which the Communi ty has no 
powers. 
2. The Treaty Basis of the draft Directive 
The Treaty basis of the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive14 was 
Articles 57(2) and 66. The preamble to the Directive made clear that 
a major objective of harmonisation was the creation of a framework 
which would allow for the exercise of full freedom of services within 
the Community: 
"whereas such co-ordination, by establishing a balance between the 
interests of the insurer on the one hand and the protection of the 
policyholder and insured person on the other, is likely to enable 
freedom of choice to be extended and thus to facilitate the exercise 
of freedom to provide services". 
The immediate objective which the draft Insurance Contract Law 
Directive was intended to achieve was the adoption of the Second Non-
Life Directive. As agreement was reached without harmonisation and as 
many of the restrictions left in place by that Directive will be 
removed once the Non-Life Framework Directive enters into force l5 , it 
is possible to argue that the Treaty basis of the original Insurance 
IICase 45/86, Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493. 
120n choice of legal bases see: S. Crosby, "The Single Market and 
the Rule of Law" 16 ELR (1991) 451; and G. Close, "Harmonisation of 
Laws: Use or Abuse of the Powers under the EEC Treaty" 3 ELR (1978) 
461. 
13Rene Barents, "The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations 
on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation" 30 CMLRev (1993) 85. 
14COM (79) 355 final as amended by COM (80) 854 final. 
15The implementation date is 1.7.1994 (subject to derogations). 
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Contract Law Directive is no longer appropriate. However, as will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter, there are grounds for holding that 
harmonisation would improve the operation of the Single Market in 
insurance. In particular, it will be argued that harmonisation would 
assist the free circulation within the Community of insurance policies 
lawfully marketed in any Member State. Articles 57(2) and 66 could 
therefore still form a valid Treaty basis for a harmonisation 
Directive, but, as discussed below, other Treaty provisions provide a 
clearer basis for action. 
3. Alternative Treaty Bases 
(a) Article 10016 
This provides a possible legal basis for a measure harmonising 
insurance contract law. However, there are two reasons for arguing that 
it is not the most appropriate legal basis. First, it relates to 
measures which "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market". Measures which relate to the smooth operation of the 
Single Market, such as harmonisation of insurance contract law, fall 
more obviously within Article 100A which relates to measures "which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market,,17. Secondly, as discussed below in relation to Article 100A, 
the Court of Justice has made clear that the co-operation procedure18 
contained in Article 100A may result in preference being given to it 
as the most appropriate legal basis. 
16 Article 100. 
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market. 
The Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee shall be consulted 
in the case of directives whose implementation would, in one or more 
Member States, involve the amendment of legislation. 
17However, as discussed below, there is no substantive difference 
between the "common market" and the "internal market". 
18This is set out in Article 149 of the Treaty. 
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(b) Article 100A19 
The introduction of Article 100A into the Treaty by the Single European 
Act has provided an alternative Treaty basis for the harmonisation of 
insurance contract law. Whilst Article 100 provides only for harmonis-
ation of measures which directly affect the establishment or working 
of the common market, Article 100A provides for harmonisation of 
measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market. Article 8A, which was also introduced by the 
Single European Act, provides that the internal market is to be 
established over a period expiring on the 31st December 1992 and that 
it shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The Court of Justice has 
taken the view in the Titanium Dioxide case20 that, whilst there is 
no substantive difference between the "common market" referred to in 
Article 100 and the "internal market" referred to in Article 100A, the 
co-operation procedure provided for in Article 100A cannot be avoided 
by recourse to al ternative Treaty bases where it is clear that a 
measure falls within Article 100A. This is not to say that the choice 
of Article 100A as a legal basis will be influenced primarily by its 
requirement for co-operation. The Court's decision in Titanium Dioxide 
makes clear that there must be objective grounds, such as distortions 
in competition which affect the functioning of the Single Market, to 
justify the choice of Article 100A21 . 
19Article 100A. 
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise 
provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8A. The Council shall, 
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in co-
operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation 
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. 
20Commission v Council (case 300/89), [1991] ECR I 2867. 
21See Barents, op.cit., p95. 
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The issue of whether or not differences in insurance contract law 
affect the functioning of the Single Market will be examined in section 
C, below. However, at this point, it is worth noting that Article 100A 
has already been ci ted by the Commisssion as the basis for the 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts22 , the preamble of 
which states: 
"Whereas the laws of Member States relating to the terms of contract 
applicable between the seller of goods or supplier of services, on the 
one hand, and the consumer of them, on the other hand, show many 
disparities, with the result that the national markets for the sale of 
goods and services to consumers differ from each other and that 
distortions of competi tion may arise amongst the sellers and suppliers, 
notably when they sell and supply in other Member States;" 
Article 100A(3) provides that the Commission, in its proposals 
envisaged in Article 100A(I) concerning health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level 
of protection. At present, the Communi ty has no express policy on 
consumer protection al though many measures have been adopted which 
include consumer protection among their objectives23 . Three programmes 
for consumer protection have been adopted by the Community in 1975, 
1981 and 1986 respectively. More recently, the Commission adopted a 
Three Year Action Plan of Consumer PoliCy24 which concentrated policy 
ini tiatives on measures needed for the completion of the Single Market. 
The latter resulted in the publication in 1990 of the draft Directive 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
The failure to develop a coherent consumer protection policy has 
attracted criticism both from within Community institutions and from 
outside. McGee and Weatheril1 25 have argued that there is a general 
22Directive 93/13, OJ 1993 L95/29. 
23For a history of the Communi ty' s involvement in the field of 
consumer protection see: Background Report, Consumer Policy in the 
European Comunity - An Overview, ISEC/B2/93 (1st Jan.1993). 
24COM (90) 98 final. 
25"The Evolution of the Single Market - Harmonisation or Liberali-
sation" 53 MLR (1990) 578. 
163 
trend for the dismantling of national barriers to take place without 
parallel action to create a Community regime which effectively protects 
the consumer and that such an approach fails to take the protective 
function of commercial law as seriously as its role in facilitating 
free trade. A similar approach has been adopted by the Economic and 
Social Committee which has recently proposed26 that consumer policy 
be given greater priority as a policy in its own right rather than 
simply as an adjunct of Single Market proposals. 
Two issues are particularly important in any consideration of consumer 
protection in the field of insurance. One is the necessity to ensure 
that any authorised insurer will have sufficient resources to pay 
claims: the other is the need to ensure a proper balance in contract 
law between the interests of the insurer and insured. 
The Communi ty' s regulatory structure for insurance has ensured that the 
quality of security offered by insurers operating in the Community 
meets certain minimum standards. Thus, all policyholders are protected 
by provisions designed to ensure that an insurer remains solvent and 
can pay claims. However, as was established in chapter 3, the balance 
between the interests of the insured and insurer in contract law varies 
throughout the Community. Such a situation is incompatible with the 
operation of the Single Market in that the product which is delivered 
to the consumer (essentially a set of contingent claims against the 
insurer), whilst ostensibly homogeneous, varies according to the 
contract law which is applicable. The result is that the degree to 
which insurance contract law protects the consumer differs among the 
Member States. 
Moreover, the Consumer Contracts Directive does not offer a solution 
to the establishment of an equivalent standard of protection for 
insurance policyholders throughout the Community. As noted in chapter 
227 , the Directive excludes insurance contract terms which clearly 
260pinion on Consumer Protection and Completion of the Internal 
Market, OJ 1991 C339/08. 
27See section C.2.a. 
164 
define or circumscribe the insured risk and the insurer's liability. 
The exclusion can be justified on the basis that the Directive was an 
inappropriate28 mechanism for dealing with insurance contract law 
but there are two unsatisfactory consequences. First, as discussed in 
chapter 2, fundamental terms of an insurance contract are excluded from 
the Consumer Contracts Directive whilst some less important terms 
appear to be included. Secondly, the Community's consumer protection 
poicy has ignored the insurance sector despite it being one in which 
most consumers are active. 
(c) Article 129A of the European Community Treaty29 
Wi thin the context of Article IDDA, harmonisation of insurance contract 
law can be considered only in terms of its impact on the functioning 
of the Single Market, which, at present, does not encompass general 
considerations of consumer protection. Ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union would provide greater impetus to the harmonisation of 
insurance contract law through its addition to the Treaty of Rome of 
an explicit recognition of the Community's role in consumer protection. 
Article I29A of the European Community Treaty provides that: 
1. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of 
consumer protection through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article IDDA in the context of the 
completion of the single market 
(b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued 
by the Member States to promote the heal th, safety and economic 
interests of consumers and to provide adequate information to 
consumers. 
28The British Insurers International Committee opposed the 
Consumer Contracts Directive in a written submission to the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Community (see 6th Report 1991-
92). Its opposition was based on the belief that the Directive might 
restrict the use of essential exclusion clauses, such as war risks, and 
that the definition of "unfair" contract terms was too vague. 
29 The Treaty of Rome as amended by the Treaty on European Union is 
referred to as the European Community Treaty. 
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This article would provide an additional basis to Article 100A for a 
harmonisation Directive, particularly in respect of those aspects of 
insurance contract law such as cancellation provisions and transparency 
in life policies which are directly concerned wi th consumer protection. 
C. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SINGLE MARKET IN INSURANCE 
Any attempt to justify harmonisation of insurance contract law within 
the Community on the basis of Article lOOA must demonstrate that 
differences in contract law have an impact on the functioning of the 
Single Market. The Community's willingness to take action under Article 
IOOA has been criticised on the basis that there are circumstances in 
which other Treaty provisions are more appropriate30 and that Article 
100A has been used as a means of escaping from the framework of 
specific powers attributed to the institutions by the Treaty31. 
However, it is submitted that differences in insurance contract law 
represent an area in which resort to Article IOOA can be justified. The 
impact of differences in contract law on the functioning of the Single 
Market in insurance can be summarised as follows: 
1. They distort competition by treating differently purchasers of the 
same product in different Member States; 
2. They result in varying degrees of freedom of contract in insurance 
and divergence in the degree of freedom of choice of law among the 
Member States; 
3. They allow greater reference to the "general good" as a justifica-
tion for restrictions on freedom of services than would be possible 
with harmonisation. 
Each of these points is examined in greater detail below. 
30 See Crosby, op.cit. 
31See Barents, op. cit. pI08. 
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1. Competition 
Harmonisation is not always the appropriate response to situations in 
which there is a diversity of approach between national legal systems 
within the Community. As argued in chapter 132 , the approach to the 
Single Market through the principle of mutual recognition implies some 
degree of competition between national systems. However, it is 
submi tted that competition between national systems of insurance 
contract law produces no material benefit to the Community and that 
there is a clear case, based on measures already adopted by the 
Community, for arguing that differences in contract law represent a 
distortion of the Treaty rules on competition. 
(a) The Impact of Differences in Insurance Contract Law 
The main effect of differences in insurance contract law among the 
Member States of the Communi ty is that they create distinctions 
betweeen policyholders in different Member States as regards their 
rights and obligations in respect of an insurance contract. This can 
arise in two ways. First, the possibility of a claim being paid, or the 
amount to be paid, may vary according to the contract law which governs 
the contract. Secondly, the extent to which a proposer for insurance 
has a right to receive information from the insurer during the pre-
contractual period may vary. The effect is that purchasers of the same 
product in different Member States are treated differently. It is not 
just that the policyholders rights and obligations in relation to the 
product difffer but that the very nature of the product itself may 
differ in that it mayor may not provide cover against the insured 
event. 
Kitch33 has argued, in the context of the federal system in the United 
States, that diversity in state legal and regulatory systems carries 
32See chap 1, section J. 
33E. Ki tch, "Regul a t ion and the American Common Market", in A. Dan 
Tarlock, Regulation, Federalism and Interstate Commerce (1981), pp 7-
55. 
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wi th it benefits in the form of increased efficiency and consumer 
choice which results from competing jurisdictions. However, Porter34 
has argued that the potential benefi ts of such di versi ty may be 
eliminated where social values such as consumer or environmental 
protection are subject to competition between legal orders. The latter 
view holds good in relation to insurance contract law wi thin the 
Community: competition between national systems of contract law would 
lower the prevailing level of consumer protection without offering any 
obvious benefits in terms of increased efficiency or greater product 
choice. This view is implicitly recognised by the Community's approach 
to insurance contract law which restricts competition between national 
systems in the case of non-life "mass" risks and life assurance. As 
noted by Reich35 , the choice-of-law rules adopted by the Community are 
necessary so long as insurance contract law is not harmonised in order 
to provide an adequate protection mechanism for the insured. 
(b) The Community's approach to Competition and Harmonisation 
It is clear that the Community has been prepared to take action to 
limit the scope for competition between national legal systems where 
it has a distorting impact on the operation of the Single Market. There 
is ample precedent in the form of measures adopted within the Community 
for the contention that differences in contract law represent a 
distortion of competition. 
(i) The Consumer Contracts Directive 
The preamble to the Consumer Contracts Directive36 identifies the 
presence of a marked divergence in national laws relating to unfair 
contract terms as a distortion of competition in that it may deter 
consumers from direct purchases of goods or services in another Member 
34M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), pIS. 
35Norbert Reich, "Competi tion between legal orders: a new paradigm 
of EC law?", 29 CMLRev (1992) 861. 
36Directive 93/13, OJ 1993 L9S/29. 
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State. It also notes that a lack of knowledge on the part of consumers 
as to the rules of law of other Member States may deter them from 
entering into transactions wi th suppliers based in other Member States. 
It follows from this approach that the presence of any divergence in 
contract law which results in consumers being treated differently in 
different Member States may well constitute a distortion of competi-
tion. The Consumer Contracts Directive therefore reinforces the 
Commission's original contention37 that differences in insurance 
contact law represented a distortion of competition. 
(ii) The Product Liability Directive 
Comparison can also be made wi th the Product Liabili ty Directi ve38 
which was adopted under Article 100 of the Treaty as a measure designed 
to cure market distortion caused by legal differences between the 
Member States. The preamble to that Directive states: 
"Whereas approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the 
liability of the producer for damage caused by the effectiveness of his 
products is necessary because the existing divergences may distort 
competi tion .. " 
The Product Liability Directive introduced only a limited form of 
harmonisation39 , but it does illustrate a willingness to treat differ-
ences in national laws as an obstacle to the functioning of the Single 
Market. An objective underlying the Product Liability Directive was to 
reduce competi tive distortions arising from differences in product 
liability premiums which producers in different Member States would be 
required to pay. By way of analogy, it seems clear that if distortions 
arise due to differences in product liability premiums, they arise also 
where the law governing the insurance contract differs as in each 
instance producers in each Member State are in a different position. 
37This appeared in the explanatory memorandum to the draft 
Insurance Contract Law Directive. 
38Directive 85/374, OJ 1985 L2l0/29. 
39Article 15 allows Member States to choose whether to retain the 
"development risk" defence and Article 16 allows for the adoption of 
an aggregate limit for damage or injury caused by identical items. 
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(iii) The Insurance Directives 
The presence of insurance contract law measures in the Second and Third 
Life Directives, in the form of provisions in respect of "transparency" 
and the policyholder's cancellation rights, is based on their impact 
on competition. The preamble to the Third Life Assurance Directive, 
referring to the "transparency" provisions, states: 
" Whereas in a single insurance market the consumer will have a wider 
and more varied choice of contracts; whereas if he is to profit fully 
from this diversity and from increased competition, he must be provided 
with whatever information is necessary to enable him to choose the 
contract best suited to his needs .. " 
If competition is distorted by divergence in information provided to 
a proposer for insurance during pre-contactual negotiations, it seems 
a fortiori that it is also distorted by differences in the rights and 
obligations of policyholders who have purchased a policy, for example 
in respect of their rights to have a claim paid. Both have the capacity 
to affect the choice of policy available to the purchaser, through 
their influence on the insurer's decision in respect of whether to 
offer a policy in a particular Member State. The distinction which 
apppears 40 to be made in the insurance Directives between measures of 
insurance contract law which affect competition and those that do not 
is therefore a false one and should be remedied by a coherent approach 
to harmonisation within the Community. 
2. Freedom of Contract and Choice of Law 
Freedom of contract and freedom of choice of applicable law are 
important guiding principles for the regulation of insurance within the 
Single Market. The latter is evident mainly in the regime applicable 
to "large" non-life risks, where there are no restrictions on choice 
40 This distinction is not express, but is implicit in the 
rejection of any wide-ranging harmonisation of insurance contract law. 
Indeed the Second and Third Life Directives do not treat the issues of 
"transparency" and cancellation rights as measures related to contract 
law although, as argued in chap.2, they do fall into this category. 
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of law. The objective of freedom of contract is evidenced by the 
aboli tion of prior approval of policy forms and rates, which will 
result in the dismantling of much of the administrative control of 
insurance contracts in continental Europe. 
However, the presence of differences in insurance contract law has two 
consequences. First, obstacles to freedom of contract may remain in 
place and secondly, the complex provisions governing choice of law, 
made necessary by the abandonment of the draft Insurance Contract Law 
Directive, are likely to act as an impediment to the development of 
services business in insurance. 
(a) Freedom of Contract 
Freedom of contract within the Single Market will be enhanced by two 
developments. The first is the abolition of prior approval of contract 
terms and rates and the second is the greater choice of insurers which 
will be available to policyholders though the introduction of full 
freedom of services. 
Abolition of prior approval entails a substantial change in practice 
in Member States such as France and Germany, where administrative 
control of insurance contracts is well established. The current law in 
France41 provides for the approval, in respect of non-life "mass" 
risks, of not only policy forms but also proposal forms, sales 
literature and premium rates. In Germany, the authorisation process42 
involves the submission of standard policy terms and, for some classes, 
premium rates. The dismantling of this system of administrative control 
clearly involves a significant change in practice for those Member 
States. 
Full freedom of services creates the potential for a greater degree of 
freedom of contract accompanied by a wider choice for consumers in 
41Code des Assurances, Article R310-6. 
42 VAG section 5. --' 
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purchasing insurance. Restrictions which have been applied in the past 
were well illustrated in the case of Commission v Germany43, where the 
requirement for establishment in Germany on the part of an insurer was 
held to be incompatible with Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty. The 
operation of the "single licence" system on completion of the Single 
Market will enable an insurer authorised in any Member State to write 
insurance business in any other Member State wi thout the need for 
separate authorisation and without any need to maintain an establish-
ment in the relevant state. 
However, differences in contract law constitute a significant 
limitation on freedom of contract. The abolition of prior approval of 
policy forms and rates represents only a partial dismantling of 
substantive controls on the terms of insurance policies as the degree 
to which national insurance contract laws allow for freedom of contract 
varies substantially. In France, for example, much of the Code des 
Assurances is mandatory in the sense that it cannot be altered by 
contract terms. In Germany, some parts of the insurance contract law 
statute can be altered by contract terms whilst others cannot. Contract 
law in the United Kingdom imposes no substantive controls on the terms 
of insurance contracts. Thus, the abolition of prior approval of 
contract terms has the potential to enhance freedom of contract in 
Germany to a greater extent than in France, whilst no change will be 
evident in the United Kingdom. 
An example illustrates that insurance contract terms can be influenced 
as much by insurance contract law as by administrative control. Section 
33 of the VVG provides that a policyholder has to give notice to the 
insurer without delay as soon as he acquires knowledge of the 
occurrence of a loss. As this is not a compulsory or semi-compulsory 
section of the VVG44 it will be open to change at the discretion of -- , 
the contracting parties following the abolition of prior approval of 
43Case 205/84, [1986] ECR 3755. 
44Certain sections of the VVG are compulsory in the sense that no 
deviations are possible. Other sections are semi-compulsory in that 
deviations to the advantage of the insured are permitted. See chap. 3. 
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contract terms. However, in France, the law governing claims notifica-
tion45 is not capable of amendment by contract terms: the abolition 
of prior approval of contract terms will not alter French insurance 
contract law and therefore will have no impact on freedom of contract 
in this situation. 
The presence of differences in contract law within the Single Market 
means that varying levels of control over policy conditions are likely 
to remain in place through the medium of contract law. The effect of 
this will be felt both in establishment and services business. In the 
former case, the extent to which freedom of contract exists in each 
national market will vary. In the latter case, differences in contract 
law may resul t in restrictions on access to products offered by 
insurers established in states other than that of the purchaser: this 
gives rise to considerations relating to restrictions on freedom of 
services which are permitted on the basis of the general good, which 
are considered in greater detail in subsection 3 below. 
(b) Choice of Law 
Differences in contract law can restrict choice of law when they fall 
wi thin the category of mandatory rules 46 . The choice-of-Iaw rules 47 
in respect of both the life and non-life sectors provide that such 
rules may override a choice of law. Two consequences follow. First, 
differences in mandatory rules lead to divergence in the degree of 
choice of law among the Member States. Secondly, issues relating to 
permissible restrictions on freedom of services may be triggered by the 
application of mandatory rules: this gives rise to considerations 
relating to restrictions on freedom of services which are permitted on 
the basis of the general good, which are considered in greater detail 
in subsection 3 below. 
45 Code des Assurances, Article Ll13-2, which provides for 
notification within the period provided for by the policy, which must 
be no less than five working days. 
46 In the sense in which this term was used in chap.2. 
47 See chap. 2 . 
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3. The General Good 
(a) The General Good and the Insurance Directives 
The origins of the concept of the "general good" in Community law lie 
in the "judicial exception" to Article 59 of the Treaty which has been 
developed by the Court of Justice in its delimitation of permissible 
restrictions on freedom of services. The various elements48 of the 
"judicial exception" were brought together by the Court in the 
insurance cases, but, as Chappatte has demonstrated49 , each of the 
individual elements were evident in the case-law of the Court prior to 
its decision in the insurance cases50 . 
The Framework Directives follow the decision of the Court of Justice 
in Commission v Germany in providing that a host state can only 
prevent the sale of an insurance contract where it conflicts with its 
legal provisions protecting the general good51 . The preamble to each 
Directive attempts to specify the conditions for the application of the 
principle: 
"Whereas wi thin the framework of an internal market it is in the 
policyholder's interest that he should have access to the widest 
possible range of insurance products available within the Community so 
that he can choose that which is best suited to his needs; whereas it 
is for the Member States in which the risk is situated to ensure that 
48 The relevant measures must satisfy the tests of objective 
justification in the general interest, non-discrimination, equivalence 
and proportionality. See chap. 1. 
49philippe P. Chappatte, "Freedom to Provide Insurance Services in 
the European Community" 9 ELR (1984) 3. 
50The "judicial exception" to Article 59 differs from the Treaty 
exception contained in Article 56. The latter relates to discriminatory 
measures which may be adopted by a Member State in order to restrict 
freedom of services on the basis of public policy, public security or 
public health. The Second Life Directive (Article 14(5) ) specifically 
referred to the right of Member States to apply this exception. 
Smulders & Glazener, op. ci t., take the view that Article 14 (5) is 
purely declaratory: it is any case deleted by virtue of Article 35 of 
the Third Life Directive. For a more detailed discussion of Article 59, 
see chap.l. 
51Article 28 of both Directives. 
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there is nothing to prevent the marketing within its territory of all 
the insurance products offered for sale in the Community as long as 
they do not conflict with the legal provisions protecting the general 
good in force in the Member States in which the risk is situated, and 
in so far as the general good is not safeguarded by the rules of the 
home Member State, provided that such provisions must be applied 
without discrimination to all undertakings operating in that Member 
State and be objectively necessary and in proportion to the objective 
pursued;" 
This adds little to the delimitation of the principle of the general 
good by the Court of Justice. In particular, it does not address the 
issue of the field of application of the mandatory rules of contract 
law of the Member States. As discussed below, this issue is fundamental 
to the delimi tation of the general good as applied to insurance 
contracts. 
(b) The General Goood and Contract Law 
The concept of the general good in the field of insurance encompasses 
contract law but also extends to administrative (public law) rules 
which exist for reasons of prudential supervision. In relation to 
contract law, the issue of the general good arises in the application 
of mandatory rules of contract law, that is those rules from which it 
is not possible to derogate by way of contract. Smulders and 
Glazener52 distinguish mandatory rules and provisions relating to the 
general good in the following terms: 
"Mandatory rules should nevertheless be distinguished from provisions 
relating to the protection of the general good in that the former are 
part of a set of Community rules of conflict, whereas the latter are 
essentially a 'Communi ty fil ter' in order to avoid the contracting 
parties' freedom of choice of applicable law becoming unduly restrict-
ed." 
The application of mandatory rules of contract law must be in 
accordance wi th the concept of the general good insofar as they 
restrict freedom to provide services53 . However, the extent to which 
52 op.cit. p792. 
53 This follows from the delimitation of the "judicial exception" 
to Article 59 in the insurance cases and corresponds with the view of 
Smulders & Glazener, op.cit. p792. 
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the concept of the general good permits restrictions based on mandatory 
rules of contract law is not entirely clear: mandatory rules are 
determined by each individual Member State and most of them pre-date 
the development of the concept of the general good in Community law. 
The possibility of abuse of the provisions of the insurance Directives 
relating to the general good has been recognised by the Department of 
Trade and Industry54 in the United Kingdom: 
"We would be concerned if Member States sought to construe the 
definition of the general good too widely and thereby justify unfair 
barriers to trade, but it is for the Court, not the directive, to 
determine what may legitimately be justified in the general good." 
A similar view has been expressed wi thin the Comi te Europeen des 
Assurances55 : 
".it is not unlikely that the concept of mandatory private internation-
al law becomes a certain compensation for the form of consumer 
protection that, to date, the supervisory authorities ensure by way of 
prior approval of insurance contracts." 
In framing its approach to contract law, the Commission has recognised 
the need to limit the field of application of mandatory rules. Sir Leon 
Brittan, setting out the Commission's approach to the Framework 
Directives, said56 : 
"Our general aim will be to limit those national mandatory contract 
condi tions whose effect is to limi t consumers' freedom of choice 
without being justified in terms of consumer protection." 
However, the absence of precise definition of the field of application 
of mandatory rules means that the risk of abuse of the general good 
arises where the law governing the contract differs from the law of the 
country of the establishment from which services are being provided. 
54 DT1 Consultative Document on the Third Life Directive, para. 
4.28. 
55A view expressed by the German delegation at the CEA' s 12th 
Annual Legal Colloquium (Avignon 4-7 October 1991). Similar views were 
expressed by the Spanish and Belgian delegations. See J. Biancarelli, 
"General Report", op.cit. p39. 
56 In an address to the CEA in 1989. Extracted from Regulation of 
Insurance in the United Kingdom and Ireland, (Editors T.H. Ellis & J.A. 
Wiltshire) p.A.5.5-04. 
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In most cases, the law governing the contract will be that of the State 
in which the policyholder is resident. This provides the policyholder 
with the protection of his own national law. The problems likely to 
arise in Member States having recourse to the general good are due to 
manadatory provisions of the applicable law which dictate the form or 
contract terms of insurance policies. These may have the effect of 
limiting access to national markets of insurance policies lawfully 
marketed in other countries 57 . 
This is ultimately a question for the Court of Justice which, given the 
plethora of mandatory rules which abound wi thin the Communi ty, is 
likely to arise in the near future. It is submitted that only 
"internationally mandatory" rules of contract law, that is those which 
apply irrespective of the law otherwise aplicable to the contract, 
should be considered as falling within the concept of the general good. 
I f the general good were to be widened to include those rules of 
contract law which are mandatory only in an internal sense, the effect 
would be to limit severely freedom of services: in particular, it would 
be possible to limit or even render futile a choice of law which had 
been legitimately exercised under the provisions of the insurance 
Directives. 
D. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY 
1. Subsidiarity as a Principle of Community Law 
Much of the recent debate regarding the future of the Community has 
focused on the principle of subsidiarity as a guiding principle for 
establishing the proper distribution of power between Community 
institutions and individual Member States. Two influences appear to be 
particularly prominent in the debate. The first is the fear, particu-
larly evident in the United Kingdom, that the increasingly political 
dimension of the Community will lead to greater "interference" by the 
57 See also chap. 5 part 1, section C.3, where this is discussed in 
the context of policies sold by way of freedom of services from the 
United Kingdom. 
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Community in matters previously left to the Member States. The second 
is concern within some Member States, particularly Germany, that the 
process of transfer of competence to the Community may distort the 
existing distribution of legislative authority between the central and 
regional government. As the principle has now been incorporated in the 
Treaty on European Union, it is important to consider its relevance 
both for the programme for the establishment of the Single Market in 
insurance and the approach towards insurance contract law. 
The origins of the principle of subsidiari ty are a matter of some 
dispute: various commentators have attributed it to Aristotle, 
Proudhon, St. Thomas Aquinas, John Stuart Mill and Pope Pius X158. The 
difficulty inherent in defining subsidiarity is encapsulated by the 
following comment 59 : 
"It is not as such a constitutional or judicial concept, rather a 
principle of social organisation developed to be used in combination 
with other principles of collective and individual action." 
However, the principle is clearly evident in the constitutional law of 
several states wi th federal structures, such as Germany60 and Cana-
da61 . 
58 See Subsidiarity: The Challenge of Change, European Institute of 
Public Administration, Jacques Delors Colloquium, 1991. 
59 Mark Wilke and Helen Wallace, Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power 
Sharing in the European Community, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs Discussion Paper no.27. 
60Articie 72(2) of the Grundgesetz provides that the Federation 
shall have the right to legislate in matters within the concurrent 
powers of the Federation and the Laender where: 
1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of 
individual Laender, or 
2. the regulation of a matter by a Land law might prejudice the 
interests of other Laender or of the people as a whole, or 
3. the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the 
maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of 
anyone Land, necessitates such regulation. (See Blaustein & Flanz, 
Constitutions of the World). 
61Section 92(16) of the Canadian Constitution Act 1867 (formerly 
known as the British North America Act) provides that the competence 
of the provinces extends to: 
"Generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
Province." 
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Within the Community, it is possible to find reference to subsidiarity 
as a guiding principle long before its insertion in the Treaty on 
European Union. The 1975 Spinelli Report on European Union62 referred 
to it in the following terms: 
"The Union only acts for effecting tasks which may be undertaken in 
common in a more efficient way than if Member States were to act 
separately." 
Explicit reference to the principle is made in the provisions of the 
Single European Act in respect of the environment63 whilst the Social 
Charter of 1989 mentions the principle in its preamble. However, it was 
not until the Treaty on European Union that the principle was given a 
formal Treaty basis which covered all the activities of the Community. 
Article 3(b) of the Treaty on European Union64 provides as follows: 
"The Community shall act within the limit of the powers conferred upon 
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not fall wi thin its exclusive competence, the 
Communi ty shall take action, in accordance wi th the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty." 
The Commission takes the view65 that subsidiari ty encompasses two 
distinct legal concepts: first, the need for action; and secondly, the 
intensity (proportionality) of the proposed action. In areas of 
62Report of the Commission on European Union. 
63Article 130r(4) provides that the Community shall take action 
relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives 
referrred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level 
than at the level of the individual Member States. This specific 
reference to subsidiarity is deleted by the re-drafted Article 130r in 
the Treaty on European Union. 
64Subsidiari ty is also referred to in Articles A and B of the 
Treaty on European Union. However, Article L of the Treaty provides 
that the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over, inter alia, 
Articles A and B. 
65"The principle of subsidiari ty": SEC (92) 1990 final. 
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exclusive competence, such as the removal of barriers to free movement 
under Article SA of the Treaty, the Commission's view is that the need 
for action cannot be limited by the principle of subsidiari ty. However, 
it recognises that in areas where powers are shared between the 
Community and the Member States, there are difficulties in determining 
whether there is a need for Community action. In the following 
subsection, these issues will be considered in relation to insurance 
contract law. 
2. Subsidiarity and the Harmonisation of Insurance Contract Law 
In considering the appropriateness of harmonisation of insurance 
contract law, it is important to determine whether the issue falls 
within an exclusive or a shared competence area66 . Harmonisation of 
insurance contract law would fall within the area of shared competence 
as the Member States retain control over contract law but differences 
in contract law give rise to issues which affect the functioning of the 
Single Market 67 . In areas of shared competence the Commission has 
proposed68 the following approach to the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity: 
"Each case must therefore be considered individually in the light of 
two tests laid down in Article 3b - the scale and the effects of the 
proposed action. This would involve: 
- checking that the Member States have at their disposal the means -
including the financial means - to the end (national, regional or local 
legislation, codes of conduct, agreements betewen employers and trade 
unions, etc.) - the comparative efficiency test; 
- assessing the effectiveness of Community action (its scale, cross-
border problems, consequences of failure to act, cri tical mass, etc.) -
the value added test." 
66 0n the division of competence see: Herve Bribosia, "Subsidiari te 
et repartition des competences entre la Commanaute et ses Etats membres 
_ Commentaire sur I' Article 3B du trai te de Maastricht", Revue du 
Marche Unique Europeen 1992 vol.4 p165. 
67 The Commission's view is that measures related to the smooth 
operation of the internal market and consumer protection measures 
related to the internal market are instances of shared powers: see COM 
(92) 1990 final pS. 
68"The principle of subsidiarity", op.cit., piO. 
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On both criteria the case for harmonisation of insurance contract law 
seems well established. As regards the scale of the proposed action, 
the Member States lack the means to resolve problems which arise from 
differences in contract law, particularly those which relate to cross-
border business. The effects of Community action would be, as discussed 
earlier, to eliminate distortions in competition, limit the scope for 
divergence in the control of conditions of insurance through contract 
law and restrict reference to the "general good" as a basis for 
restrictions on freedom of services. It follows that the value added 
by Community action would be the creation of a legal framework which 
facilitated the effective exercise of freedom of services within the 
insurance sector. 
E. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO CONTRACT LAW: THE UNITED STATES 
In considering the Community's approach to contract law within the 
Single Market programme for insurance, it is appropriate to refer to 
the position in the United States. This provides a model of a single 
market operating wi thin a federal structure. I ts approach to the 
regulation of insurance and differences in insurance contract law among 
the Member States is therefore relevant to the Community. 
The regulation of insurance in the United States 69 is a matter for the 
individual states. Only insurers who have been authorised and become 
established in the relevant state are permitted to transact business. 
There is no right of establishment, in the sense in which that right 
is understood in the Community, for insurers whose main establishment 
is in another State: in other words, admission is at the discretion 
of the relevant State. The principle of mutual recognition which allows 
the operation of home country control wi thin the Communi ty is therefore 
absent from the United States. Of particular relevance to the issue of 
differences in contract law is that the United States does not 
69 0n regulatory requirements in the United States see: G.J. Couch, 
Couch Encyclopaedia of Insurance Law (Rochester, New York); K. 
Lenaerts, "La loi applicable et la libre prestation des services en 
matiere d'assurance vie", Annales de droit de Louvain. Tome L 1-1/1990 
145; Coopers & Lybrand, International Insurance Industry Guide. 
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recognise any right to freedom of services: there is nothing to prevent 
a customer purchasing a policy from an insurer in another State, but 
insurers cannot solicit business on a services basis10 in States in 
which they are not authorised and established. 
Looking beyond the regime governing the transaction of business by way 
of establishment and services, there are other important differences 
in the regulation of insurance. First, most States in the United States 
exert control over rates and policy conditions, whereas this form of 
control, at least as a pre-condition for authorisation, will not be 
present in the Single Market wi thin the Communi ty. Secondly, as 
Lenaerts 11 has observed, the role of federal law in issues arising in 
relation to jusrisdiction and choice of law is confined to imposing 
constitutional limits on the scope of the rights of individual States: 
the formulation and application of the rules relating to choice of law, 
subject to those constitutional constraints, remains in the hands of 
the individual States. By contrast, issues related to jurisdiction and 
choice of law in insurance within the Community are now subject to 
Communi ty law12 . 
As regards their approach to the impact of differences in contract law, 
the Community and the United States adopt a similar approach in that 
neither has pursued harmonisation. Rudden13 has argued that the 
American approach is evidence that harmonisation is not required within 
the Community. However, it is submitted that such a conclusion ignores 
the basic differences in the nature of the Single Market which is to 
operate in the Community by comparison with that which exists in the 
United States. As Lenaerts14 has observed, conclusions in respect of 
the significance of the differences in contract law which exist in the 
10 In the sense that this term is understood in Community law. 
11op.cit. p150. 
12See chap. 2. 
73Bernard Rudden, "Disclosure in Insurance: A Comparative View", 
British Insurance Law Association Conference Materials 1989. 
14op . cit. p150. 
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single market in the United States by comparison with those present in 
the Communi ty are not easy to reach. The solution adopted by the 
Communi ty should relate specifically to the regulatory framework wi thin 
which it operates and not a model which matches neither the circum-
stances nor the ambitions of the Single Market within the Community. 
F. FORCES FOR CHANGE 
Having argued that a change in the approach to insurance contract law 
is necessary, it is appropriate to refer to those factors which are 
likely to act as forces for change. 
1. Growth in Services Business 
It has already been noted that the current approach towards the issue 
of contract law is predicated on the belief that choice-of-1aw issues 
will be largely restricted to business transacted on a services basis, 
which currently accounts for only a small part of the total volume of 
insurance business. It follows that a substantial expansion in the 
volume of busines transacted on a services basis would threaten this 
stance. Expansion in the "large" risk category would be unlikely to 
provoke any change in approach to contract law, as freedom of choice 
of law already applies in this area and there is no consumer interest 
to protect, but expansion of the services market in "mass" risks could 
result in a re-appraisal of the current approach. This would follow 
from the increasing reference which would be required to the complex 
webb of rules governing choice of law: it would soon be acknowledged 
that a better solution could be found in the harmonisation of the 
essential provisions of insurance contract law and a simplification of 
the rules on choice of law. 
A substantial expansion in the volume of business transacted on a 
services basis can be envisaged as a result of "direct selling", which 
is the mos t rapidly growing form of di s t ri bu t ion in the non-l i fe 
sector. Insurers using this technique are able to cut costs by saving 
the commissions normally paid to intermediaries, by securing immediate 
access to the premium payments through electronic funds transfer and 
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by centralising their administrative functions. It is possible to 
envisage rapid growth in this form of distribution on a services basis, 
particularly in border areas, where a central office is capable of 
dealing directly with policyholders in several Member States. Business 
is already transacted on this basis in respect of UCITS 75 , particular-
ly in the Benelux region, which lends itself paricularly well to this 
type of distribution. 
2. Free Movement of Persons 
On the assumption that the operation of the Single Market will result 
in greater labour mobility within the Community, it can be expected 
that the potential for choice-of-Iaw issues to arise in business 
transacted on an establishment basis will increase. An example would 
be a household policy, issued in the Uni ted Kingdom by an "established" 
insurer, to a German national working in the United Kingdom, covering 
his holiday home in Denmark. Under the current regime 76 , the applica-
ble law would be either that of Germany or Denmark. If the same person 
has a motor policy governed by the law in the United Kingdom and a life 
policy governed by German Law, he may find it difficult to understand 
that the contracts are governed by fundamentally different provisions 
of contract law, yet all three policies have been purchased within a 
single market. Thus, it seeems inevitable that increasing mobility of 
labour will create dissatisfaction with the current regime. 
75Undertakings for Collective 
Securities. 
Investments in Transferable 
76Article 7.1.(b) of the Second Non-life Directive. 
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PART 2: THE INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW DIRECTIVE REVISITED 
G. THE HARMONISATION PROCESS 
1. Harmonisation Techniques 
The general approach to harmonisation within the Community, in 
particular the "new approach" adopted during the 1980's, has already 
been discussed in chapter 2. As regards the process of harmonisation, 
it is possible to distinguish three different techniques 77 in Communi-
ty secondary legislation which covers the field of consumer protection: 
(a) Minimum Harmonisation 
This allows Member States to adopt or retain stricter consumer 
protection provisions within the limits laid down by Community law. An 
example of this is the Consumer Contracts Directive78 . 
(b) Optional Harmonisation 
In this situation a Member State may choose between several options set 
out in a Directive. An example is Article 15 of the Products Liability 
Directive79 which allows Member States to choose whether to retain the 
"development risk,,80 defence. 
77See McGee & Weatherill, "The Evolution of the Single Market -
Harmonisation or Liberalisation", 1990 MLR 578 and Weatherill, 
"Regulating the Internal Market: Result Orientation in the House of 
Lords" 17 ELR (1992) 299. 
78Directive 93/13, OJ 1993 L95/29. See para. 12 of the preamble. 
79Directive 85/374, OJ 1985 L210/29. 
80 This allows a producer to escape liability for damage caused by 
a defective product if it is proven that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation 
was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered. 
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(c) Uniform Harmonisation 
This can be said to occur where harmonisation is based on a fixed 
standard from which no derogation81 is possible. An example of this 
approach can be seen in the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive 82 • 
2. Harmonisation of Insurance Contract Law 
(a) Scope 
Two possibili ties arise in determining the scope of harmonisation 
measures. The first is that it could be confined to mandatory 
requirements of the insurance contract laws of the Member States. This 
would resolve many of the problems which are likely to arise in 
determining the extent to which mandatory rules of contract law can be 
used to limi t the sale of insurance products on a services basis. 
Harmonisation of mandatory rules would limit the ability of Member 
States to argue that equivalent protection was not provided by the laws 
of other Member States. However, the scope of mandatory provisions83 
varies widely among Member States. Moreover, the concept of mandatory 
rules does not fit easily into the structure of the law in the United 
Kingdom, where there are very few provisions of insurance contract law 
which cannot be altered by the contracting parties. The alternative 
approach, which was adopted by the Commission at the time that it 
supported harmonisation, is to harmonise the essential or fundamental 
elements of insurance contract law. This avoids complications which 
arise from the variation in the scope of mandatory provisons and, 
subject to the technique of harmonisation, is capable of providing an 
Slather than that inherent in the legislative instrument, such as 
the discretion permitted to Member States by Article 189 (EEC) in the 
implementation of Directives. 
S2See para. 8 of the preamble to the draft Directive which is set 
out in Appendix 2. 
83 See chap 3. and EEC-Insurance Contract Law (Comite Europeen des 
Assurances, 1990). 
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equivalent level of protection to the consumer as regards the essential 
elements of the contract, irrespective of the applicable law. 
(b) Technique 
During the negotiations on the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive, 
there was a divergence in views among the Member States in relation to 
the way in which harmonisation should proceed. At issue was whether not 
only the contracting parties but also the Member States should be able 
to change the content of the Directive to give increased protection to 
policyholders. One argument put forward was that implementation of the 
Directive would lead some Member States to change their laws to make 
them less favourable to the insuredB4 • The Commission rejected this 
argument, opting instead for an approach based on a uniform implementa-
tion of the Directive by the Member States and freedom for the 
contracting parties to agree on more favourable terms for the 
policyholder, insured person or injured third party than those provided 
for in the Directive. The justification for this approach was that if 
the Directive was to be implemented as a minimal standard, it would be 
possible to maintain that there had been no genuine harmonisation of 
insurance contract law and obstacles to freedom of services could 
therefore be kept in place. 
A similar approach to that proposed by the Commission should be adopted 
in respect of any future harmonisation of insurance contract law as the 
justification advanced by the Commission holds good in the context of 
the proposals for the completion of the Single Market. As noted in part 
1, the Framework Directives leave the Member Sates discretion as to 
restrictions which are in the general good: in order to limit this 
discretion, harmonisation would need to be on a uniform and not a 
minimal basis. 
84 See Monique Goyens, "Consumer Protection in a Single European 
Market: What Challenge for the EC Agenda?", 29 CMLRev (1992) 7. 
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H. THE DRAFT INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW DIRECTIVE 
1. Scope 
(a) The Exclusion of Life Assurance 
The proposals for an insurance contract law Directive85 put forward 
by the Commission excluded life assurance as well as several categories 
of direct non-life insurance86 . In adopting this approach, the Commis-
sion followed a pattern evident in several Member States by which 
certain classes of business falling wi thin the grouping of "marine, 
aviation and transport" ("MAT") are excluded from the ambit of general 
insurance contract legislation87 . The rationale for this approach on 
the part of both the Member States and the Commission is that "MAT" is 
an international business, transacted between professionals, which 
should not be subjected to limitations on freedom of contract in the 
same manner as purely domestic business in which there is a consumer 
interest to protect. This approach was recommended by the Law 
Commission in its proposals88 for the reform of the law in the United 
Kingdom, and has been incorporated in the Third Non-Life Directive's 
provisions89 regarding freedom of choice of law. Any future proposals 
for harmonisation should retain this approach as regards MAT but should 
85The text of the Directive is set out in Appendix 2. 
86Article 1 provides that the draft Directive applies to certain 
categories of risk identified in point A of the Annex to the First Non-
Life Directive (73/239) with certain exceptions which are: 4(railway 
rolling-stock}, 5 (aircraft), 6 (ships, sea, lake and river and canal 
vessels), 7 (goods in transit), 11 (aircraft liability), 12 (liability 
for ships, sea, lake and river and canal vessels), 14 (credit) and 15 
(suretyship) . Moreover, as reinsurance was excluded from the First Non-
Life Directive, it is not covered by the draft contract law Directive. 
87The Code des Assurances in France has special rules for marine 
insurance (Ti tIe 7 of the Legislative Section). In Germany, marine 
insurance is excluded from the VVG. See chapter 3. 
88 Cmnd . 8064 para. 10.2. The Law Commission's proposals are 
discussed in chap. 5. 
89 See chap. 2, section C.I.a. 
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ensure that harmonisation applies to the broader category of "large" 
risks 90 • 
The explanatory memorandum to the draft Directive contained no 
explanation as regards the exclusion of life assurance. This omission 
is odd as it is normal for many of the provisions of the type found in 
the draft Directive to apply equally to both life and non-life 
insurance within the national laws of the Member States. One explana-
tion for the omission is that the original draft of the contract law 
Directive was published only four months after the adoption of the 
First Life Directive: at that point in time the issue of freedom of 
services, which prompted considerations of harmonisation of contract 
law, must have been regarded as a distant objective in respect of life 
assurance. As the programme for the creation of the Single Market in 
insurance is now complete, there seems no good reason why life 
assurance should be excluded from proposals for the harmonisation of 
contract law. 
(b) The Relationship with other Directives 
The draft Insurance Contract Law Directive excluded two important 
harmonisation measures which have subsequently been incorporated in the 
Second and Third Life Directives: first, the right of the policyholder 
to cancel the policy and, secondly, the obligation of the insurer to 
disclose information to the policyholder during the pre-contractual 
negotiations ("transparency"). The Life Directives may have served as 
a useful practical vehicle for the introduction of limited measures to 
harmonise contract law, particularly as it became increasingly clear 
that no agreement would be reached between the Member States over the 
draft Insurance Contract Law Directive, but they are not an adequate 
substitute for an insurance contract law proposal which deals with the 
subject in a coherent fashion. 
90 This point is considered in greater detail below. 
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(c) Consumer Protection 
Several of the provisions 91 of the Directive are applied only to 
"consumer" insurance. Al though consumer protection is an important 
consideration, different categories of policyholder, as opposed to 
different classes of business92 , should not be treated differently. 
Thus, for example, a small businessman does not merit different 
treatment in purchasing fire insurance for his shop to that which he 
receives in purchasing fire insurance for his home. This is reflected 
in the laws of France and Germany, which have provision for consumer 
protection but do not treat policyholders purchasing the same class of 
insurance differently according to circumstance. However, as noted in 
chapter 3, the effect of the Statements of Insurance Practice in the 
United Kingdom is to create a distinction between consumers similar to 
that in the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive. In both instances, 
the distinction is at odds with the principle of securing equivalence 
in the standard of protection provided to policyholders. 
2. The Rules relating to Disclosure (Article 3) 
The duty of disclosure as it appears in the draft Directive is unduly 
complex. By comparison with the single paragraph of the MIA 190693 
which embodies the essence of the duty of disclosure and the conse-
quences of its breach, Article 3 extends to eighteen paragraphs. The 
resul t is a formulation of the duty of disclosure which lacks the 
clarity and brevity which the significance of the principle in everyday 
transactions demands. 
91Article 3(2)(a), which deals with the duty of disclosure, and 
Article 7(2), which deals with costs incurred by the insured in 
minimising losses, distinguish risks which cover an industrial or 
commercial activity of the policyholder from those that do not. 
92 Such as "MAT", as argued above. 
93Section 18(1). See chap. 5, part 2. 
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The Law Commission, in its investigation94 into the potential effect 
of the draft Insurance Contract law Directive on the law in the United 
Kingdom, commented on Article 3 as follows: 
"( i) the formulation of the Article as regards the various ways in 
which the duty of disclosure may be broken is inept and the ambit of 
each type of breach is not defined with sufficient precision; 
(ii) the Article provides for complicated and uncertain procedures to 
be put into motion during the currency of the contract; 
(iii) as a whole Article 3 seems likely to bring about undue and 
unnecessary increases in administrative expenses; 
(iv) the Article is bound to lead to a great deal of litigation." 
An examination of the role of three elements of the formulation of the 
duty in Article 3 - common error, subjectivity and proportionality -
suggests that a simpler formulation is possible. 
(a) Common Error 
Article 3.2.a provides as follows: 
"If circumstances existing at the time of entering into the contract 
which were unknown to both parties when the contract was concluded come 
to light subsequently, or if the policyholder has failed to declare 
circumstances of which he was aware but which he did not expect to 
influence a prudent insurer's assessment of the risk, the insurer or 
the policyholder shall be entitled, within a period of two months from 
the date on which he becomes aware of the fact, to propose an amendment 
to or termination of the contract." 
This approach confuses the duty of disclosure in insurance with the 
principles of common error in the general law of contract. Circumstanc-
es unknown to both parties at the conclusion of the contract, provided 
they do not arise from non-disclosure, fall within the general 
principles of common error in the law of contract. The duty of 
disclosure in insurance has no particular contribution to make in these 
circumstances. It would therefore lead to greater clarity in the 
formulation of the duty of disclosure if this reference to common error 
was deleted. 
94 Cmnd . 8064, para. 4.31. 
191 
(b) Subjectivity 
The introduction of an element of subjectivity into the duty of 
disclosure, through the medium of Article 3.2.a (above) runs counter 
to the initial formulation of the duty in Article 3.1, which provides 
as follows: 
"When concluding the contract, the policyholder shall declare to the 
insurer any circumstances of which he ought reasonably to be aware and 
which he ought to expect to influence a prudent insurer's assessment 
or acceptance of the risk." 
The standard of the reasonable insured, which is in essence an 
objective test, should not be qualified subsequently by reference to 
a subjective standard in determining the insured's awareness of the 
relevance of information to the insurer. The latter reference (in 
Article 3.2.a) should be deleted so as to make it clear that the test 
of reasonableness applies to the insured's assessment of the relevance 
of the information to the insurer95 . 
The reference to "a prudent insurer's assessment or acceptance of the 
risk" in Article 3.1 should be altered so as to make clear that the 
relevant information would have changed either the insurer's decision 
to accept or the terms of the insurance. This would pre-empt implemen-
tation of the Directive in the manner followed in CTI v Oceanus 
Mutua196 , where the Court of Appeal held that information could be 
"material" wi thin the context of the MIA 1906 wi thout necessarily 
changing an underwri ter t s decision to accept or the terms of the 
insurance. 
(c) Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality does not fit easily into the system 
of open competition envisaged for the Single Market in insurance. It 
operates on the premise that, when there is non-disclosure on the part 
95 This approach was followed by the Law Commission (Cmnd. 8064) in 
its Insurance Law Reform Bill, section 2(1)(b). See chap. 5. 
96[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476. See chap. 5, part 2. 
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of the proposer, it is possible to identify the correct premium which 
would have applied had there been full disclosure. Where premiums are 
based on tariffs to which all insurers subscribe, this may be possible, 
but it is much more difficult in an environment in which insurers are 
not subject to controls over premiums or conditions of insurance. 
Moreover, even if the principle was not rejected outright, there are 
defects in its formulation in Article 3.c in respect of the conditions 
which must be met to enable an insurer to avoid liability for innocent 
non-disclosure (i.e. for proportionality to be inapplicable). Article 
3.c provides: 
"However, if the insurer can show that no prudent insurer would have 
accepted the risk regardless of the rate of premium if he had been 
aware of the circumstances which the policyholder should have 
disclosed, or if the insurer can show that a prudent insurer would not 
have accepted the risk unless certain conditions were complied with, 
he shall not be bound to pay any claim." 
This provision attempts to graft elements of the (pre-CTr v Oceanus) 
disclosure rule in the United Kingdom onto the French principle of 
proportionality and incorporate the amalgam into a rule of disclosure 
which belongs to nei ther jurisdiction. The practical problems of 
implementing the rule would be considerable in a single market free 
from tariffs and administrative control of policy forms and rates: 
presumably reference would have to be made to the practice of all 
Community insurers who were authorised to write the risk, a procedure 
which would impose a heavy burden of proof on the insurer. 
The solution of dispensing with the principle of proportionality is 
most appropriate for the Single Market, but, if it is to be retained, 
it should be in the form in which it appears in the French Code des 
Assurances 97 . It would be better to follow the policy of that legisla-
tion in not allowing avoidance for innocent non-disclosure in any 
circumstances rather than allowing avoidance in certain cases which are 
likely to be contentious and difficult to prove. 
97 See chap.3, section D.3. 
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3. Increase in Risk (Article 4) 
The provisions of the draft Directive follow the (pre-1989) French law 
as regards the duty to disclose increased risk: the insured is required 
to declare any new circumstances or changes in circumstance of which 
the insurer has requested notification in the contract. There is no 
obligation to disclose a reduction in risk. 
As noted in chapter 3, policyholders in the United Kingdom are under 
no general obligation to disclose increase in risk in the absence of 
express contract terms. However, both the French and German law impose 
an obligation of disclosure of increased risk on the insured irrespec-
tive of whether the matter is governed by contract terms. Article 4 of 
the draft Directive provides a suitable solution for the purposes of 
harmonisation in that it would allow for the retention of an obligation 
of disclosure in France and Germany whilst requiring no change in the 
law or practice in the United Kingdom. This would mean that there would 
be no necessity to disrupt the traditional practice of active renewal 
of non-life poicies in the United Kingdom and the tacit renewal of such 
policies in France and Germany. 
However, the comments made above in respect of the appropriateness of 
the principle of proportionality, as well as its formulation in Article 
3.c of the Directive, apply equally here as Article 4.4 makes it clear 
that the principle is intended to apply to situations in which the 
insured is in breach of the duty to disclose increased risk. 
4. Compliance with Contract Terms 
The draft Insurance Contract Law Directive made no reference to this 
issue. Given the complexities of integrating any proposals into the 
general law regarding breach of contract, it is hardly surprising that 
no proposals were put forward. As noted in chapter 3, there are 
significant differences between the laws of the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany in this area, which result in material differences in the 
level of protection provided to the policyholder. It is unlikely that 
any future attempt at harmonisation of insurance contract law would 
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resolve those differences unless it were accompanied by some approxima-
tion of the general law of contract in the Community. 
5. Remedies 
Having been modelled closely on the (pre-1989) French law, it is hardly 
surprising that the draft Insurance Contract Law Directive placed a 
heavy emphasis on the principle of proportionality98 in limiting the 
remedies available to an insurer. However, the principle, by attempting 
to reduce the indemnity available to the insured in relation to the 
premium which the insurer would have received had the insured complied 
with his duties, pre-supposes the existence of standard premium rates. 
Whilst this may have been appropriate at a time when the industry was 
heavily regulated as regards both rates and policy forms, it is 
inappropriate to the operation of a single market in which freedom of 
contract is an important principle. In a situation in which premium 
rates are free from administrative control, it will become much more 
difficult to establish what the Itcorrectlt premium actually should have 
been, with the result that the principle cannot operate with arithmeti-
cal certainty99. 
98 See chapter 3, section E.3.c. 
99 The Law Commission (Cmnd. 8064, para 4.5) argued against the 
principle of proportionality on these grounds and also on the basis 
that it did not deal adequately with situations in which the insurer 
would have reacted to the non-disclosed information other than by 
increasing the premium, such as declining the risk or demanding 
exclusion clauses or warranties. 
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J. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The principle of mutual recognition does not form an adequate basis 
for addressing issues arising from differences in insurance contract 
law. It follows that it can be of only limited value in determining 
whether the Communi ty' s approach should be based on choice-of-Iaw rules 
or harmonisation. 
2. There is an adequate Treaty basis for harmonisation of insurance 
contract law in Article lOOA. Differences in insurance contract law can 
be considered as having an impact on the functioning of the Single 
Market within the meaning of that Article for three reasons: first, 
they distort competition; secondly they permit divergence in freedom 
of contract and choice of law among Member States; and thirdly, they 
allow greater reference to the "general good" in order to restrict 
freedom of services than would be possible with harmonisation. 
3. Harmonisation would be in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Action in relation to insurance contract law falls within 
the field of shared competence and satisfies the tests of scale and 
effect. It also satisfies the test of proportionality which applies to 
all Community action. 
4. The treatment of contract law wi thin the single market which 
operates in the United States is of limited value in determining the 
Community's approach. In particular, the absence of a right to freedom 
of services in the Uni ted States gives the legal framework of its 
market a different character to that of the Community. 
5. The complexity of the rules relating to choice of law are likely to 
restrict the development of services business within the Community. If 
the Single Market in insurance is to develop in a manner in which there 
is a substantial flow of cross-border business, it is likely that the 
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Communi ty will have to re-appraise its approach to differences in 
contract law and return to work on a harmonisation Directive100 . 
6. If the Community reverts to a policy of harmonisation there are a 
variety of ways in which it could be implemented. The scope of a 
harmonisation Directive could be confined to mandatory provisions of 
contract law or could encompass all fundamental provisions. The 
harmonisation technique could be based on minimum, optional or uniform 
harmonisation. The original approach adopted by the Commission 
(uniform harmonisation of fundamental provisions) would be best suited 
to the objectives of the Single Market. However, the original proposals 
for harmonisation are likely to require substantial amendment. 
lOOJacques Biancarelli, "General Report". CEA XI I Colloquium. 
op.cit .• goes as far as to suggest that the complexity of the system 
of choice-of-law in the insurance Directives is intended to provoke the 
Member States into agreeing a harmonisation Directive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: AN ANALYSIS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the operation of the choice-
of-law rules of the insurance Directives in the United Kingdom. Two 
issues will be examined: first, the circumstances in which English or 
Scots law may be the applicable law; and secondly, the rights and 
obligations of the insurer and policyholder where English or Scots law 
is the applicable law. 
Part 1 examines the circumstances in which Scots or English law will 
govern an insurance contract in the Single Market and the consequences 
for the insurer and policyholder. This encompasses both contracts 
concluded with policyholders who are resident in the United Kingdom and 
those wi th policyholders resident in other Member States. Consideration 
is also given to the position of Conduct of Business Rules and the 
Statements of Insurance Practice within the contract law regime which 
will operate in the Single Market. 
Part 2 analyses the development of insurance contract law in the United 
Kingdom from the perspective of three important influences. These are 
the nature of the contract, the negotiation of the contract and the 
legal force of policy terms. Consideration is also given to rules 
which, strictly speaking, fall outside the field of contract law but 
which are nevertheless important in balancing the interests of the 
insurer and policyholder. Finally, reference is made to the law reform 
debate and in particular to the Law Commission's proposals which were 
prompted by the expectation that the European Community would adopt the 
draft Insurance Contract Law Directive. 
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PART 1: THE APPLICATION OF ENGLISH AND SCOTS LAW TO INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
IN THE SINGLE MARKET 
A. THE CHOICE OF LAW RULES 
1. General Principles 
English and Scots law have traditionally referred to the system of law 
which governs a contract as the "proper law" of a contract l . Recently, 
however, there has been a tendency to use the term "applicable law,,2 
as the rules which determine the law which governs a contract are now 
largely contained in the 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (the Rome Convention). The latter term is used 
in this thesis. 
The common law rules of English and Scots law do not restrict choice 
of law in the field of insurance contracts. The general principles are 
as follows 3: 
1. An express choice of law determines the applicable law. 
2. Where there is no express choice, the intention of the parties is 
to be inferred from the terms and nature of the contract and from the 
general circumstances of the case. 
3. Where there is no express choice and no inference is possible from 
the circumstances, the contract is governed by the system of law with 
which it has its closest and most real connection. In the case of 
insurance, this tes t will normally resul t in the contract being 
governed by the law of the country in which the insurer carries on its 
lSee Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (11th edn.) pl161, and 
Anton, Private International Law (A Treatise from the Standpoint of 
Scots Law) (2nd edn.) p262. 
2See , for example, Richard Plender, The European Contracts 
Convention. 
3See Dicey & Morris, op.cit. chap.33 and Anton, op.cit. chap 10. 
There is no material difference between the English and Scots common 
law rules. 
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business4, and if it carries on business in more than one country, by 
the law of the country in which the head office is located. 
The Rome Convention superimposes a new set of rules on the existing 
common law rules governing the applicable law. The exclusion of 
insurance from the Convention reflected the work being undertaken by 
the Community in that field which resulted in the choice-of-Iaw rules 
contained in the Second Life and Non-Life Directives. The common law 
rules remain important as the Rome Convention rules are not retrospec-
tive. The common law will continue to govern contracts within the scope 
of the Rome Contracts Convention and the insurance Directives which 
were concluded prior to the effective dates of those measures in the 
Uni ted Kingdom5• 
Although the Rome Convention excludes insurance, a recent change in the 
law in the Uni ted Kingdom makes clear that it is of relevance in 
determining the law applicable to insurance contracts. The Regula-
tions6 which implement the Second Life Directive in the United Kingdom 
provide, both in respect of life and non-life insurance, that a court 
in the United Kingdom shall, subject to the rules of the insurance 
Directives on choice of law, act in accordance wi th the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990, which implemented the Rome Convention in the 
United Kingdom. The policy underlying this approach was made clear by 
the Department of Trade and Industry's Consultative Document on the 
Regulations implementing the Second Life Directive: 
" We take the view ... that the choice of law provisions in the Services 
Directives are not intended to replace the Rome Convention but are 
simply extra provisions which, together with the Rome Convention, form 
a separate code. Accordingly, where the rules of the Convention have 
no counterpart in the Services Directives member States can choose to 
apply the rules of the Convention." 
4Greer v Poole (1850) 5 QBD 272. 
5See below for effective dates. 
6The Insurance Companies (Amendment) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/ 
174) which amend s.94B and sch.3A of the Insurance Companies Act 1982. 
200 
As discussed in chapter 2, a choice of law made under the provisions 
of the insurance Directives is made suject to "mandatory" and 
"internationally mandatory" rules7. The effect of the application of 
mandatory rules is to defeat a choice of law where all the elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of choice are connected with one 
Member State only8. The application of "internationally mandatory" 
rules also defeats a choice of law, but in this instance there is no 
requirement for a connection between the situation at the time of 
choice and the Member State which seeks to apply its own rules. The 
concept of mandatory rules is not one which is well defined in the 
Uni ted Kingdom. According to Fawcett9, English law has not fully 
developed such a concept although there are specific rules which can 
be citedlO . Scots law does recognise the concept of mandatory rules 11 
and a choice of law may take effect only subject to those rules. 
In implementing the insurance Directives, the United Kingdom has chosen 
to exclude the possibili ty of reference being made to the "internation-
ally mandatory rules,,12 of other Member States. Both the Second Life 
and Non-Life Directives13 allow Member States to choose whether, in 
certain circumstances, such rules may govern the contract. The 
7See chapter 2 (section C.l). 
8See Article 7(1)(g) of the Second Non-Life Directive. 
9J.J. Fawcett, "Evasion of Law in Private International Law", 49 
Cambridge Law Journal (1990) 44. 
lOSee for example s. 27 (2) (a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977. This provides that the Act applies notwithstanding a choice of 
foreign law where that choice was imposed by a party wholly or mainly 
for the purpose of enabling him to evade the application of the Act. 
11 1n English v Donnelly 1958 SC 494, it was held that the Hire 
Purchase and Small Debt (Sc.) Act 1932 was mandatory for contracts 
entered into in Scotland and could not be evaded by a contract term 
which provided for the applicable law to be English. The choice-of-law 
rules of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (s. 27) also apply to 
Scotland. 
12 1n the sense in which this term was used in chap.2. 
13Article 7(2) 2nd. para. (non-life) and Article 4(4) 2nd. para. 
(life). See Annex 1 to chap. 2. 
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combination of this approach in the United Kingdom with the relative 
under-development of the concept of mandatory rules suggests that there 
will be few instances in which issues relating to mandatory rules arise 
in contracts subject to the law in the United Kingdom. 
2. The Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 
This Act implemented in the United Kingdom the Rome Contracts 
Convention wi th effect from 1 April 1991, in respect of contracts 
concluded after 1 July 1991. The Convention excludes contracts of 
insurance covering risks situated in the territories of the Communi-
ty14 and provides that, in the determination of whether a risk is 
situated in these territories, a court shall apply its internal law. 
In the United Kingdom, the internal law is section 96A(3) of the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 which follows Article 2(d) of the Second 
Non-Life Directive15 . 
The Rome Convention applies to reinsurance as Article 1(4) provides 
that the exclusion of direct insurance does not apply to reinsurance. 
Although not required by the Convention16 , the 1990 Act makes clear 
that it will apply to conflicts between the laws of different parts of 
the United Kingdom17 . Two other aspects related to the scope of the 
Convention are also likely to be significant in the field of insurance. 
First, the Convention excludes questions as to whether an agent is able 
to bind a principal to a third party18. This situation is likely to 
occur frequently within the Single Market as insurers seek to market 
their products through agents in other Member States. Secondly, the 
14Article 1 (3) . 
15 See Annex 1 to Chapter 2 for the wording of this Article. The 
Regulations implementing the Second Life Directive (SI 1993/174) 
provide that the internal law is to be schedule 3A of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982, but the definition of "situated" in that schedule 
is contained in s.96A(3) of the Act. 
16See Article 19(2). 
17 Sec t ion 2 ( 3 ) . 
18Article 1(2)(f). 
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rules of the Convention do not apply to arbitration agreements 19 , with 
the result that arbi tration clauses in insurance contracts will be 
subject to common law rules in the determination of the applicable 
law20 . 
3. The Contract Law Rules of the Insurance Directives 
The posi tion in the Uni ted Kingdom following the amendment of the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 by the 1993 Regulations 21 will be that 
the rules contained in the insurance Directives will apply by way of 
a lex specialis to the rules of the Rome Convention. 
(a) Non-Life Insurance 
As discussed in chapter 2, the choice-of-law rules are contained mainly 
in the Second Non-Life Directive22 . The Framework Directive extends 
the scope for a free choice of law in respect of "large" risks but 
leaves the basic rules unchanged23 . The Second Non-Life Directive was 
implemented in the United Kingdom by the Insurance Companies (Amend-
ment) Regulations 199024 . As regards contract law, Regulation 6 
implemented the provisions of the Second Directive by introducing 
section 94A25 and schedule 3A into the Insurance Companies Act 1982. 
2. 
I9Article 1(2) (d). 
20See Plender, op.cit. paras 4.19-4.29. 
2ISI 1993/174. See para. 1 above. 
22See Articles 2(d), 7 and 8 which are set out in Annex 1 to chap. 
23 See chap. 2, section C.1. 
24Statutory Instrument 1990/1333. 
25This is renumbered as s.94B by the 1992 Regulations (SI 
1992/2890) which implemented the Motor Services Directive (90/618) and 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Second Life Directive (Rules relating to 
branches and agencies of third country insurers). 
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The impact of the provisions of the Second Directive on choice of law 
varies according to whether or not the insured is resident in the 
United Kingdom and is considered in greater detail in sections F and 
G below. The position in relation to contracts in respect of which no 
choice of law has been made is simpler. Schedule 3A of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982 provides that, in this situation, the contract shall 
be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected, subject to the proviso that the contract is rebuttably 
presumed to be most closely connected with the Member State where the 
risk is situated. This represents a change from the common law rule 
that it is the legal system26 and not the country with which the 
contract is most closely connected which determines the applicable law. 
(b) Life Assurance 
As in the non-life sector, the rules on choice of law are contained in 
the Second Directive27 . No changes are made by the Framework Direc-
tive. The Second Life Directive will be implemented in the United 
Kingdom by the Insurance Company (Amendment) Regulations 199328 , 
Regulation 5 of which amends section 94B29 and schedule 3A of the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 so as to give effect to the rules 
contained in that Directive. As was discussed in chapter 2, the basic 
rule governing choice of law in life assurance is that the contract is 
governed by the law of the Member State of the commitment, which means 
the Member State in which the policyholder is habitually resident. 
However, there are two circumstances in which another law may be 
chosen. First, where the law of the Member State of the commitment so 
allows, the parties may choose another law. From the perspective of 
policyholders resident in the United Kingdom, this has the effect of 
26Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] 
AC 50. See also Plender, op.cit., paras. 6.01-6.04. 
27See Articles 2 and 4 of the Second Life Directive which are set 
out in Annex 1 to chap. 2. 
28Statutory Instrument 1993/174, which takes effect as from 20th 
May 1993. 
29previously section 94A. 
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allowing a free choice of law. Secondly, where a policyholder is an 
individual and has his habitual residence in a Member State other than 
that of which he is a national, the parties may choose the law of the 
Member State of which he is a national. 
B. THE POLICYHOLDER IS RESIDENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. English or Scots Law as the Applicable Law 
The insurance Directives provide explicitly for a free choice of law 
only in respect of "large" risks. However, the restrictions on choice 
of law in respect of "mass" risks and life assurance are made subject 
to the proviso that a wider choice may be permitted by the Member State 
whose law would otherwise be the applicable law. The common law 
principle of free choice of law in the United Kingdom therefore results 
in a free choice of law being open to the contracting parties in 
respect of all life and non-life contracts which, according to the 
rules of the insurance Directives, are governed prima facie by the law 
in the United Kingdom. 
Where no choice of law has been made, it is likely that either English 
or Scots law will be the applicable law. As discussed above, the 
determination of the applicable law for non-life risks is dependent 
primarily on the situation of the risk. As regards life assurance, the 
absence of choice will result in the applicable law being that of the 
insured's residence (the Member State of the Commitment). 
2. Conduct of Business Rules 
Rules made pursuant to the Financial Services Act 198630 (hereafter 
"FSA 1986") impinge on certain aspects of insurance contract law in 
respect of those life assurance contracts which are included within the 
definition of "investments". The existing law is not amended in the 
30Chapter 3 provides for the approval of the Conduct of Business 
Rules of Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs) and Registered Profes-
sional Bodies (RPBs). 
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strict sense as no general power of amendment is given to the relevant 
bodies. However, as the rules impose obligations on insurers and agents 
of the proposer which exceed those of the common law, the effect is 
that the law is amended in a hybrid fashion. The hybrid character of 
these rules is reinforced by the remedies available to the insured 
where the insurer is in breach of a rule of an SRO or RPB. The FSA 
198631 provides for a right of action in damages: however, the remedy 
is not contractual in nature but for breach of a statutory duty32. 
The provisions of the insurance Directives in relation to choice of law 
are not relevant to Conduct of Business Rules. The Directives do not 
refer to Conduct of Business Rules. Both the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the European Commission take the view that a choice of law 
does not encompass such rUles 33 . Thus, Conduct of Business Rules will 
apply to all relevant business concluded with policyholders resident 
in the United Kingdom irrespective of whether the insurer is subject 
to the supervision of the regulatory authority in the United Kingdom34 
or not. This leaves considerable discretion in the hands of the 
authori ties in the Uni ted Kingdom as regards the conduct of all 
business transacted in the Uni ted Kingdom, including cases where 
31Section 62. The right of action was subsequently limited to 
"private investors" by an amendment introduced by section 193 of the 
Companies Act 1989. However, the term "private investor" has not yet 
been defined by Statutory Instrument. 
32Defences to an action for breach of statutory duty include the 
exercise of reasonable care in instances where the duty is not 
absolute: see Re The Bristol and North Somerset Railway Company (1877) 
3 QBD 10. 
33 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 
12th Report (1990-91), A Single Insurance Market. 
34The Department of Trade and Industry is responsible for the 
authorisation and supervision of insurers. 
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insurance is sold on a services basis35 from a location outside the 
Uni ted Kingdom36 . 
The major areas in which Conduct of Business Rules are relevant to 
insurance contract law are "best advice", the duty of disclosure before 
and after conclusion of the contract and the rules setting out the 
insured's right to cancel the contract after it has been concluded. In 
the following analysis of these three areas, reference will be made to 
the Conduct of Business Rules 37 of the Securities and Investments 
Board, the body charged with primary responsibility for ensuring 
implementation of and compliance with the Act 38 . 
(a) "Best Advice" 
The principle of "best advice" is central to the SIB's Rulebook39 : 
"A firm shall not make a recommendation to a person ... unless it has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the transaction is suitable for 
that person having regard to the facts known, or which ought reasonably 
35 In the sense in which this term was used in chap. 1. 
36However, Article 31(3) of the Life Framework Directive provides 
that the Member State of the commitment may require assurance 
undertakings to furnish information in addition to that listed in Annex 
I I of the Directive (Information for Policyholders) only if it is 
necessary for a proper understanding by the policyholder of the 
essential elements of the commitment. 
37The Financial Services Conduct of Business Rules 1990, most of 
which came into effect on the 1st November 1990. 
38Strictly speaking, the Conduct of Business Rules of the SIB do 
not apply to members of SROs and persons certified by RPBs who are 
subject to the rules of their own SRO or RPB (FSA 1986 s.48). The FSA 
1986 originally required the rulebooks of SROs and RPBs to provide a 
level of protection to investors equivalent to that of the rulebook of 
the SIB. This was amended by the Companies Act 1989 (s.203) which 
requires the rulebooks of SROs and RPBs simply to provide an adequate 
level of protection. However, it is appropriate to use the rulebook of 
the SIB as a general source for two reasons: first, it applies to firms 
directly authorised by the SIB in respect of investment business; and 
secondly, the old test of equivalence means that it has exerted a major 
influence on the rulebooks of SROs and RPBs. 
39 SIB Conduct of Business Rule 5.01. 
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to be known, to the firm, about that investment, scheme or agreement 
and as to that persons's other investments and his personal and 
financial situation." 
Prior to this, the rule of "best advice" was limited to situations in 
which it was part of the fiduciary duty of an agent to act in the best 
interests of his client40 . In other cases, such as where a policy is 
purchased from a salesman employed by an insurer, good business 
practice might well call for the application of the principle, but it 
was not required by the law. The SIB's rulebook makes clear that the 
principle of "best advice" applies to virtually all situations in which 
investments are recommended to individuals in their private capacity, 
irrespective of whether the person making the recommendation is acting 
as a principal (including instances where the person making the 
recommendation is the agent of the insurer) or agent of the proposer. 
(b) Disclosure of Commissions, Charges and Expenses 
The SIB's Rulebook includes a general disclosure requirement41 
applicable to all firms making recommendations in respect of life 
policies which requires the provision of such information to the 
proposer as is necessary for an informed decision and notice of the 
right of cancellation. As discussed below, this rule expands the common 
law duty owed by an insurer to a proposer for life assurance. In the 
case of an agent acting for the proposer, the disclosure rules are even 
more stringent than the general rule and once again represent an 
extension of the common law. 
(i) The Insurer 
Under the common law, the insurer is subject to the general duty of 
good fai th which applies to the contract of insurance
42
. However, 
40The duty to act bona fide follows from the agent's designation 
as a fiduciary: CQ9JSS v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC). 
41SIB Conduct of Business Rule 5.12A. 
42Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A. v We~tgate In~~~~~~ Co. Ltd. 
[1991] 2 AC 249. 
208 
despi te the lack of precedent ~ it seems likely that the insurer's 
common law duty of disclosure in life assurance does not extend as far 
as the obligations imposed by the SIB's Rulebook. 
The disclosure provisions of the SIB's Rulebook43 require the insurer 
to issue to the proposer a "statement of product particulars" which 
includes details on matters such as bonus expectations, liability to 
taxation, surrender values and the effect of charges and expenses. They 
therefore expand the insurer's common law duty of disclosure into areas 
in which most proposers for life assurance have little or no expertise. 
(ii) The Agent of the Proposer 
The common law fiduciary duties of the agent require disclosure of his 
commission on request to his principal, a position implicitly 
recognised by the Code of Conduct of the Insurance Brokers Registration 
Counci1 44 , which includes this disclosure requirement. 
The SIB's Rulebook introduces a more extensive disclosure requirement 
in respect of the agent of the proposer than is required by common 
law45 • I t requires disclosure, prior to the recommendation of a 
transact ion, of46 : 
(a) the basis of the remuneration of the intermediary payable by the 
customer; and 
(b) the fact, if relevant, that commission will be paid by a person 
other than the customer and that information relating to the commission 
will follow from that person in due course. 
43 SIB Conduct of Business Rule 5.14. 
44Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) 
Approval Order 1978, SI 1978/1394. 
45"Independent intermediary" is a term used to describe an agent 
of the proposer as opposed to a "tied agent" which is the term 
generally applied to an agent of the insurer. 
46 This section paraphrases rule 5.13 of the SIB's Conduct of 
Business Rules. 
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(c) Cancellation Rights 
The FSA 198647 gives the SIB power to make rules to enable a person 
who has entered into an investment agreement with an authorised person 
to rescind the agreement within such period and in such manner as the 
Board prescribes. The rules 48 adopted by the Board generally allow a 
cancellation period of fourteen days from receipt of the notice of 
cancellation. As rescission of the contract would not be open to the 
proposer under the common law49 , the right of cancellation is an 
example of a fully-fledged amendment of the common law introduced by 
the FSA 1986. In this respect, the cancellation rules differ from the 
rules relating to "best advice" and disclosure which, as noted above, 
do not alter the common law of contract in the sense that the term 
"amendment" is generally used. 
However, a choice of applicable law other than English or Scots will 
not prevent the application of the United Kingdom cancellation rules. 
The Reguiations 50 implementing the cancellation rules of the Second 
and Third Life Directives make clear that a cancellation notice51 must 
be sent or given to policyholders resident in the United Kingdom where 
the policy is sold by a Community insurer on either an establishment 
or services basis. In implementing the cancellation rules of the 
47Section 51. 
48 The Financial Services (Cancellation) Rules 1989 (as amended) 
govern the cancellation procedure for investment business. Other long-
term contracts are governed by sections 75-77 of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982. The Insurance Companies (Cancellation) and 
(Cancellation no.2) Regulations 1993 will implement Article 15 of the 
Second Life Directive (as amended by Article 30 of the Third Li fe 
Directive) in respect of contracts falling under the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982. It is intended that a separate review of FSA 
Cancellation Rules will be undertaken by the SIB (see DTI Consultation 
Document on Article 15). 
49Although he would have the right to withdraw up until payment of 
the first premium which represents the conclusion of the contract. 
50 See note 48 above. 
51 The form of the notice is set out in the Insurance Companies 
(Cancellation no. 2) Regulations 1993. 
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insurance Directives, the United Kingdom has opted for the minimum 
cancellation period of 14 days which is provided for in the Life 
Directives52 . 
3. The Statements of Insurance Practice 
The scope of the Statements of Practice is defined as follows: 
(a) Statement of General Insurance Practice (1986); 
"The following Statement of normal insurance practice applies to 
general insurances of policyholders resident in the UK and insured in 
their private capacity only." 
(b) Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice (1986); 
"The following Statement of normal insurance practice applies to 
policies of long-term insurance effected in the UK in a private 
capacity by individuals resident in the UK." 
In both instances, the definition of the scope of the Statements raises 
issues regarding the law applicable to the contract as determined by 
the insurance Directives53 . Two sets of circumstances are possible: 
(i) The insurer is based in the United Kingdom. In this situa-
tion, the Statements of Practice apply to policyholders resident 
in the United Kingdom where the insurer has subscribed to the 
Statements. 
(ii) The insurer is based outside the United Kingdom. In this 
situation, the insurer will not have subscribed to the Statements 
of Insurance Practice. Therefore, policyholders resident in the 
United Kingdom who purchase such policies are not covered by the 
52Article 15 of the Second Directive provided policyholders 
purchasing policies on a services basis with a cancellation period of 
betewen 14 and 30 days from the time of intimation of conclusion of the 
contract. Article 30 of the Third Directive extends this right to all 
policyholders purchasing individual life assurance from Communi ty 
insurers. See also chap. 2, section C.2. 
53 The position of policyholders not resident in the United Kingdom 
is considered in section G below. 
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Statements even if the contract is subject to the law in the 
United Kingdom. 
It follows that policyholders in the United Kingdom purchasing policies 
on a "services" basis do not have a similar level of protection to 
those purchasing policies within the domestic market, who benefit from 
the Statements of Practice. 
C. THE POLICYHOLDER IS NOT RESIDENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. English or Scots Law as the Applicable Law 
A choice of English or Scots law as the applicable law is dependent, 
in this situation, on the rules of the insurance Directives and the 
laws of other Member States. It is particularly important to identify 
whether the laws of other Member States provide for a wider choice of 
law than the rules of the insurance Directives. Several situations can 
be identified in which a choice of English or Scots law will be 
available to the contracting parties. 
Three instances can be cited in the non-life sector. First, "large" 
risks, where a free choice is always available. Secondly, where a 
Member State in which the risk is situated and in which the insured has 
his habitual residence allows a free choice of law. Thirdly, where a 
risk is situated in the United Kingdom, the parties may take advantage 
of the freedom of choice of law available in the United Kingdom. 
In the life sector, a choice of English or Scots law will be possible 
where the Member State of the commitment allows a free choice of law. 
It will also be possible where the policyholder is a United Kingdom 
national, irrespective of the law of the Member State of the commit-
ment. This means that, in respect of "expatriate" policies sold from 
the United Kingdom by way of freedom of services54 into other Member 
States, a choice of English or Scots law is always available. 
54 In the sense in which this term was used in chap. 1. 
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Where no choice has been made, the applicable law is likely to be 
English or Scots law if the risk is situated in the United Kingdom 
(the country of the closest connection). In the case of life assurance, 
tha applicable law in the absence of choice will be that of the Member 
State in which the insured is habitually resident (the Member State of 
the commi tmen t) . 
2. Conduct of Business Rules 
As noted above, a choice of law does not encompass Conduct of Business 
Rules. Thus, where a policyholder is resident in a Member State outside 
the United Kingdom, he will be subject to that Member State's Conduct 
of Business Rules, if such rules eXist 55 • The application of those 
rules will not be prejudiced by a choice of English or Scots law as the 
applicable law56 . 
3. The Statements of Insurance Practice 
Where a policy is sold on a services basis into another Member State 
and is made subject to the law in the United Kingdom, it is clear that 
the Statements do not apply. It follows that the rights and obligations 
of a POlicyhOlder57 whose contract is subject to the law in the United 
Kingdom will vary according to whether or not he is resident in the 
United Kingdom. This gives rise to considerations of mandatory rules 
of contract law which may be justified in the "general good" which were 
discussed in chapters 2 and 4. In particular, it might be argued that 
the failure of the United Kingdom to extend an equivalent level of 
protection to policyholders in other Member States whose policies are 
55 Not all Member States have Conduct of Business Rules. See the 
evidence of the DTI to the House of Lords Select Commi ttee on the 
European Communities (12th Report, session 1990-91, A Single Insurance 
Market) . 
56The Regulations implementing the cancellation rules of the 
insurance Directives (see note 48 above) provide that they do not apply 
where the policyholder is habitually resident in another Member State. 
57 The Statements can only apply to policyholders purchasing in a 
private capacity. 
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subject to English or Scots law justified the retention of mandatory 
rules of contract law which impaired the free access of United Kingdom 
policies to another country in the Community. The law on warranties can 
be cited as an example. The Statements of Practice require a causal 
link between breach of warranty and a loss if the insurer is to avoid 
liability, but the law in the United Kingdom requires no such causal 
link. Member States such as Germany58, which require a causal link as 
part of their law may regard a contract or a choice of law which evades 
this requirement as being contrary to the "general good" and seek to 
apply the rule of causality as a mandatory rule. 
58 See chap. 3 for more details on German law. 
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PART 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
It is proposed to use the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (hereafter MIA 
1906) as the basis of the statement of current insurance contract law 
in both England and Scotland. The MIA 190659 makes express provision 
regarding its application to other classes: 
ft •• except as by this section provided, nothing in this Act shall alter 
or affect any rule of law applicable to any contract of insurance other 
than a contract of marine insurance as by this Act defined." 
However, an approach based on the MIA 1906 can be justified on two 
grounds. Firstly, a tendency to extrapolate from marine to other 
classes of business was evident long before the introduction of the MIA 
1906: the early case-law related mainly to marine insurance, but the 
principles were extended to other classes. Secondly, the act was itself 
largely a codifying statute and its provisions have subsequently. 
whether rightly or wrongly, been applied to non-marine classes of 
business. Categoric support for this extension to other classes can be 
found in the House of Lords decision in the case of Thomson v weems 60 : 
"I think that on the balance of authority the general principles of 
insurance law apply to all insurances, whether marine, life or fire." 
D. THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT 
1. Definition of Insurance 
The MIA 190661 provides the following definition: 
"A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the asssured, against marine losses, that is 
to say, the losses incident to marine adventure." 
The definition contained in the Insurance Companies Act 198262 is less 
ambitious in that it simply provides that the term "insurance 
business", for the purposes of the Act. includes certain common 
59Section 2(2). 




categories of business. As neither statutory definition is exhaustive, 
common law definitions remain important. However, attempts on the part 
of judges and commentators to reach a more wide-ranging definition, 
which would cover non-marine classes and encompass the fact that the 
principle of indemni ty is of limited relevance to life assurance, 
appear to have had only limi ted success. Ivamy' s defini tion63 is 
challenged by Colinvaux64 on the basis that the law does not pre-
scribe the form which indemni ty is to take, nor does it require a 
premium, al though the general principles of English contract law 
require some form of consideration, unless the policy is under seal. 
Clarke65 resorts to the observation that: 
"The English courts know an elephant when they see one, so too a policy 
of insurance". 
Wi thin the relevant case-law, the best definition is probably in 
Prudential Insurance Co. v Inland Revenue Commissioners66 : 
"When you insure a ship or a house, you cannot insure that the ship 
shall not be lost or the house burned, but what you do insure is that 
a sum of money shall be paid on the happening of a certain event. That 
I think is the first requirement in a contract of insurance. It must 
be a contract, whereby, for some consideration, usually, but not 
necessarily, for periodical payments called premiums, you secure to 
yourself some benefit, usually, but not necessarily, the payment of a 
sum of money upon the happening of some event." 
These essential elements were relied on in DTI v St. Christopher's 
Motorists Association61 , although it was stressed that they did not 
63General Principles of Insurance Law (4th edn.) p3: 
"A contract of insurance in the widest sense of the term may be defined 
as a contract whereby one person, called the insurer, undertakes, in 
return for an agreed consideration called the premium, to pay to 
another person, called the assured, a sum of money or its equivalent 
on the happening of a specified event." 
64 The Law of Insurance (4th edn.) p4. 
65Malcolm Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, pl. 
66[1904] 2K.B. 658, 663. 
67 [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep 17. I t was held that the provision of a 
chauffeur service by the Association to members in the event of their 
being unable to drive through accident or disqualification amounted to 
insurance. 
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constitute an exhaustive definition. Indeed, the judge in that case 
cast doubt over the desirability of an exhaustive definition, saying68 
that the legislature had not defined insurance as: 
"no difficulty has arisen in practice, and therefore there has been no 
all-embracing defini tion, and the probabili ty is that it is undesirable 
that there should be, because definitions tend to obscure and 
occasionally to exclude that which ought to be included". 
A similar approach was followed in Medical Defence Union v Dept. of 
Trade69 . No definition of insurance was attempted in that case, but 
it was stressed that the payment of money or money's worth on the 
occurrence of the insured event was fundamental to the contract of 
insurance 70. 
Among the Scots sources, Bell7l offers a defini tion which does not 
limit the form of the indemnity in the manner indicated by the cases 
cited above: 
"Insurance is a contract to indemnify against possible or probable 
loss, in consideration of a sum or premium paid, or held to be paid." 
However, a contemporary definition of insurance in Scots law would 
probably follow the English model 72 . 
2. Insurable Interest 
Insurable interest operates to limit access to insurance to parties who 
have a financial interest in the occurrence of the insured event. In 
its early years, the transaction of insurance was seen as analogous to 
gambling, in that the element of speculation appeared to be one of the 
68 Ibid . p18. 
69[1980] Ch. 82. 
70The court concluded that the benefits provided by the Medical 
Defence Union to its members were not of such a nature as to constitute 
insurance. 
71principles, s.457. 
72 As discussed below, Scots law has tended to follow the English 
approach to insurance contract law although there are points on which 
the two legal systems differ. 
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major characteristics of the contract. The practice of insurers, who, 
in the formative years of the industry, were concerned mainly with 
marine risks, no doubt reinforced the analogy: ships were often insured 
after they had sailed and subject to the "lost or not lost" provision, 
which meant that the insurance was valid whether or not the ship had 
already been lost at sea. It was against this background and in order 
to distinguish insurance from gambling that the requirement that the 
insured have an "insurable interest U in the subject matter of insurance 
developed. 
The MIA 190673 defines insurable interest in relation to marine 
insurance as follows: 
"In particular a person is interested in a marine adventure where he 
stands in any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any 
insurable property at risk therein, in consequence of which he may 
benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be 
prejudiced by its loss, or by damage thereto, or by the detention 
thereof, or may incur liability in respect thereof." 
The Act further provides that where the insured does not have an 
insurable interest or the expectation of acquiring such an interest, 
the contract is deemed to be a gaming or wagering contract and 
therefore void74 . This represents the current law as regards marine 
insurance in both England and Scotland, but, as discussed below, the 
development of the law in each jurisdiction was substantially 
different. 
(a) England 
The English common law recognised the validi ty of wagering con-
tracts75 , al though where it was clear that the contract was one of 
indemnity, proof of interest was required76 . The Marine Insurance Act 
1745 made marine policies lacking interest, or no further proof of 
73Section 5 (2) . 
74MIA 1906, section 4. 
75Jones v Randall (1774) Cowp. 17. 
76Lucena v Craufurd (1802) 3 B&P 75, 101. 
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interest than the policy itself, void. It was later repealed in toto 
by the MIA 1906. The rather misleadingly titled Life Assurance Act of 
1774 extended the requirement of insurable interest to insurances "on 
the Life or Lives of any Person or Persons, or on any other Event or 
Events whatsoever", but excluded from its ambit insurances "on Ships, 
Goods, or Merchandises". 
This apparent gap in statute law concerning insurable interest in 
respect of "goods or merchandises" was later resolved by the Marine 
Insurance Act 1788, which required the insertion of the name of an 
interested party for "insurances, on ships and on goods, merchandises 
or effects", and the Gaming Act 1845 which declared "That all Contracts 
or Agreements, whether by Parole or in Writing, by way of gaming or 
wagering shall be null and void." 
The key point appears to be that the contingency in respect of which 
insurance is effected must relate to the insured's legal rights: thus, 
a shareholder, even a substantial one, has no insurable interest in the 
company's property77, although he does have an insurable interest in 
his shares in the company78. 
The issue of when insurable interest must exist was clarified in the 
case of Mark Rowlands Ltd. v Berni Inns 79 , which held that insurance 
policies on buildings and land do not require interest at the outset. 
It had previously been argued that the Life Assurance Act 1774 had 
imposed a requirement of interest at the outset. 
(b) Scotland 
The abuse of insurance as a method of gaming or wagering was not 
present in Scotland as gambling contracts were void at common law80 . 
77Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. [1925] AC 619. 
78Wilson v Jones (1867) L.R. 2Exch. 139. 
79[1985] 3 All ER 473. 
80Bruce v Ross (1787) M 952. 
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The Marine Insurance Act 1745 and the Life Assurance Act 1774 both 
applied to Scotland as did the Marine Insurance Act 1788. However, the 
Gaming Act of 1845 did not apply to Scotland, and it has been 
suggested81 that it is not at all clear that the requirement of the 
1788 Act regarding the insertion of the name of an interested party 
creates a requirement for insurable interest in respect of property 
(Le. "goods and merchandises" under the 1774 Act) insurances in 
Scotland. 
Nevertheless, Bel1 82 refers to insurable interest as an accepted 
principle of Scots law: 
"It is essential to the contract of insurance that there shall be a 
subj ect in which the insured has an interes t , a premium given or 
engaged for, and a risk run". 
He goes on to define the scope83 of insurable interest as being: 
"every real and actual advantage and benefi t arising out of or 
depending on the thing to which it refers". 
Case-law supports a requirement of insurable interest in the case of 
all property insurances in Scotland. In Arif v Excess Insurance 
GrouJ4, it was held that one partner in an hotel business was not 
entitled to recover under a fire policy covering the building and its 
contents as the ti tIe to the building was in the other partner's 
name85 . 
(c) A wider definition of insurable interest? 
It has been noted86 that the recognition of insurable interest has 
expanded with time: 
81 J . J . Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, p335. 
82principles, s.457. 
83principles, s.461. 
84 1987 S.L.T. 473. 
85There was also non-disclosure as the partnership interest had 
not been disclosed. 
86Moran Galloway v Uzielli [1905] 2 K.B. 555, 563. 
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"The definition of insurable interest has been continuously expanding 
and dicta in some of the older cases, which would tend to narrow it, 
must be accepted with caution." 
WOlffe87 has argued that the delimi tation of insurable interest in 
Arif v Excess, which followed the approach of the House of Lords in 
Macaura v Northern Insurance Co. 88, is unduly restrictive. He bases 
his argument on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Constitution Insurance Company of Canada v Kosmopoulos 89 where, on the 
basis of facts 90 similar to those in Arif v Excess, it was decided 
that the insured could recover under the policy. The rationale of 
Kosmopoulos followed that of Bell (above) in that it extended 
insurable interest to anyone who could show a pecuniary loss from the 
insured event. As argued by Wolffe, the adoption of such an approach 
in the United Kingdom would widen the category of person with insurable 
interest without increasing materially the risk of fraud 91 . 
87W. J . Wolffe, "Insurable Interest: Time for a Change" 1989 SLT 
103. 
88[1925] AC 619. 
89(1987) 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208. 
90KosmopouloS was sole shareholder and director of a limi ted 
company, Kosmopoulos Leather Goods Ltd., through which he carried on 
a business known as Spring Leather Goods. He insured the business 
assets against fire damage in the name of "Andreas Kosmopoulos O/A 
Spring Leather Goods". The insurer repudiated a claim for fire damage 
on the basis of lack of insurable interest. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
found for Kosmopoulos by lifting the coprorate veil. The Supreme Court 
also found for Kosmopoulos but on the basis that he had an insurable 
interest: in reaching this view it disregarded the approach of the 
House of Lords in Macaura v Northern Assurance [1925] AC 619. 
91 The main risk identified in Kosmopoulos was that of sharehold-
ers in small companies destroying assets insured in their own names so 
as to defeat creditors. This was counterbalanced by the consideration 
that criminal sanctions provided a deterrent to fraudulent destruction 
of property. Moreover, it was noted that it was open to creditors to 
satisfy themselves as to the adequacy of insurance in the company name. 
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3. The Requirement of Good Faith 
The nature of the contract of insurance is the foundation of the 
separation of 
Insurance, 
insurance from the normal rules 
other contracts 92 
of contract law. 
is designated a 
contract 
along with several 
uberrimae fidei 93 , that is a transaction whose nature 
requires good faith in both the negotiating process and performance. 
Such contracts can be distinguished from those which require good faith 
due to the relationship which exists between the parties at the time 
they enter into a contract: examples are the relationships of agency 
and trusteeship. Thus, the requirement of good faith in contracts 
uberrimae fidei can be regarded as transaction-based, whereas other 
examples of a requirement of good faith in the negotiation of contracts 
are relationship-based94 . 
4. Insurance as an Investment 
The past thirty years have seen fundamental changes in the nature of 
life assurance, with the emphasis switching away from provision for 
dependants in the event of death to investment products which are 
intended to provide a return to the insured during the course of his 
lifetime95 . This process has been most obvious in the development of 
unit-linked life assurance, whereby an investment bond and life 
92Spencer Bower, Turner & Sutton, Actionable Non-Disclosure (2nd 
edn), para 5.01, list the following as contracts uberrimae fidei (in 
addi tion to insurance): (i) contracts for the sale of land (ii) 
contracts of suretyship (iii) releases and compromises (iv) contracts 
for partnership (v) contracts to marry and separation deeds. 
93 The use of the latin superlative "Utmost Good Faith" is 
superfluous as contracts either require good faith or do not. See chap. 
3, part 1, section A. 
94 This distinction is recognised by Spencer Bower, Turner & 
Sutton, op.cit. chap.l. 
95 See "The Marketing and Sale of Investment-Linked Insurance 
Products" (A Report by the Director General of Fair Trading to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, March 1993) and "Fair Trading and Life 
Insurance Savings Products" (A Report by the Director General of Fair 
Trading, March 1993). 
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assurance are linked together to form one contract in which the bulk 
of the premium is generally in respect of the investment element rather 
than the life assurance. However, the trend has also been evident in 
conventional life assurance products, where "wi th-profi t" endowment 
policies have for a long time acted as regular savings plans designed 
to provide a lump-sum during the lifetime of the assured. 
It was against this background that Professor Gower, in his Review of 
Investor Protection96 recommended that: 
"all forms of bonds, whether or not linked to life policies, should be 
treated as 'securities'.. and so should all life policies, for 
investment is what they undoubtedly are." 
That recommendation was accepted by the government and incorporated in 
the Financial Services Act 1986. The result is that life assurance is 
included within the definition of "investment" for the purposes of the 
Act, except where the insurance is one which provides no lifetime 
savings element 97 . The Financial Services Act imposes obligations on 
insurers in relation to their investment business in the form of 
Conduct of Business Rules adopted by self-regulatory bodies under the 
authority of the Act. The relationship of those rules to contract law 
and their relevance to the rules which govern the applicable law within 
the Single Market were considered in part 1 of this chapter. 
E. NEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT 
Two influences can be identified in the law relating to the negotiation 
of insurance contracts. The first is a reliance on freedom of contract 
which results in a legal framework in which there are few limitations 
on contract terms. The second is an emphasis on the relative bargaining 
posi tions of the contracting parties. In the formative years of 
insurance contract law, the prevailing view was that the advantage of 
information as to the risk lay with the insured. This formed the basis 
of the insured's duty of disclosure at inception of the contract. 
96 Cmnd . 9125 (1984), Part 1. 
97 The most important categories of exemption are contracts, such 
as term or whole life insurance, which provide benefits only on death. 
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Recent developments, however, indicate a divergence of approach in the 
law relating to disclosure as between commercial and personal 
insurances. On the one hand, the Statements of Insurance Practice98 
have, through self-regulation on the part of insurers, strengthened the 
posi tion of the policyholder who purchases insurance in a private 
capacity. On the other hand, the law relating to disclosure in relation 
to commercial insurances has developed in a manner which imposes a 
heavy duty on the insured. 
1. Freedom of Contract 
There are few substantive limitations on freedom of contract in the 
field of insurance in the United Kingdom. As noted in chapter 3, the 
United Kingdom, unlike other Member States such as France and Germany, 
does not exercise administrative control over either the terms of 
insurance contracts or premium rates. Standard forms of contract are 
common in relation to risks where insurance is compulsory99 but this 
arises from the obligation to insure rather than from control over 
contract terms. As noted in chapter 2, contract terms relating to 
jurisdiction are governed by the Brussels Convention and those relating 
to choice of law primarily by the Second Life and Non-Life Directives. 
The Statements of Insurance Practice modify, on a self-regulatory 
basis, the rights of the insurer and policyholder in relation to 
insurances purchased in a private capacity: as will be discussed below, 
this has the effect of limiting the use of certain contract terms. 
Formal limitations on freedom of contract in the United Kingdom arise 
mainly where there is an obligation on the part of the insurer to bring 
certain matters to the attention of the proposer. There are three main 
instances of such an obligation. The first arises at common law: in 
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.
lOO
, 
98These are discussed in greater detail in section G below. 
99 An example is third party motor cover under the Road Traffic Act 
1988. 
100[1989] QB 433. 
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the Court of Appeal held that effect will not be given to particularly 
onerous or unusual contract terms unless they are fairly and reasonably 
brought to the attention of the other party prior to entering into the 
contract. The second instance is the requirement for life assurers to 
issue certain notices to a proposer under rules adopted pursuant to the 
Financial Services Act 1986101 . Finally, the Statements of Insurance 
Practice contain several requirements regarding the form of insurers' 
documentation102 . 
2. Good Faith 
The MIA 1906 codified the common law duty of good faith as follows 103 : 
"A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost 
good faith and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either 
party, the contract may be avoided by the other party." 
The principle of good faith applies equally to both parties to the 
contract. Whilst the substance of the principle is most readily 
identifiable in relation to the insured's duty of disclosure, the 
insurer has also been held to owe a duty of disclosure to the 
insured104 . Moreover, both parties are bound to act in good faith in the 
settlement of claims105 . 
As regards the period during which utmost good faith operates, it has 
been said106 that: 
101These were discussed in more detail in part 1 of this chapter. 
l02 For example, para. 1(d) of the Statement of General Insurance 
Practice requires proposal forms to contain questions on matters which 
insurers have found generally to be material. 
103Section 17. 
104Bangue Financiere de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. 
[1991] 2 AC 249. 
l05 This has developed in the United States into the principle of 
"reverse bad fai th" under which there have been numerous cases of 
damages awarded to the insured where the insurer has acted in bad faith 
during the claims settlement process. See Clarke, op.cit. chap.27. 
l06Boulton v Houlder Bros. [1904] 1KB 784, 791-2. 
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"I t is an essential condi tion of the policy of insurance that the 
underwriters shall be treated with good faith, not merely in reference 
to the inception of the risk, but in the steps taken to carry out the 
contract". 
In particular, the duty revives whenever the insured has an express or 
implied duty to supply information to enable the insurer to make a 
decision107 . Thus, although most frequently referred to in the context 
of the duty of disclosure prior to the formation of the contract, the 
principle of good faith continues to operate throughout the policy 
term but with varying levels of obligation as to disclosure and conduct 
placed on the parties. 
It was noted in chapter 3 that the notion of good faith as a general 
principle of contract law varies between Scotland and England, but 
there does not appear to be any material distinction between the two 
jurisdictions as regards the application of the principle to insurance 
contracts. 
3. The Duty of Disclosure 
The legal basis of the duty of disclosure has been disputed over the 
years by both judges and commentators. The MIA 1906108 adopted the 
common law requirement of disclosure in insurance but did not make 
clear the nature of the duty. The dominant view in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was that that the duty was an implied 
term of the contract 109 . Recent case-law, however, has rejected an 
implied term as the basis of the duty110. In Bangue Financiere de la 
107The Litsion Pride [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 435,511. 
108Section 18(1). 
109 ThiS interpretation is supported by the majority view in 
Blackburn Low & Co. v Vigors (1887) 12 AC 531, and by Arnould's Law of 
Marine Insurance (2nd edn. 1850 to 12th edn. 1939). 
110Merchants & Manufacturers Ins. Co. v Hunt [1941] lKB 215,313; 
March Cabaret v London Assurance [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep 437,518; and 
Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Associates [1989] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 238. See H.Y. Yeo, "Of reciprocity and remedies - duty of 
disclosure in insurance contracts" 11 Legal Studies (1991) 131. 
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Cite S.A. v Westgate Insurance Co.Ltd. ll1 , the Court of Appeal 
favoured the dissenting view of Lord Esher in Blackburn Low & Co v 
Vigors 112 and held the duty to be a conditionl13 precedent to the 
right of a party to insist on performance. As such, breach of the duty 
of disclosure did not give rise to a remedy in damages. This view was 
followed in "The Good Luck"114 when the Court of Appeal relied on the 
ruling in Bangue Financiere in holding that breach of the duty of good 
fai th after conclusion of the contract did not support a claim in 
damages. 
(a) England 
In areas other than insurance, the common law does not recognise a 
general duty of disclosure of informationl15 . However, it is fundamen-
tal to the contract of insurance as failure to fulfil the duty means 
that the contract is voidable at the option of the insurer116 . The 
duty is the same each time the policy is renewed as at the outset l17 . 
Folowing the general principles of contract law, the presence of fraud 
gives rise to a claim for damages. 
111[1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 513. The decision was affirmed by the House 
of Lords on different grounds: [1991] 2 AC 249. 
112(1887) 12 AC 531. 
113The reference to a "condition" is confusing within the context 
of a rejection of the duty as an implied contract term. However, it was 
made clear in Bangue Financiere (Court of Appeal, p548) that the 
reference to a condition was in the sense of a contingent condition, 
the non-fulfillment of which gives no right of action for breach but 
merely suspends the obligations of one or both parties. See Chitty on 
Contracts (25th edn.) paras 752-3. 
114The Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd. [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 238. The decision was reversed by 
the House of Lords on other grounds: [1992] 1 AC 233. 
115 See Treitel, The Law of Contract (8th edn.) p349, and chap. 3 
of this thesis. 
116MIA 1906, section 18(1). 
117Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
485. 
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English common law did not allow avoidance of a contract in cases of 
innocent misrepresentationl18 , but insurance cases were an exception 
to this rUle l19 . As regards other contracts, the courts of equity 
might grant rescission for innocent misrepresentation, but at law the 
contract stood unless the representation amounted to a condi tionI20 . 
It has been observed that it is doubtful whether an action for non-
disclosure can be brought under section 2(1) of The Misrepresentation 
Act l21 , although such actions would, in most cases, be precluded by 
the Statements of PracticeI22 adopted by the industry. 
(i) The Scope of the Duty of Disclosure 
The MIA 1906 codified the common law in respect of disclosure as 
follows I23 : 
"Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose 
to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material 
circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed 
to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, 
ought to be known by him" 
118Redgrave v Hurd 1881 20 Ch.D. 1. 
1I9Graham v Western Australian Insurance (1931) 40 Lloyd's Rep 64. 
I20Implying fundamental term of the contract. 
I2I This provides: 
"Where a person enters into a contract after a misrepresentation has 
been made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he 
has suffered loss, then, if the person making the representation would 
be liable to damages in respect thereof had the representation been 
made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that 
the representation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he 
had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe up to the time the 
contract was made that the facts represented were true." 
I22 para . 2(b)(ii) of the Statement of General Insurance Practice 
and para. 3(a) of the Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice limit 
repudiation of claims to deliberate or negligent misrepresentation of 




These principles were first recognised by Lord Mansfield in Carter v 
Boehm124 : 
"Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The special facts, upon 
which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie more commonly in the 
knowledge of the insured only: the underwriter trusts to his represen-
tation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief 
that the circumstance did not exist, and to induce him to estimate the 
risque as if it did not exist. The keeping b,~ in such a circumstance 
is a fraud and therefore the policy is void . Although the suppres-
sion should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention; 
yet still the underwriter is deceived and the policy is void." 
However, the same judge in the following year directly contradicted 
this famous passage, holding that: 
"It must be a ff2~udulent concealment of circumstances, that will 
vitiate a policy" . 
It has been argued127 on the basis of this decision and the weight of 
the duty of investigation placed on the insurer in Carter v Boehm128 , 
that Lord Mansfield framed the duty of disclosure in a much narrower 
form than that in which it subsequently developed. However, the 
formulation of the duty of disclosure in Carter v Boehm makes it 
difficult to accept that Lord Mansfield intended that there must be 
fraud if the insurer is to avoid the policy for non-disclosure. 
As regards the duration of the insured's duty of disclosure, it 
continues until the conclusion of the contract. In the case of life 
assurance, the contract is not concluded until the first premium has 
been paid, and the duty of disclosure therefore continues until the 
124(1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
125This has been taken by commentators to mean voidable. 
126Mayne v Wal ter (1787). Report in Park, The Law of Marine 
Insurances (1787), p220. 
127R. A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law -
A Critical Evaluation" 1969 32 MLR 615. 
128The decision was in favour of the insured largely due to the 
fact that the insurer had failed to investigate" the condition of the 
place" (Fort Marlborough on the island of Sumatra) in respect of the 
risk of French attack which was insured by the policy. 
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insured tenders the first premium129 . There is no legal duty to 
disclose changes in risk during the period of cover, although such an 
obligation may arise in the case of non-life insurance in the form of 
a specific contract term. 
The insurer may, however , waive disclosoure of material facts 130 . 
Al though the proposer's duty of disclosure is not discharged by 
completion of a proposal form, the formulation of questions in the 
proposal form may be indicative of the insurer having waived the right 
to further information131 . 
(ii) "Material" Information 
The MIA 1906 132 provides that: 
"Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgement of 
a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will 
take the risk". 
A concise outline of the potential meaning of "material" was provided 
in Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society133, where four possible 
interpretations of prior case-law were advanced: 
1. to disclose such facts as the particular assured believes to 
be material 
2. to disclose such facts as a reasonable man would consider to 
be material 
3. to disclose such facts as the particular insurer would regard 
as material 
4. to disclose such facts as a reasonable or prudent insurer 
would regard as material. 
It was explained that the last alternative was the correct interpreta-
tion of the law and that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy 
129Looker v Law Union & Rock Ins. Co. [1928] 1 K.B. 554. 
130MIA 1906, section 18(3)(c). 
131 In Roberts v Plaisted [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 667 the insured did 
not disclose that a discotheque was occasionally run in his hotel but 
the insurer was taken to have waived this information by the nature of 
the questions in the proposal form. 
132Section 18(2). 
133[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 485. 
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on the grounds that the insured had failed to disclose a conviction 
when renewing the policy. 
The MIA 1906134 provides that the "materiality" of any particular 
circumstance is a question of fact. Some guidance is available from 
Woolcott v Sun Alliance135 , where it was held that the insurer was 
entitled to avoid the policy on the grounds that the insured had not 
disclosed a twelve-year-old conviction for robbery. This decision was 
reached despite the fact that the insurance was ancillary to a mortgage 
agreement as it was held to be within the insured's actual or presumed 
knowledge that the building society would effect the insurance of his 
property on his behalf as well as on their own. 
It is not necessary for an insurer to demonstrate that a prudent 
insurer would have altered his decision if he were in possession of a 
material fact which has not been disclosed. Following the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus 
Mutual Underwri ting Association136 it is clear that the relevant 
information, considered in isolation, need have made no difference to 
the acceptance of the risk or the terms of the contract. This decision 
has been criticised137 as being inconsistent with precedent and 
placing an unduly onerous burden on the insured, but it now represents 
the law in England. The test of materiality in CTI v Oceanus is of 
general application and not limited to marine insurance138 . It was 
134Section 18(4). 
135[1978] 1 WLR 493. 
136[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476,510. 
137 See M. Clarke, "Failure to Disclose and Failure to Legislate: 
is it Material?", 1988 JBL 206, 298. 
138Highlands Insurance Co. v The Continental Insurance Co. [1987] 
1 Lloyd's Rep 109. 
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recently applied in Pan Atlantic Ins. Co. Ltd. v Pine Top Ins. Co. 
Ltd139. 
(b) Scotland 
The substance of the current Scots law in respect of disclosure in 
insurance is probably not different to England140 . The definition of 
the duty of disclosure advanced by Bell 141 is less onerous than that 
indicated by the case-law and appears to be no more than a general 
principle of Scots contract law, in that it focuses on representations 
and not on the duty of disclosure. The provisions of the MIA 1906 apply 
to both jurisdictions and the courts have generally followed the 
English common law in relation to non-marine classes of business. In 
Life Association of Scotland v Foster142 , the facts of the case 
resul ted in the insurer being bound by the contract but it was 
recognised that: 
"uberrima fides is part of Scots law and that without any fraudulent 
intent and even in bona fide, the insured may fail in the duty of 
disclosure". 
However, it is possible that the test of materiality may differ between 
Scotland and England. In Gifto Fancy Goods Ltd. v Ecclesiatical 
Insurance Office143 the court reserved its opinion on the question of 
139[1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 101. However, the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in this case ( [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 496) makes clear that CTI 
v Oceanus has not adequately resolved the law on materiality in that 
it is not clear if it is necessary for the relevant information to have 
had the effect of increasing the risk in the judgement of the prudent 
insurer. 
140However, as noted in chap. 3,( part 1 section A), the general 
law on disclosure in pre-contractual negotiations may differ between 
Scotland and England. 
141principles, s.474: 
"Insurance is a contract of good fai th, in which the insurer, in 
calculating the risks to be run, greatly relies on the statement of the 
insured. The statement is called a Representation which, whether 
fraudulent or innocent, if material to the risk, must be 'substantial-
ly' true, or complied with, otherwise there is in the option of the 
insurer no insurance." 
142(1873) 11M 35l. 
143 1991 GWD 2-117. 
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whether the appropriate test of materiali ty in establishing non-
disclosure in relation to a non-marine risk was that of CTr v Oceanus. 
This stands in contrast to the position in England where, as discussed 
above, the test of CTr v Oceanus 
risks. 
has been extended to non-marine 
The complications arising from innocent misrepresentation in England 
do not apply in Scotland as it is well established that a contract is 
voidable on those grounds 144 . 
F. THE LEGAL FORCE OF POLICY TERMS 
The process of balancing the interests of the insurer and policyholder 
extends beyond the rules governing the negotiation of the contract. As 
discussed below, the effect which the law gives to policy terms has 
important consequences for the insured's ability to secure payment of 
a claim and for the insurer's ability to limit the scope of cover. 
1. The Categories of Policy Term 
This area presents something of a terminological nightmare. In English 
law, a warranty is a stipulation which is not fundamental to the 
contract, breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages but does 
not justify rescission of the contract, whereas a condi tion is a 
fundamental stipulation, something guaranteed, for non-implement of 
which the contract can be rescinded and damages claimed. This usage 
appears in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Scots law, however, does not 
follow the English approach, although there are cases in which the 
English terminology has been used. rnstead, Scots law looks at the 
nature of the breach, distinguishing between "material" and "non-
material" breaches: the former gives the innocent party the right to 
145 
rescind the contract, whereas the latter does not . 
144TUlloch v Davidson (1860) 22D (H.L.) 7. The Misrepresentation 
Act does not apply to Scotland. 
145MCBryde, Contract, chap .14. 
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Confusingly, the term "warranty" in insurance in England corresponds 
to condition in contracts other than insurance: in other words, it is 
a fundamental term, breach of which justifies rescission. The term is 
used in a similar sense in insurance policies applicable to Scotland, 
but the concept of "material breach" is not dependent on the classifi-
cation of the terms of the contract 146 . 
2. Warranties 
The MIA 1906 147 codified the common law on warranties in respect of 
marine risks as follows: 
"A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly 
complied with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not 
so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, 
the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach 
of the warranty, but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him 
before that date." 
Even before the MIA 1906 this principle was well established in 
relation to all classes of business. In Thomson v Weems 148 , the House 
of Lords held that an insurer was entitled to avoid a life policy on 
the basis that a warranty provided by the assured in relation to his 
health was not true, and that once a representation becomes a warranty, 
the issue of materiality is not relevant. However, an insurer cannot 
reject a claim for breach of warranty wi thout at the same time 
repudiating the policy149. 
The issue of whether or not a provision of the contract constitutes a 
warranty is one of intent not form: it is not essential that words such 
as "warranty" or "warranted" are used150 . Warranties may appear on the 
face of the policy or may be incorporated by reference to another 
document, usually the proposal form. The extreme position adopted in 
146 Ibid . 
147Section 33(3). 
148(1884) 9 AC 671. 
149 West v National Motor Insurance Union Ltd. [1955] 1 All ER 800. 
150Dawsons Ltd. v Bonnin [1922] 2AC 413, 428-9. 
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marine insurance, whereby any statement of fact bearing upon the risk 
contained in the policy is construed as a warranty151 is not applica-
ble to other classes of business l52 . However, as Birds153 has point-
ed out, problems may nevertheless be encountered in distinguishing 
between contract terms which are warranties and those which are merely 
descriptive of the risk~ breach of which does not justify avoidance of 
the policy but relieves the insurer of liability if the term is not 
being complied with at the time of loss. An example can be seen in the 
case of Farr v Motor Traders' Mutual Ins. Soc. Ltd. 154 : the plaintiff 
insured his two taxi-cabs and answered "Just one" to a question in the 
proposal form asking whether the vehicles were driven in one or more 
shifts per 24 hours. Following an accident to one of the taxi-cabs, it 
was discovered that the same vehicle had been driven in two shifts one 
day three months previously. The Court of Appeal held that the insurer 
could not avoid the policy as the clause did not constitute a 
warranty155. 
There is no requirement of a causal link between the breach of a 
warranty which gives rise to the right to avoid the contract and the 
actual loss sustained by an insurer. In Jones and James v Provin-
cial156 it was held that the failure of the insured to maintain his -- , 
vehicle in an efficient condi tion was a breach of warranty which 
allowed the insurer to avoid a claim for theft. 
151 MIA 1906, section 35. 
152Thomson v Weems (1884) 9AC 671. 
153 J. Birds ~ "Warranties in Insurance Proposal Forms" 1977 JBL 231. 
154[1920] 3 K.B. 669. 
155The incorporation of answers to questions in proposal forms into 
a policy as warranties has been limited by the Statements of Insurance 
Practice. See section G below. 
156 1929 35 Ll L Rep 135. However, where a reinsurance contract 
subject to English law is made on a back-to-back basis with an original 
policy which is subject to a requirement of causality if the insurer 
is to avoid liability for breach of warranty, the reinsurer's liability 
is controlled by the original insurance unless there is an express 
clause to the contrary: see Forskringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher 
and Others [1989] 1 AC 852. 
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The consequences of a breach of warranty have recently been clarified 
by the House of Lords in The Good Luck 157 . The Court of Appeal158 
had held that breach of warranty did not automatically bring the policy 
to an end: the insurer had the right to avoid the policy but also had 
the right to waive the breach. Thus, the Court took the view that the 
insurer could only be discharged from liability by a positive decision. 
However, the House of Lords held that section 33 of the MIA 1906 
operated to discharge the insurer from liability automatically as from 
the date of breach, as compliance with the warranty was a condition 
precedent to the attaching of the risk. Waiver of the breach by the 
insurer was held by the House of Lords to remain a possibility, but in 
a different manner to that envisaged by the Court of Appeal: 
"When, as section 34(3) contemplates, the insurer waives a breach of 
a promissory warranty, the effect is that, to the extent of the waiver, 
the insurer cannot rely upon the breach as having discharged him from 
liability. This is a very different thing from saying that discharge 
of the iffiurer from liability is dependent on a decision by the 
insurer." 
Provisions of the policy which are not warranties in the insurance 
sense fall under the general principles of contract law, which in both 
Scotland and England provides that the aggrieved party may claim 
damages or withold performance but not rescind the contract. 
3."Basis of Contract" Clauses 
The "basis of contract" clause is a technique which has been used by 
insurers to transform all statements made by an insured into "warran-
ties", thereby avoiding the test of "materiali ty" which normally 
applies to the duty of disclosure. The most common example was where 
a proposal form, completed by the insured or an agent, contained a 
clause making the proposal form the "basis of the contract", thereby 
157 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd. [1992] 1 AC 233. 
158[1990] 1 Q.B. 818. 
159 p263 (H.L.) 
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satisfying the requirement outlined above that there be a clear 
intention to create a warranty. 
The first reported case dealing wi th such a clause was Ducket v 
Williams 160 , in which it was held that, where a "basis of contract" 
clause was operative, the insurer could avoid the policy due to an 
innocent misrepresentation made by the insured. Although it was a life 
reinsurance case, it was subsequently followed as an authori ty for 
cases of ordinary insurance. In Thomson v Weems 161 , an applicant for 
life assurance was asked the following question: 
"Question 7 (a) Are you temperate in your habits? (b) and have you 
always been strictly so?". 
His answer was (a) "Temperate" (b) "Yes" and he subsequently signed a 
declaration to the effect that the foregoing statements were true, that 
he agreed that the declaration should be the basis of the contract and 
that any untrue statement would result in the policy being void. The 
House of Lords held that this declaration constituted an express 
warranty and that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy, having 
proved that the answer to question 7 was false. 
In Dawsons Ltd. v Bonnin162 a firm of contractors in Glasgow, in 
applying for motor insurance, wrongly stated the garaging address of 
the vehicle which was subsequently destroyed by fire. The policy 
provided that the proposal should be the basis of the contract and held 
as incorporated in the policy, and it was expressed to be granted 
subject to the conditions at the back thereof. The fourth condition 
provided that "material misstatement or concealment of any circumstance 
by the insured material to assessing the premium herein, or in 
connection with any claim, shall render the policy void". The court 
held: 
(1) that the misstatement in the proposal was not material within 
the meaning of condition 4 ; but 
160(1834) 2 Cr.&M 348. 
161(1884) 9 AC 671. 
162[1922] 2AC 413. 
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(2) that the recital in the policy that the proposal should be 
the basis of the contract had the effect of turning the garaging 
address into a warranty and that the effect of the recital was 
not diminished by the special conditions on the back of the 
policy. 
The wide-ranging protection which this mechanism provided to insurers 
susequently attracted criticism from several quarters and, as will be 
examined in greater detail below, has been an important feature of 
recent discussions regarding law reform. 
G. THE LAW REFORM DEBATE 
1. Background 
The law relating to disclosure and contract terms met with criticism 
on the basis that there was an imbalance in the rights and obligations 
of the parties to the contract. Two factors seem particularly 
influential in the development of the case against the existing law. 
First, the conditions under which insurance was transacted were 
becoming substantially different to those applicable in the industry's 
formative years. Most of the early cases involved marine insurance and 
framed the duty of disclosure on the basis of the knowledge of the 
risks to be run being weighed heavily in favour of the insured. As 
insurance expanded into areas such as life, fire, motor and liability 
and the expertise and experience of insurers increased, the circum-
stances in which the law relating to disclosure had been framed became 
unrepresentative of the conditions which actually prevailed. Secondly, 
the increasing erosion of the principle of caveat emptor through 
legislation such as the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 made the duty of disclosure in 
insurance seem particularly harsh and strengthened the case for law 
reform. 
Dissatisfaction with the law was evident in judicial circles. In Joel 
v Law Union and Crown Insurance163 , Fletcher Moulton J. said in 
relation to "basis of contract clauses": 
163[1908] 2 K.B. 863. 
238 
" .. 1 wish I could adequately warn the public against such practices on 
the part of insurance offices." 
In Glicksman v Lancashire and General Assurance Co. 164 , Lord Atkinson 
described as "lamentable" the continiued failure of insurance companies 
to put questions "in clear and unambiguous language". Academic 
criticism was evident both in respect of the law in the United States 
and in England. Harnett 165 argued that the doctrine of concealment in 
the Uni ted States served no useful social function and should be 
abandoned in favour of the application of the ordinary rules of 
contract law to insurance. Hasson166 proposed that the American 
courts167 had correctly interpreted the classical doctrine outlined 
in Carter v Boehm and that it had been misunderstood by the English 
courts. 
The case for leaving the law as it stood was based more on the 
contention, which appears from the limi ted case-law to have some 
justification, that insurers rarely used the full force of the law in 
their dealings with insureds other than when they suspected fraud: in 
most situations insurers claimed168 to demand less from the insured 
than the law strictly demanded. This standard of conduct on the part 
of the insurers, together with the absence of any significant number 
of cases in which there was seen to be injustice resulting from the 
strict application of the law, formed the basis for the industry's 
claim that the potential for abuse could be solved by self-regulation 
and that there was no need for law reform. In the end, it was this view 
164[1927] AC 139. 
165 B. Harnett, "The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law 
of Insurance", 15 Law & Contemporary Problems (1950) 391. 
166R. A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law -
A Critical Evaluation", 32 MLR (1969) 615. 
167The American courts applied the English rule of disclosure only 
to marine risks. In non-marine insurance, the insurer can avoid the 
contract only if there is non-disclosure in bad faith. See F. 
Achampong, "Uberrima Fides in English and American Insurance Law: A 
Comparative Analysis" 36 ICLQ (1987) 329. 
168 See Law Reform Committee 5th Report, Jan. 1957: Cmnd.62. 
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which won the day, with the result that insurance contract law in the 
Uni ted Kingdom is now, as far as policies purchased in a private 
capaci ty are concerned, largely an irrelevance in terms of the practice 
of the industry. As discussed below, self-regulation has supplanted, 
though not changed, the existing law in several important areas. 
2. Early Proposals for Law Reform 
Growing concern regarding the state of insurance contract law led to 
a review being undertaken by the Law Reform Committee in 1957 169 . The 
Committee's observations on its role and the effect of reforming the 
law had a major influence on its final recommendations. First, it 
observed that the mere fact that a branch of the law was theoretically 
open to criticism and susceptible to abuse did not justify a recommen-
dation that it should be changed, especially where the prejudice to the 
insured arose from express contractual provisions rather than from 
rules of law as such. Secondly, it took the view that legislation to 
alleviate the position of the insured would involve interference with 
the liberty of contract of the parties and that the desirability of 
such legislation was a broad question of social policy outside its 
competence. 
However, the Committee was still able to make three proposals for law 
reform: 
(i) that, for the purposes of any contract of insurance, no fact 
should be deemed material unless it would have been considered 
material by a reasonable insured; 
(ii) that notwithstanding anything contained or incorporated in a 
contract of insurance, no defence to a claim thereunder should be 
maintainable by reason of any misstatement of fact by the insured, 
where the insured can prove that the statement was true to the best 
of his knowledge and belief; 
(iii) that any person who solicits or negotiates a contract of 
insurance should be deemed, for the purposes of the contract, to be 
the agent of the insurers, and that the knowledge of such person 
should be deemed to be the knowledge of the insurers. 
169 Law Reform Committee 5th Report, Jan. 1957: Cmnd.62. 
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The 1imi ted scope of the recommendations can be attributed to the 
ini tia1 observations, outlined above, which the Committee made in 
respect of its review170 . However, despite their limited scope, the 
recommendations failed to make further progress and it was not until 
the introduction of the Unfair Contract Terms Bil1171 that the issue 
of legislation regarding insurance contract law was once again 
subjected to serious consideration. 
3. Law Reform versus Self-Regulation 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 was designed, inter alia, to 
introduce a test of "reasonableness" in respect of terms in "standard 
form" contracts. The Act does not apply to insurance contracts 172 . The 
"consideration" for this exemption was the agreement by the insurance 
industry to draw up and implement "Statements of Practice". These were 
published in 1977: the Non-Life Statement was subscribed to by the 
British Insurance Association and Lloyd's, whilst the Life Statement 
was subscribed to by the two dominant industry associations 173 . 
Although the Statements are not applicable to insurers who are not 
members of these bodies, the Department of Trade and Industry has 
indicated that it expects all insurers to comply with the spirit and 
letter of the Statements 174 . 
170R. A. Hasson, op.cit., observed that "The analysis of the 
doctrine [of uberrima fides] is extremely superficial and the proposals 
for its reform timid and confusing". 
171Which became the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
172Schedu1e l(l)(a) disapp1ies ss.2-4 for the purposes of English 
law and s.15(3)(a)(i) disapp1ies ss.16-18 for the purposes of Scots 
law. 
173 The Life Offices Association and the Association of Scottish 
Life Offices (now superseded by the Association of British Insurers). 
174See R. Lewis, "Insurers' Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal 
Rights", 48 MLR (1985) 275. The vast majority of insurers belong to the 
Association of British Insurers which is now the industry association 
for both life and non-life insurers. 
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The Statements remedied, on the basis of self-regulation, several of 
the problems which had been identified over the years; they are 
applicable only to individuals who insure in a private capacity. The 
following provisions of the (1977) Non-Life Statement were particularly 
important: 
Clause 1. Proposal Forms 
(a) The declaration at the foot of the proposal form should be 
restricted to completion according to the proposer's knowledge 
and belief. 
(c) Those matters which insurers have found generally to be 
material will be the subject of clear questions in proposal 
forms. 
This gave effect to the second of the Law Reform Committe's recommenda-
tions (above). However, the 1977 Statement of Practice did not follow 
the Committee's recommendation in respect of the definition of 
"material", opting instead for a formula based on the judgement of the 
insurer. Nevertheless, the introduction of a requirement, in cases of 
repudiation of liability by the insurer, of a causal connection between 
a breach of warranty and a loss went beyond the Committee's recommenda-
tions: 
Clause 2. Claims 
(b) Except where fraud, deception or negligence is involved, an 
insurer will not unreasonably repudiate liability to indemnify 
a policyholder: 
(i) on the grounds of non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a 
material fact where knowledge of the fact would not materially 
have influenced the insurer's judgement in the acceptance or 
assessment of the insurance; 
(ii) on the grounds of a breach of warranty or condition where 
the circumstances of the loss are unconnected with the breach. 
The emergence of self-regulation as the primary means of controlling 
the relationship of the parties to an insurance contract did not escape 
criticism. Professor Gordon Barrie remarked in 1982 175 : 
"I do not think the balance between legal regulation and self-
regulation is right at present because the basic law about disclosure 
175 In an address to the Insurance Institute of London. Extracted 
from Regulation of Insurance in the United Kingdom and Ireland (editors 
T.H. Ellis and J.A. Wiltshire). 
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and warranties is unsatisfactory and only legislation can alter that. 
But there is scope for self-regulation to complement the law because 
there are many matters of good insurance practice that are simply not 
suitable for legal regulation." 
Professor Gower, the architect of the Financial Services Act 1986, 
referring to insurance in his Review of Investor Protection in 1984 
said: 
"There is a growing habit, both in this field and elsewhere for 
regulators, whether governmental regulators or self-regulators, to 
promulgate Codes of Conduct rather than rules or regulations. In the 
course of my preliminary discussions, disquiet has been expressed about 
this practice - a disquiet that I share." 
However, these cri ticisms were to have Ii ttle or no impact on the 
subsequent development of the insurance law reform debate. 
4. The Outcome of the Law Reform Debate 
The industry I s desire for self-regulation was clearly vindicated by the 
acceptance of the Statements of Practice as adequate protection for the 
insured, but the issue of law reform was not dead. The publication of 
the European Commission's draft Insurance Contract Law Directi ve 176 
in 1979 served not only to illustrate the divergence of approach within 
the Community, but also the gap in the United Kingdom between law and 
practice. The draft Directive was referred to the Law Commission, which 
subsequently published its findings in a Command Paper
177
. 
From the outset, the Law Commissiom made clear that it regarded the 
existing law on non-disclosure and breach of warranty as in need of 
reform, and that the Statements of Insurance Practice were not 
adequate: 
"The mischiefs in the present law cannot be cured by voluntary matters 
of self-regulation by the insurance industry such as Statements of 
176 COM (79) 355 as amended by COM (80) 854. 
117 Cmnd. 8064, Insurance Law: Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
(Law Commission Report 104). 
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Insurance Practice. In the absence of effective administratt'y,e control 
of underwriting, reform of the law is therefore required." 18 
However, it was also acknowledged by the Law Commission that the 
proposed Directive would do little or nothing to remedy the defects and 
would freeze the law in the United Kingdom permanently in an unsatis-
factory state179 . The recommendations for law reform were made in the 
knowledge that the future of the draft Directive was uncertain and that 
there was some possibility of any immediate change to the law in the 
United Kingdom being subsequently amended by legislation implementing 
the Directive. 
The key recommendations of the Law Commission were as follows 180 : 
(i) Non-disclosure. The duty of disclosure should be retained but 
modified along the lines suggested by the Fifth Report of the Law 
Reform Committee (i.e. the test of the "reasonable insured"). The 
adoption of special rules for those who apply for insurance as 
consumers was rejected. 
(ii) Proposal forms. The duty to volunteer information in 
addition to answering the questions in the proposal form should 
be retained. The duty would be the same as the duty of disclosure 
when there is no proposal form. 
(iii) Warranties. A term of a contract of insurance should only 
be capable of constituting a warranty if it is material to the 
risk. Where the insured is in breach of warranty the insurer 
should prima facie be entitled to reject claims in respect of 
all losses which occur after the date of the breach. However, 
where the insured shows that the breach was not material to the 
loss, he should be entitled to recover. 
(iv) "Basis of contract" clauses. Such clauses should be 
ineffective for the purposes of the creation of warranties as to 
past or present fact. However, the present law should be allowed 
to remain effective as regards the creation of warranties 
relating to the future ("promissory warranties"). 
(v) Non-fraudulent misrepresentation. The insurer should be 
limited to his rights and remedies for non-disclosure where the 
insured has made an actionable misrepresentation and has by doing 
so acted in breach of the modified duty of disclosure outlined 
in (i) above. 
178 Cmnd . 8064, para, 10.5. 
179 Ibid ., para. 1.21. 
180 Ibid ., part 10. This section paraphrases the recommendations, 
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These recommendations, inter alia, were incorporated into a draft 
Insurance Law Reform Bill, which was subsequently introduced to 
Parliament. However, the bill failed to reach the statute book. Once 
again a solution was reached by means of self-regulation. The 1977 Non-
Life Statement181 was amended to include the following provision in 
respect of "basis of contract" clauses: 
"Neither the proposal form nor the policy shall contain any prOV1S1on 
converting the statements as to past or present fact in the proposal 
form into warranties. But insurers may requifi~ specific warranties 
about matters which are material to the risk." 8 
A similar change was made to the 1977 Life Statement 183 , although 
warranties may still be created through "basis of contract clauses" 
where the warranty relates to a statement of fact concerning the life 
to be assured under a life of another policy. Furthermore, the test of 
"materiality" in clause 2(b) (i) of the 1977 Non-Life Statement was 
changed to that of a reasonable insured, in line with the recommenda-
tion of the Law Commission184 . The latter's recommendation in respect 
of remedies for innocent misrepresentation was also introduced into the 
revised Statements 185 . 
W~th the demise of the Law Reform Bill and the draft Directive, the 
result is that insurance contract law in the United Kingdom applies in 
its entirety only to commercial insurances. The principles set out in 
the early legislation and case-law are far removed from those 
incorporated in the industry's Statements of Practice. In relation to 
policies purchased in a private capacity, the Statements have largely 
181 Its name was also changed to the Statement of General Insurance 
Practice. 
182 This became para.1(b) of the revised Statement. 
183 para . 1 (b) of the revised Statement, now referred to as the 
Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice. 
184A similar amendment was made to the Life Statement of Practice 
(new para. 3). 
185Generally on the revised Statements, see A. Forte, "The revised 
Statements of Insurance Practice: cosmetic change or major surgery?" 
49 MLR (1986) 754. 
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remedied the abuses which arose from the application of the existing 
law. 
However, the heavy reliance placed on self-regulation is open to 
cri ticism on two grounds. The first is that it should not be the 
primary means of regulating economic relationships into which most 
people at some time in their life will enter186 . Contract law should 
provide a framework to govern the rights and obligations of the parties 
to an insurance policy. There is a role for self-regulation in relation 
to the working practices of insurers but not, it is submi tted, in 
matters as fundamental as the law on disclosure and warranties. 
Secondly, self-regulation is not an appropriate mechanism for law 
reform in the context of the Single Market. As was made clear in part 
1 of this chapter, the Statements of Practice give rise to problems in 
situations in which either English or Scots law is the applicable law 
for policyholders resident outside the United Kingdom or for policy-
holders resident in the United Kingdom who purchase insurance on a 
services basis from insurers in other Member States. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Determination of English or Scots Law as the Applicable Law 
The rules governing the determination of the applicable law for 
insurance contracts in the Single Market are to be found primarily in 
the Second Directives which now form part of the law in the United 
Kingdom. However, these rules are to be applied subject to the more 
general rules governing the law applicable to contracts found in the 
Rome Contracts Convention which has also been incorporated in the law 
in the United Kingdom 
Where a policyholder is resident in the United Kingdom, a free choice 
of law will generally be available. Where no choice has been made, the 
applicable law will normally be that of England or Scotland. The 
186 rn the United Kingdom, life assurance often constitutes an 
individual's largest or only means of discretionary saving. 
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Conduct of Business rules in the United Kingdom will apply irrespective 
of any choice of law and policyholders purchasing insurance in a 
pri vate capacity will normally benefit from the Statements of Insurance 
Practice. 
Where a policyholder is not resident in the United Kingdom the 
insurance Directives ensure, in the case of "large" risks, that a free 
choice is available. However, in other cases, the availability of the 
law in the United Kingdom as the applicable law depends on the law of 
the Member State whose law is prima facie the applicable law. A choice 
of English or Scots law will not prejudice the aplication of local 
Conduct of Business Rules and will not allow the the insured to benefit 
from the Statements of Insurance Practice. 
2. Substantive Aspects of the Law in the United Kingdom 
Several considerations should be taken into account when a choice of 
English or Scots law as the applicable law is under consideration. 
First, there are few restrictions on freedom of contract in the United 
Kingdom. The control of contract terms, whether through administrative 
control or mandatory provisions of contract law has been rejected in 
the Uni ted Kingdom. The Framework Directives aim to abolish prior 
approval of contract terms throughout the Communi ty but mandatory 
provisions of contract law will remain in place in other Member States. 
Secondly, a narrow approach towards insurable interest has been 
adopted, at least in English law, although there is no requirement for 
interest at inception for non-life contracts. Thirdly, the test of 
materiality in CTI v Oceanus imposes a heavy duty of disclosure on a 
proposer for commercial insurances. Finally, as regards insurances 
purchased in a private capacity, the Statements of Insurance Practice, 
although not part of the law, considerably strengthen the position of 
the insured. 
There are two areas in which Scots and English law may diverge: 
insurable interest and the test of materiality. As regards insurable 
interest, there are grounds for arguing that Scots law adopts a wider 
definition than does English law. As regards the test of materiality 
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for the purposes of establishing non-disclosure, the test of CTr v 
Oceanus has been neither adopted nor rejected in Scotland, with the 




Conclusions have already been reached in respect of the topics 
discussed in each individual chapter. However, it is now appropriate 
to bring them together so as to reach an overall assessment of the 
treatment of insurance contract law within the Single Market. 
1. Objectives of the Single Market in Insurance 
The creation of the Single Market in insurance is intended to achieve 
two objectives. The first is the operation of a "single licence" which 
enables an insurer authorised in one Member State to do business 
elsewhere in the Community without the need for separate authorisation. 
This involves the Member State in which an insurer has its head office 
assuming reponsibility for the supervision of its entire business. The 
second is that purchasers of insurance in the Communi ty should be 
offered the widest possible choice. This is achieved by improving 
access to national markets through the operation of the "single 
licence" and by prohibi ting the prior approval of policy condi tions and 
premium rates as a condition for authorisation. 
The first objective has met with greater success than the second. 
Whilst the working of the system will no doubt identify scope for 
improvements, the "single licence" system represents an innovative, 
and, in the main, coherent approach towards the regulation of insurance 
business within the Single Market. Two aspects of the "single licence" 
system are particularly important. First, it is de-regulatory in that 
it improves access to national markets and reduces the extent to which 
insurance products are subject to prior approval. Secondly, it leaves 
scope for competition between national regulatory systems by applying 
the principle of mutual recognition to those national laws and 
regulations which have not been harmonised by the insurance Directives. 
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The objective of securing increased choice for consumers has met with 
less success. Two considerations are relevant in this respect. First, 
the Community's system of regulation has not fully addressed issues 
arising in relation to the role of intermediaries who play a crucial 
role in ensuring that a wide choice of products is available to 
consumers. The Court of Justice avoided the issue in the insurance 
cases and the Commission recommendation on intermediaries represents 
a limited and transitional measure. However, as the Single Market in 
insurance becomes a reality, differences in national regulations 
governing the qualifications, status and conduct of intermediaries will 
have to be addressed. Secondly, in contrast to the trend in trade in 
goods, insurers have not, in the main, responded to de-regulation by 
developing products to be sold on a pan-European basis or by selling 
their existing product range in other countries. Instead, attention has 
focused on expansion into other Community countries by way of 
establishment, with products being tailored for each individual market. 
This reflects a variety of influences which lie outside the regulatory 
framework for the Single Market : they include the absence of fiscal 
harmonisation; the need to establish a local presence to service 
business; and differences in insurance practice and consumer preferenc-
es between the different Member States. However, the failure to secure 
increased choice for consumers can also be attributed to the manner in 
which the Community has approached insurance contract law. The failure 
of initial efforts to harmonise insurance contract law led the 
Community to adopt a complex system of rules governing the applicable 
law. The resul t is that insurance contracts purchased wi thin the 
Single Market will be governed by differing provisions of contract law. 
Such differences alter the fundamental nature of insurance contracts 
and also limit the extent to which products lawfully marketed in one 
Member State can be marketed in other Member States. For the reasons 
set out in paragraphs two to four below, consumer choice would be 
better served by a renewed effort to harmonise the essential provisions 
of insurance contract law. 
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2. The Regime for Insurance Contract Law 
Differences in insurance contract law among the Member States give rise 
to several issues which affect the functioning of the Single Market. 
First, there is a need to identify the applicable law in the case of 
services business. Secondly, the impact which differences in contract 
law have on competition should be considered. Thirdly, the extent to 
which national laws safeguard consumer interests is relevant if 
consumers in one Member State are to enter into a contract governed by 
the laws of another Memeber State. Finally, consideration must be given 
to provisions of insurance contract law which contain restrictions 
which are not compatible with the EEC Treaty or the provisions of the 
insurance Directives. 
The solution adopted by the Community addresses only the first of these 
issues. The rules in the insurance Directives are intended to govern 
choice of law, where a choice is allowed, and to identify the 
applicable law where no choice is allowed. In addition to the failure 
to address the broader issues which arise from differences in contract 
law, the provisions of the insurance Directives can be criticised on 
several other grounds. First, the complexity of the rules is likely to 
hinder the development of cross-border insurance business. Many 
policyholders are likely to be unfamiliar with the rules which 
determine whether the applicable law is governed by the Rome Contracts 
Convention, the insurance Directives or national choice-of-law rules. 
Secondly, the rules applicable to insurance differ from those 
applicable to banking, despite the declared objective of the creation 
of a "level playing field" in financial services within the Community. 
Thirdly, in cases where a broker acts for the insured, the choice of 
law rules which apply to the insured/broker relationship differ from 
those applicable to the insurer/insured relationship. 
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3. Differences in Insurance Contract Law 
The Communi ty' s approach to contract law wi thin the Single Market 
programme means that fundamental differences between the Member States 
remain in place. A comparative analysis of the insurance contract laws 
in the Uni ted Kingdom, France and Germany leads to the following 
conclusions: 
(a) There are differences in the overall approach to the regulation of 
insurance contracts. Some Member States, such as France and Germany, 
control contract terms and rates through administrative procedures, 
whilst others, such as the United Kingdom, do not. 
(b) The interaction of the general law controlling the terms of 
contracts with insurance contract law varies between Member States. 
(c) The extent to which provisions of the insurance contract laws of 
individual Member States can be overriden by specific agreement of the 
contracting parties varies. Some Member States, such as the United 
Kingdom, have few mandatory requirements of contract law, whilst 
others, such as France, adopt an approach in which the bulk of their 
contract law is mandatory. The result is that freedom of contract in 
the field of insurance varies significantly throughout the Community 
as a result of differences in contract law. 
(d) There are important differences in the substance of insurance 
contract laws relating to the negotiation of the contract, its 
performance and its termination. 
The effect of these differences is that the rights and duties which 
attach to the insurer/policyholder relationship vary substantially 
according to the law which governs the contract. The regulatory 
framework wi thin which contracts are concluded also differs materially. 
Even with the abolition of prior approval of contract terms and rates 
which will follow implementation of the Framework Directives, 
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administrative controls will remain in place in markets such as France 
and Germany. Moreover, mandatory requirements of contract law have the 
effect of limiting the impact of the abolition of prior approval of 
contract terms as certain contract conditions remain compulsory. 
4. Harmonisation as an alternative to Choice-of-Law Rules 
Harmonisation of insurance contract law should be considered as an 
alternative to the approach adopted by the Community. This would allow 
the broader issues which arise in relation to differences in contract 
law - competition, consumer protection, freedom of contract - to be 
addressed. 
Article lOOA of the EEC Treaty provides an adequate legal basis for a 
harmonisation measure. Differences in insurance contract law can be 
regarded as having an impact on the functioning of the Single Market 
for three reasons. First, they distort competition. Policyholders and 
insurers in different Member States have different rights and 
obligations with the result that purchasers of the same product in 
different Member State's are treated differently. Secondly, they permi t 
divergence in freedom of contract and freedom of choice of law among 
Member States whereas the obejctives of the Single Market Programme are 
to harmonise the regime governing control of policy condi tions and 
choice of law. Finally, differences in insurance contract law allow 
greater reference to the "general good" in order to restrict freedom 
of services than would be possible wi th harmonisation. Moreover, 
harmonisation of insurance contract law would be in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Although it falls into an area of shared 
competence, the scale and effect of such a harmonisation measure 
suggests that Community action is appropriate. 
If the Community reverts to a policy of harmonisation, there are a 
variety of ways in which it could be implemented. The scope of a 
harmonisation Directive could be confined to mandatory provisions of 
contract law or could encompass all fundamental provisions. The 
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harmonisation technique could be based on minimum, optional or uniform 
harmonisation. However, the original approach adopted by the Commission 
(uniform harmonisation of fundamental provisions) would be best suited 
to the objectives of the Single Market even if the original proposals 
for harmonisation are likely to require substantial amendment. 
5. United Kingdom Law in the context of the Single Market 
The rules governing the determination of the applicable law for 
insurance contracts in the Single Market are to be found primarily in 
the Second Directives which now form part of the law in the United 
Kingdom. However, those rules are to be applied subject to the more 
general rules governing the law applicable to contracts found in the 
Rome Contracts Convention which has also been adopted as law in the 
United Kingdom. 
Where a policyholder is resident in the United Kingdom, a free choice 
of law will generally be available. Where no choice has been made, the 
applicable law will normally be that of England or Scotland. The 
Conduct of Business rules in the United Kingdom will apply irrespective 
of any choice of law and policyholders purchasing insurance in a 
private capacity will normally benefit from the Statements of Insurance 
Practice. 
Where a policyholder is not resident in the Uni ted Kingdom the 
insurance Directives ensure, in the case of "large" risks, that a free 
choice is available. However, in other cases, the availability of the 
law in the United Kingdom as the applicable law depends on the law of 
the Member State whose law is prima facie the applicable law. A choice 
of English or Scots law will not prejudice the aplication of local 
Conduct of Business Rules and will not allow the the insured to benefit 
from the Statements of Insurance Practice. 
Several considerations should be taken into account when a choice of 
English or Scots law as the applicable law is under consideration. 
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First, there are few restrictions on freedom of contract in the United 
Kingdom. The control of contract terms, whether through administrative 
control or mandatory provisions of contract law has been rejected in 
the United Kingdom. The Framework Directives aim to abolish prior 
approval of contract terms througout the Communi ty but mandatory 
provisions of contract law will remain in place in other Member States. 
Secondly, a narrow approach towards insurable interest has been 
adopted, at least in English law. Thirdly, the test of materiality in 
CTI v Oceanus imposes a heavy duty of disclosure on a proposer for 
commercial insurances. Finally, as regards insurances purchased in a 
private capacity, the Statements of Insurance Practice, although not 
part of the law, considerably strenghten the position of the insured. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT COMMUNITY MEASURES 
.. 
D.IRECTIVE :$~r~J~qT~»: 
(OJ R:ef.) . :::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::: 
STATUS 
.. - _. · - .... . . . . . - - - -· . - . -- - . -· - . -
64/225 Reinsurance Council Directive of 25.2.1964 on 
the abolition of restrcitions on 
freedom to provide services in 





















Motor Council Directive of 24.4.1972 on In force 
Insurance the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to 
insurance against civil liability 
in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and to the enforcement 
of the obligation to insure 
against such liability. (Referred 
to as the First Motor Directive) 
Direct Non- First Council Directive of In force 
Life Insurance 24.7.1973 on the co-ordination of 
laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions 
relating to the take up and 
pursuit of direct insurance other 
than life assurance. (Referred to 
as the First Non-Life Directive) 
Direct Non- Council Directive of 24.7.1973 In force 




freedom of establishment in the 
business of direct insurance 
other than life assurance. 
Council Directive of 13.12.1976 
on measures to facilitate the 
effective exercise of freedom of 
establishment and freedom to 
provide services in respect of 
activities of insurance agents 
and brokers and, in particular, 
transitional measures in respect 
of those activities. 
Council Directive of 30.5.1978 on 
the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative 




























First Council Directive of 
5.3.1979 on the co-ordination of 
laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of direct 
life assurance. (Referred to as 
the First Life Directive) 
Second Council Directive of 
30.12.1983 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States 
relating to insurance against 
civil liability in respect of the 
use of motor vehicles. (Referred 
to as the Second Motor Insurance 
Directive) 
Second Council Directive of 
22.6.1988 on the co-ordination of 
laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions 
relating to direct insurance 
other than life assurance and 
laying down provisions to 
facilitate the effective exercise 
of freedom to provide services 
and amending Directive 73/239. 
(Referred to as the Second Non-
Life Directive or the Non-Life 
Services Directive) 
Third Council Directive of 
14.5.1990 on the approximation of 












relating to insurance against derogat-
civil liability in respect of the ions 
use of motor vehicles. (Referrred 
to as the Third Motor Directive) 
Council Regulation of 31.5.1991 
on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices 





































Council Directive of 8.11.1990 
amending particularly regarding 
motor vehicle liability 
insurance, Directive 73/239 and 
Directive 88/357 which concern 
the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct 
insurance other than life 
assurance. (Referred to as the 
Motor Services Directive) 
Second Council Directive of 
8.11.1990 on the co-ordination of 
laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions 
relating to direct life 
assurance, laying down provisions 
to facilitate the effective 
exercise of freedom to provide 
services and amending Directive 
79/267. (Referred to as the 
Second Life Directive or the Life 
Services Directive) 
Council Directive of 19.12.1991 
on the annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts of 
insurance undertakings. 
Council Directive of 19.12.1991 
setting up an Insurance 
Committee. 
Commission Recommendation of 
18.12.1991 on insurance 
intermediaries. 
Council Directive of 18.6.1992 on 
the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct 

















assurance and amending Directives ions 
73/239 and 88/357. (Referred to 
as the Third Non-Life "Framework" 
Directive) 
Council Directive of 10.11.1992 
on the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct 
life assurance and amending 
Directives 79/267 and 90/619. 










COM(80) 854 final; 16th December, 1980 
Amendment of the proposal for a Council Directive on the co-ordination 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
insurance contracts. 
(Submitted to the Council by the Commission pursuant to the second 
paragraph of Article 149 of the EEC Treaty) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, and in particular Articles 57(2) and 66 thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament1; 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee2; 
Whereas, pursuant to the Treaty, any discrimination in relation to the 
provision of services which is based on the fact that an undertaking 
is not established in the Member State in which the service is provided 
has been prohibited since the end of the transitional period; whereas 
this prohibition applies to services provided from any establishment 
in the Community, whether it is the head office of an undertaking or 
an agency or branch; 
Whereas the second Council Directive3 of [22nd June 1988] on the co-
ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down 
provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide 
services, granted the parties freedom to choose the law applicable to 
the contract, firstly in the case of risks classified as transport, 
primarily on account of their frequently international character, and 
secondly in the case of certain risks which are defined by precise 
criteria; 
Whereas co-ordination of laws relating to insurance contracts would 
facili tate the provision of services in a Member State by those 
providing them in another Member State; 
Whereas in co-ordinating the laws relating to insurance contracts it 
IMinutes of proceedings of the sitting of 19.9.1980 (PE 66.785, 
p. 27) . 
20J 1980 C146/1. 
3Directive 88/357, OJ 1988 L172/1. The reference to this Directive 
was left blank as it had not been adopted. 
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is necessary to maintain the fairest balance between the interests of 
the insurer on the one hand and the protection of the insured person 
on the other; whereas such co-ordination is likely to facilitate an 
extension of the freedom of choice of the law applicable to the choice 
of the law applicable to the contract; 
Whereas it was considered advisable to exclude from the scope of the 
Directive, marine, aviation and transport insurance because of their 
widely international character and the freedom traditionally allowed 
to the parties in concluding such contracts, and sickness insurance 
which in some cases is operated in a manner similar to life assurance 
and has special technical features; whereas the credit and suretyship 
insurance classes display peculiarities which, pending subsequent co-
ordination, justify not making them subject to the provisions of this 
Directive as they stand; 
Whereas among the problems posed by legislation on insurance contracts 
are the consequences resulting from the conduct of the policyholder 
at the time of the conclusion and in the course of the contract 
concerning the declaration of the risk and of the claim, and wi th 
regard to the measures to be taken in the event of a claim; 
Whereas it is also desirable to co-ordinate the law relating in 
particular to the existence of cover depending on the payment of the 
premium, the duration of the contract, and the position of insured 
persons who are not policyholders; 
Whereas, as regards the problems regulated in this Directive, Member 
States may be authorised to adopt different solutions only where this 
is expressly provided for in the text of the Directive; whereas any 
other approach would call into question the objectives of the 
Directive; whereas, however, there is nothing to prevent the parties 
from derogating from the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive, 
provided that such derogations favour the policyholder, insured person 
or third party; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
The object of this Directive is to co-ordinate the important laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions governing insurance contracts 
covering risks situated in Member States of the Community and relating 
to one of the classes contained in point A of the Annex to Directive 
73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the ~aking-up and4Pur~uit of 
the business of direct insurance other than llfe assurance, wlth the 
exception of the classes contained in points 2 (sickness), 4 (railway 
rolling stock), 5 (aircraft), 6 (ships (sea, lake, river and canal 
vessels)), 7 (goods in transit), 11 (aircraft liability), 12 (li~bility 
for ships (sea, lake and river and canal vessels)), 14 (credlt) and 
15 (suretyship). 
40J 1973, L228/3. 
Article 2 
1. Every insurance contract 







to the issue to the 
least the following 
(a) the name and address of the policyholder; name and registered 
office of the insurer or co-insurers; address of the establishment to 
which the policyholder is to send his declarations and pay the 
premiums; 
(b) the subject matter of the insurance, any exclusions and a 
description of the risks covered; 
(c) the amount insured or the method of calculating it; 
(d) the amount of the premium or contribution or the method of 
calculating it; 
(e) the dates on which premiums or contributions fall due; 
(f) the duration of the contract and the times at which cover commences 
and expires and, where it applies, the time of automatic renewal. 
2. Pending the issue of such a document the policyholder shall be 
entitled to receive, without delay, a document which attests to the 
existence of an insurance contract and contains at least the 
information referred to in paragraph l(a), (b) and (c). 
3. If, after the contract has been concluded, any agreed change occurs 
that affects the information referred to under paragraph l(a) to (f), 
the insurer shall furnish the policy-holder with a document containing 
information as to such change. 
4. If provisional cover is provided, the policyholder shall be entitled 
to receive a document which contains the information that such cover 
has in fact been provided and which contains at least the information 
referred to in paragraph l(a),(b),(c) and (f). 
5. The documents referred to in paragraphs 1,2,3 and 4 shall be drafted 
in the language of the Member State whose law is applica~le according 
to the second Council Directive 88/357 of 22nd June 1988 . 
However, the policyholder shall be entitled to stipulate as a condition 
precedent to the conclusion of the contract that all documents relating 
to the conclusion, amendment and performance of the insurance contract 
be drafted in the language of his habitual residence, provided such 
language is an official language of the Community. 
6. The documents referred to in the above paragraph shall have only a 
probative value. 
5The reference to this Directive was left blank as it had not been 
adopted. 
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7. Notwithstanding the prOV1Slons of this Article, the laws of the 
Member States may authorise a simplified form for insurance contracts 
concluded for a period of less than six months and for bearer policies. 
Article 3 
1. When concluding the contract, the policyholder shall declare to the 
insurer any circumstances of which he ought reasonably to be aware and 
which he ought to expect to influence a prudent insurer's assessment 
or acceptance of the risk. The policyhloder shall not be obliged to 
declare to the insurer circumstances of which the latter is already 
aware because he has already covered the risk. In the case of a 
corporate policyholder, circumstances of which it ought reasonably to 
be aware means circumstances of which the appropriate officer of the 
corporation ought reasonably to have been aware. Any circumstances in 
respect of which the insurer has asked specific questions in writing 
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be regarded as 
influencing the assessment and acceptance of the risk. 
2. (a) If circumstances existing at the time of entering into the 
contract which were unknown to both parties when the contract was 
concluded come to light subsequently, or if the policyholder has failed 
to declare circumstances of which he was aware but which he did not 
expect to influence a prudent insurer's assessment of the risk, the 
insurer or the policyholder shall be entitled, within a period of two 
months from the date on which he becomes aware of the fact, to propose 
an amendment to or termination of the contract. 
- Where one of the parties proposes an amendment to the contract, 
the insurer shall be entitled to a period of fifteen days and the 
policyholder to a period of one month from the date of the 
receipt of the proposal in which to accept or reject it. In the 
event of rejection of the proposal or failure to reply within the 
above time limit, the party proposing the amendment may terminate 
the contract within a period of eight days. 
Termination shall not take effect until a period of fifteen days 
has elapsed from the date on which notice of termination is 
given, as the case may be, to the insurer or to the policyholder 
at his last known address. 
The abovementioned periods shall be extended to three weeks and 
one month where they are to the policyholder's benefit and the 
contract covers a risk which is not connected with a commercial 
or industrial activity of the policyholder. 
_ Where one of the parties proposes that the contract be 
terminated, termination shall not take effect until a period of 
fifteen days has elapsed from the date on which notice of 
termination is given to the insurer or to the policyholder at his 
last known address. 
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- The abovementioned period shall be extended to one month where 
the insurer terminates the contract and the contract covers a 
risk which is not connected with a commercial or industrial 
activity of the policyholder. 
(b) If the contract is terminated, the insurer shall refund to the 
policyholder the proportion of the premium in respect of the period for 
which cover is not provided. 
(c) If a claim arises before the contract is amended or before 
termination of the contract has taken effect, the insurer shall provide 
the agreed cover. 
3.(a) If the policyholder has failed to fulfil the obligation referred 
to in paragraph 1, the insurer may, within two months from the date on 
which he becomes aware of such fact, propose an amendment to the 
contract or terminate it. 
- Where the insurer has proposed an amendment to the contract, 
the policyholder shall be entitled to accept or reject it within 
one month from the date on which he receives the proposal for an 
amendment. If the policyholder refuses the proposal or fails to 
reply, the insurer may terminate the contract within eight days. 
Termination shall not take effect until a period of fifteen days 
has elapsed from the date on which the poicyholder is notified 
thereof at his last known address. 
- Where the insurer terminates the contract, termination shall 
take effect fifteen days after the date on which the policyholder 
is notified thereof at his last known address. 
(b) If the contract is terminated, the insurer shall refund to the 
policyholder the proportion of the premium in respect of the period for 
which cover is not provided. 
(c) I f a claim arises before the contract is amended or before 
termination of the contract has taken effect, the insurer shall pay the 
policyholder a proportion of the compensation which would have been 
payable had the policyholder not failed to fulfil his obligations under 
paragraph 1 equal to the ratio between the agreed premium and the 
premium which a prudent insurer would have fixed if the policyholder 
had fulfilled his obligations under paragraph 1. However, if the 
insurer can show that no prudent insurer would have accepted the risk 
regardless of the rate of premium if he had been aware of the 
circumstances which the policyholder should have disclosed, or if the 
insurer can show that a prudent insurer would not have accepted the 
risk unless certain conditions were complied with, he shall not be 
bound to pay any claim. 
4.(a) If the policyholder has failed to fulfil the obligation referred 
to in paragraph 1 with the intention of deceiving the insurer, the 
latter may terminate the contract within two months from the date on 
which he becomes aware of such fact. 
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(b) By way of damages, premiums shall be retained by the insurer who 
shall be entitled to the payment of all premiums due, without prejudice 
to the payment of damages in respect of any additional losses he has 
incurred by reason of the intention to deceive. 
(c) The insurer shall not be liable in respect of any claim. 
5. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, the burden of proof 
of failure to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 or of 
intention to deceive on the part of the policyholder shall rest on the 
insurer. 
Article 4 
1. From the time when the contract is concluded, the policyholder shall 
declare to the insurer any new circumstances or change in circumstance 
of which the insurer has requested notification in the contract. Such 
declaration shall be made not later than the time when the risk 
increases where this is attributable to an intentional act of the 
policyholder; in all other cases, it must be made immediately the 
policyholder becomes aware of the increase. 
2. The insurer may, within two months of the date on which he became 
aware of the increase of risk, propose an amendment to or terminate the 
contract in accordance with the provisions covering such circumstances 
set out in Article 3(2). 
3. If the policyholder has failed to fulfil the obligation 
in paragraph 1, such failure to give notice shall not give 
sanction where it relates to a new circumstance or 
circumstances which is liable neither to increase the risk 
or permanently nor lead to an increase in the premium. 
referred to 
rise to any 
change in 
appreciably 
4. If the policyhlder has failed to fulfil the obligation referred to 
in paragraph 1, the insurer may, within two months of the date on which 
he becomes aware of such fact, propose an amendment to the contract or 
terminate it in the manner provided for in Article 3(3). However, in 
respect of the application of the proportionali ty provided for in 
Article 3(3)(c) account shall be taken only of the portion of premium 
corresponding to the period subsequent to the increase. 
5.(a) If the policyholder has failed to fulfil the obligation referred 
to in paragraph 1, with the intention of deceiving the insurer, the 
latter may terminate the contract within two months from the date on 
which he becomes aware of such fact. 
(b) By way of damages, any premiums paid shall be retained by the 
insurer who shall be enti tIed to the payment of all premiums due 
without prejudice to the payment of damages in respect of any 
addi tional losses he has incurred by reason of the intention to 
deceive. 
(c) The insurer shall not be liable in respect of any claim arising 
after the increase of the risk. 
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6. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, the burden of proof 
of failure to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 or of 
intention to deceive on the part of the policyholder shall rest on the 
insurer. 
7. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to circumstances 
which form the subject of an express exclusion of cover in the 
contract. 
Article 5 
If, while the contract is in force, the risk has diminished appreciably 
and permanently because of circumstances other than those covered by 
the contract the policyholder may ask for the premium to be reduced. 
The policyholder shall be entitled to terminate the contract without 
compensation if the insurer does not consent to reduce the premium 
proportionately. 
The right to terminate the contract shall arise immediately the insurer 
refuses to reduce the premium or, where he fails to reply to the 
policyholder's proposals, after a period of fifteen days following such 
proposal. 
Where the contract is terminated, the insurer shall refund to the 
policyholder a proportion of the premium corresponding to the period 
for which cover is not provided, less the administrative costs 
involved. 
Article 6 
Failure to pay a premium or part thereof shall be penalized only after 
a period of grace of at least fifteen days has elapsed from the date 
on which the policyholder is notified, in writing and after the date 
on which payment is due, of the penalty. 
This provision shall not apply to any failure to pay the first premium 
or the single premium of an annual contract where the contract or the 
law provides that commencement of cover shall be condi tional upon 
payment of such premium. 
Article 7 
1. If a claim arises, the policyholder shall take all reasonable steps 
to avoid or reduce the consequences. In particular, instructions from 
the insurer or compliance with specific provisions on this point 
contained in the contract shall be considered reasonable. 
2. Any costs incurred by the policyholder in performing the obligation 
referred to in paragarph 1 shall be borne by the insurer. 
Notwithstanding this, where the policyholder carries on a commercial 
or industrial activity and the contract covers a risk connected with 
such activity, they shall be defrayed only in so far as, when combined 
with the amount of the damage suffered, they do not exceed the sum 
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insured. 
3. If the insurer is required, under the contract, to pay in respect 
of only part of the loss, he shall be obliged to refund only a 
proportion of the costs referred to in the preceding paragraph unless 
the policyholder acted on his instructions. 
4. If the policyholder fails to comply with the provision laid down in 
paragraph 1, and may be considered to have acted improperly, the 
insurer may claim compensation for the loss which he has suffered. 
5. If the insurer proves that the policyholder's failure to fulfil the 
obligation laid down in parargraph 1 was intended to cause him loss or 
to deceive him, he shall be released from all liability to make payment 
in respect of the claim. 
Article 8 
1. If a claim arises or if an event occurs which may result in a claim 
arising, the poicyholder shall declare it to the insurer in accordance 
with the conditions and time limits laid down in the policy. The time 
limit must be reasonable. Such time limit may be fixed by national laws 
for certain classes of insurance. 
2. The insurer may require 
necessary information and 
consequences of the claim. 
the policyholder to provide all 
documents on the circumstances 
the 
and 
3. If the policyholder fails to fulfil the obligations referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, and may be considered to have acted improperly, the 
insurer shall be entitled to claim compensation for the loss he has 
suffered. 
4. If the insurer proves that the policyholder's failure to fulfil one 
of the obligations laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 was intended to 
cause him loss or to deceive him, he shall be released from all 
liability to make payment in respect of the claim. 
Article 9 
Any unjustified payment made by the parties pursuant to the foregoing 
Articles shall be refunded. 
Article 10 
1. The circumstances and conditions in which the contract may be 
denounced or terminated shall be set out in the contract ei ther 
directly or by reference to the law applicable to the contract. 
2. The contract may be terminated without notice only where one of the 
parties has failed to fulfil one of its obligations with the inten~ion 
of deceiving the other. The poicyholder may also be granted a rlght 
under national law to terminate the contract without notice in other 
circumstances. 
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3. Without prejudice to the circumstances referred to in paragraph 2: 
(a) Save where the parties have agreed to a shorter period in the 
case of war, insurrection or civil war, premature termination on 
the part of the policyholder or the insurer shall not take effect 
until a period of fifteen days has elapsed from the date on which 
notice of termination is given, as the case may be, to the 
insurer or to the policyholder at his last known address. 
(b) If provision is made in the contract for automatic renewal, 
such renewal shall take effect in each case for a period not 
exceeding one year, unless one of the parties gives notice of 
termination at least two months before the date of expiry of the 
current insurance period. 
(c) If the contract is for a period of more than three years, the 
poicyholder may terminate it at the end of the third year or of 
any subsequent year by giving at least two months' notice, 
provided that the premiums were not agreed for a fixed period. 
Article 11 
If the insured person is not the policyholder, he shall have the same 
rights against the insurer as Article 8(2) grants to the policyholder. 
He shall be treated in the same way as the latter for the purposes of 
Articles 3(1), 4(1), 8(1) and 9(1) and (2) as regards the obligations 
referred to in those Articles where he has knowledge of the contract 
and is able to fulfil such obligations6. 
Article 12 
The parties to the contract may agree on more favourable terms for the 
policyholder, insured person or injured third party than are provided 
for in this Directive. 
Article 13 
Member States shall bring into force the measures necessary to comply 
with this Directive before 1 July 1983. They shall inform the 
Commission thereof immediately. 
Article 14 
After notification of this Directive, Member States shall ensure that 
the Commission is informed, in sufficient time for it to submit its 
comments, of any new laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
which they intend to adopt. They shall also inform the other Member 
States thereof. 
6The references are reproduced as they appear in the (amended) 
draft Directive. However, following re-arrangement of the Articles, the 
reference to Article 8(1) should be to Article 7(1) and the reference 
to Articles 9(1) and (2) should be to Articles 8(1) and (2). 
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Article 15 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
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